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  Integrated water management is a wicked public policy problem with no clear 
path to resolution. This dissertation is an in-depth qualitative comparative analysis of two 
collaborative governance processes created to tackle complex water problems in New 
Zealand and Oregon, U.S.A. Both cases convened a wide range of state and non-state 
actors in efforts to find common ground, build consensus for change, and develop 
innovative water policy solutions.  
 The goal of this comparative case study analysis is to gain a better understanding 
of collaborative network governance frameworks as applied to integrated water 
management and primary factors for success. The proposition posits that collaborative 
networks involving public, private, and non-profit actors are better equipped than 
government-driven efforts to develop desired outcomes. To test this proposition, the 
research questions probe the role of state and non-state policy actors, conditions for 
collaboration, strength of actor ties, development of trust and social capital, barriers to 
success, and the role of climate change as a policy driver in these two case studies.  
 The comparative case study analysis yields fascinating insights that add to the 
network governance literature. In the New Zealand case, a collaborative-led process 
called the Land and Water Forum (LAWF) showed that this ongoing network offers 
benefits to creating consensus on complex water issues. LAWF succeeded in moving 
policy conversations forward where previous government-led efforts had failed. Within 
the LAWF collaborative network, non-state actors formed strong ties; however, 
relationships with state actors exhibited weaker ties. 
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  With Oregon’s integrated water policy, a collaborative network approach created 
a more conducive environment for meaningful dialogue among vested interests, and built 
some levels of interdependency and trust, thus generating a wider array of policy options 
than through previous legislative and bureaucratic efforts. However, long-standing 
political, legal, and institutional challenges continue to constrain effective integrated 
water management and the delivery of integrated outcomes in Oregon. The Oregon case 
did not exhibit strong leadership within the collaborative to broker challenging policy 
issues. Also, it faced implementation challenges as one state agency was given 
responsibility for stewarding integrated water management but lacked authority for 
implementation or coordination with other state agencies. Overcoming fragmented 
natural resource governance arrangements remains a daunting challenge.   
  This research revealed three key findings: 1. in both cases, collaborative network 
governance worked well for framing and designing new integrated water policies, but 
encountered implementation challenges; 2. managing the complexities around the 
intersection of top-down, vertical command and control governance with horizontal 
collaborative approaches remains an ongoing challenge to New Public Governance; and 
3. the two cases represent examples of the use of formal and informal processes for 
policy development. The benefits of collaborative governance for policy development are 
substantial, and the limitations appear to be obstacles to overcome and not fatal flaws. 
The main challenge lies in transitioning from policy and planning to applying changes on 
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 I have been captivated with rivers and their landscapes since I was a young girl. 
In college, I pursued biology because of my love of science, but soon gravitated toward 
studying physical geography with an emphasis on hydrology and geomorphology 
processes. Once I entered the professional world, I realized that I needed a more practical 
application of my field to be employable and went on to pursue a Master’s Degree in 
environmental planning with a focus on water resources management. Through that 
course of study, I was introduced to the concept of integrated watershed management, a 
process which promotes the coordinated management of water (water quality and 
quantity, surface and groundwater) and land. This holistic water management perspective 
was considered an innovative and radical approach in the 1980s. Fortunately, when I 
moved to Oregon in the early 1990s, political leaders had recognized the importance of 
taking a holistic approach to watershed management, and I found gainful employment as 
a watershed coordinator and planner. Since that time, I have been fortunate to be actively 
engaged in Oregon water governance, watershed management, and policy development 
through my professional experience and 12-year tenure in the Oregon legislature.  
 Although water management has been my primary personal and career focus, 
more recently I began following the work of the International Panel on Climate Change 
and became acutely aware of the profound impacts of climate change on water resources, 
especially in the Western United States. During my 24-year tenure in the West, I have 
witnessed diminishing snowpacks, higher than average temperatures, increasing 
wildfires, and greater frequency and intensity of droughts. The potential impacts of 
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climate change appear inexorable. This sparked my interest in learning how our existing 
water governance regimes are equipped to respond to increasing issues around scarcity 
and climate variability. 
  My interest in this Ph.D.study comes from my own experiences in developing and 
implementing water management plans and policies at the local, regional, and sub-
national levels. By working on water policy in Oregon, I learned first-hand about the 
challenges of initiating changes to an outdated water management regime. Through that 
process, I began exploring integrated water governance models globally and learned 
about New Zealand’s integrated approach to freshwater management, including the 
reform process currently underway. In 2016, I conducted my research in New Zealand as 
an Ian Axford Policy Fellow under the New Zealand Fulbright Program. As part that 
program, I observed and interacted with government officials, interested parties, Māori 
(indigenous peoples of New Zealand), citizens, academics, scientists, and others engaged 
in integrated water management and collaborative governance. Through my research and 
findings around network and collaborative governance, I aim to provide insights for both 
policy makers and practitioners seeking tools for meaningful integrated water governance 






CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“Many of the wars this century were about oil, but those of the next  
century will be over water.”  
--World Bank Vice President, Dr Ismail Serageldin, 1995 
 
   One of today’s most compelling environmental issues concerns management of 
the world’s freshwater resources. Competing demands for limited water supplies, 
including population growth, land use changes, agricultural intensification, and climate 
change, have placed additional pressures on existing water resources. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and others warn that climate change 
will have extensive impacts on water resources, and that new governance and 
management tools are needed to ensure optimal water management. The 2008 IPPC 
report, Climate Change and Water, identified that current water management practices 
may not be robust enough to cope with the impacts of climate change on water supply 
reliability, flood risk, health, agriculture, energy, and aquatic ecosystems (IPCC, 2008). 
 Water resource management is often delivered through a top-down governance 
model that is ill-equipped to respond nimbly to changing conditions. Water governance 
typically focuses on managing either water quantity or water quality, often through 
separate delivery mechanisms by disparate agencies, thus creating a fragmented approach 
that fails to manage water in an integrated manner. This outdated governance structure 
has fallen short in optimizing existing supplies by failing to protect or improve water 
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quality and avoid over-allocation,
1
 often resulting in political conflicts, inefficient use, 
and inequitable distribution and impacts. In addition, past water governance models have 
relied on a vertical, top-down technical management approach that engages a sphere of 
limited voices via the “iron triangle” model (Heclo, 1978), leaving out key viewpoints, 
especially those of non-state actors. The term iron triangle refers to the alignment of 
interests and actions among three key actors in public policy making: regulated industry 
or other special interests, legislative oversight committees, and the regulatory agency, 
which often results in regulatory policies that tend to protect or promote the regulated 
industry (Heclo, 1978). I posit that collaborative, networked governance models are more 
appropriate for managing water in an integrated manner. Thus, I propose that there is a 
need to transition from a top-down, hierarchical, command and control approach to a 
horizontal, collaborative policy development framework.  
 In public policy terms, water resource management, where scarcity and 
competing demands for limited resources increasingly dominate, presents a “wicked” 
public problem. Wicked problems are problems of such scale, persistency, and 
complexity as to defy solution by a single scale of governance (e.g., national or local 
government level) or mode (hierarchies, markets, or collaboration) (Russell, Frame, and 
Lennox, 2011). Due to its complexity, interconnectedness, and fragmented systems, 
water governance can be characterised characterized as a wicked policy problem.  
                                                 
1 Over-allocation of water rights refers to a situation where the rights granted to use water exceed the 




 U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that, “water is a classic common 
property resource. No one really owns the problem. Therefore, no one really owns the 
solution” (U.N. General Assembly Address, February 6, 2008). He went on to say 
“international cooperation is crucial to overcoming the problem, calling for governments, 
business and civil society to form new and innovative partnerships” (U.N. General 
Assembly Address, February 6, 2008). In Oregon, we, too, face a wicked public policy 
problem when it comes to managing our water resources in an integrated and sustainable 
manner. As a state, we are struggling to overcome historic fragmentation of our water 
governance and management systems that have evolved over time. Water governance is 
delivered across agencies, districts, and utilities through a patchwork of uncoordinated 
and overlapping laws, policies, and rules. This fragmentation has resulted in government 
failures to manage water effectively and efficiently. To adapt U.N. Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon’s expression, no one entity in Oregon really owns the problem, as 
responsibility is divided among multiple actors. Therefore, no one really owns the 
solution. 
  To illustrate the complex and interdisciplinary nature of water, listed below is a 
sample of the principal expectations placed upon Oregon’s current water management 
framework: 
 protecting human health by ensuring potable and safe drinking water  
 improving water quality by minimizing both point and non-point source pollution 
and enforcing water quality standards balancing multiple demands for limited 
water supplies (e.g., irrigation, municipal, industrial, recreation, ecosystems, 
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fisheries, tribal, and hydropower) including resolving over-allocation of water 
rights 
 protecting and restoring wetlands, estuaries, and coastal areas  
 managing groundwater and replenishing oversubscribed aquifers  
 managing stormwater 
 ensuring adequate data to make informed decisions  
 balancing economic and ecological needs  
 meeting future water demands for both in-stream and out-of-stream uses 
 minimizing the impacts of land use practices (i.e., urban development, forestry, 
agriculture)  on waterways  
 regulating dams and ensuring flow for fish and hydropower  
 managing water through a fragmented governance system with divided authority 
(i.e., myriad of federal and state natural resource agencies, state and local boards 
and commissions, regional and local water/wastewater utilities, irrigation and 
flood control districts, etc.) 
 managing water at various spatial scales (i.e., national, state, regional, local)  
 managing water in an interdisciplinary manner. 
 Balancing these competing demands in an effective and resilient manner given 
increasing pressures from population growth, climate variability, and scarcity presents a 
daunting challenge. In addition, disputes have escalated in recent years between 
stakeholders that want to consume water (e.g., farmers, municipalities) and stakeholders 
that want to conserve water in-stream (e.g., environmentalists, recreationalists). Trade-
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offs between economic (e.g., consumptive out-of-stream uses for irrigation, industry, 
drinking water) and environmental uses (e.g., in-stream uses for fish, wildlife, water 
quality, and recreation) are inescapable. Furthermore, legislative or legal efforts to 
resolve water problems often end in a zero-sum game scenario, creating winners and 
losers. Hence, the problem of managing water resources in a sustainable, effective and 
transparent manner highlights the challenges facing policy makers and water resource 
managers.   
  Oregon is not unique in having an antiquated, patchwork water governance 
system. Managing water resources in a holistic, integrated manner is more the exception 
than the norm. Under most water frameworks, water resources are subject to a top-down, 
command and control
2
 approach administered through bureaucratic government silos. 
This often leads to a fragmented and uncoordinated governance arrangement, ill-
equipped to respond to increasing pressures from population growth, land use 
intensification, over-allocation, and climate variability. Existing water governance 
arrangements fall short in protecting water quality and optimizing existing supplies, 
resulting in political conflicts, inefficient uses, and inequitable distribution. 
  To promote more effective management of limited water resources, policy makers 
have recently recognized the strong need for an integrated approach to address challenges 
created by the silo effects of existing management regimes. This approach, known as 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), stresses the importance of integrated 
                                                 
2
 Command and control policy refers to environmental policy that relies on regulation as opposed to 




and participatory management practices, instead of command and control, and considers 
multiple viewpoints on how water should be managed (Medema, McIntosh, and Jeffrey, 
2008). IWRM considers the interconnectedness of water resources (quality and quantity, 
surface water and groundwater), the interactions between land and water, and the 
interrelationships with cultural, environmental, social and economic uses of water. 
(IWRM concepts are presented in more detail in Chapter 2, Literature Review.) 
Research Rationale   
  This research contributes to governance theory by examing how government 
institutions are adapting water management regimes to deal with wicked policy issues. 
Through this study, I review two collaborative water governance models at national and 
subnational levels in order to assess how successful these institutional arrangements
3
 are 
in delivering an integrated approach to water management. I compare water governance 
in New Zealand and the State of Oregon, USA. Both systems are premised on an IWRM 
approach but with different legal and governance frameworks. The aim of this research 
was to gain a better understanding of how water governance is adapting to address issues 
such as scarcity due to climate change. 
 Before embarking on the comparative case study analysis, it is important to 
underscore the different institutional and cultural factors underlying these two case 
studies, and recognize that these differences affect integrated water management 
                                                 
3 Throughout this report I refer to the term institutions using the following meaning: “institutions consist of 
cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to 
behaviour. Institutions are transported by various carriers -- culture, structures and routines -- and they 




governance. These different institutional factors will not be a matter of this investigation; 
however, I will return to these differences in the concluding chapters. It is also important 
to note that this study investigates water management at two different levels of 
government: at the national level in New Zealand and at the sub-national level in 
Oregon.The New Zealand case study focuses on collaborative network structure at the 
central government level whereas the Oregon case study is focused on a state 
collaboration network at the sub-national level.  
  New Zealand operates under a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary 
system of government. The central government provides overarching policy guidance, 
whereas regional councils, organized around catchments, develop and implement 
regionally-based freshwater policies and plans. In contrast, the United States operates 
under a federalist system, a concept derived from the U.S. Constitution, and represents a 
power sharing arrangement between federal and state governments. The federal 
government has certain powers; however, powers not specifically assigned to the federal 
government are delegated to the states. Each U.S. state works within a national context, 
but each state supports a distinctive water governance system based on its own culture, 
history, and political institutions. Oregon is a populist state, and this focus helped define 
the state’s political history and culture around direct democracy and citizen involvement 
in policy boards and commissions associated with natural resource agencies. Historically, 
Oregon’s state agencies involved in natural resource and environmental management 
evolved along traditional resource allocation, management and regulatory lines creating 
fragmented institutional arrangements. This disjointed water governance structure is still 
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in place today and creates challenges for delivering integrated water management in 
Oregon.  
Theoretical Basis for Research  
  The primary theoretical basis for this research is to build upon the work of the 
New Public Governance (NPG) movement, which focuses on network and collaborative 
theories. NPG emphasizes trust- and legitimacy-building characteristics of public 
governance, which include: (1) being value-centered, with a focus on promoting the 
larger common good; (2) emphasizing the creation of government processes that facilitate 
long-lasting and implementable agreements among wide-ranging stakeholders; and (3) 
creating a public good through co-production that involves public, private, and non-profit 
sectors (Morgan and Cook, 2014, pp. 5-6). Using the NPG as a starting frame, I research 
the role of these NPG principals in governance as it relates to water management, and 
examine whether new factors emerge as parameters for success.  
  In this research project, I explore the role of network and collaborative theory in 
integrated water governance and management. This research studies whether a mixed 
form of administrative authority (horizontal and vertical relationships) offered through 
networks are better suited than historic top-down governance approaches to water 
resource management. In addition, I investigate how collaborative network processes 
have influenced the framing and development of integrated water policies. 
  Through this research and findings, I aim to provide insights for both policy 
makers and practitioners seeking tools for meaningful water planning and governance. 
Researching innovative and collaborative governance approaches will help inform 
decision-makers as they tackle issues such as scarcity due to climate change. My research 
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goals are to gain a better understanding of network governance frameworks as applied to 
integrated water management, including the key defining elements, necessary conditions 
for collaboration, and primary factors for success.  
Dissertation Overview 
  My dissertation contains seven chapters. Chapter 1 details a personal statement 
and introduction to my research subject, collaborative network governance and 
integrated water management. Chapter 2 provides a critical review of existing 
literature related to policy domains most relevant to my research: integrated water 
management and governance, network governance, collaborative water governance, and 
new public governance. Chapter 3 outlines the research design and methods including 
the research questions and proposition at risk, research philosophies, data collection,  
data analysis and validation methods, and potential research limitations. Chapter  4 
presents a comprehensive case study analysis of New Zealand’s freshwater reforms, 
including a review of background information and chronological history, governance 
institutions and policy frameworks, interview results and data analysis, and key themes 
in comparison to network governance theoretical constructs. Chapter 5 provides parallel 
information for the Oregon case study analyzing development of an Integrated Water 
Resources Strategy. In Chapter 6, an analysis and discussion of the research study 
findings, including an in-depth comparative examination between the two case studies is 
presented. This chapter also addresses to what extent the research findings answer the 
research questions, and how these findings relate back to the literature. Chapter 7 outlines 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
  This chapter provides a critical review of existing literature related to the primary 
area of study and focuses on the following policy domains: integrated water management 
and water governance, network governance, collaborative governance, and new public 
governance. Rather than providing a broad review of water law and policy, I focus on 
governance of water systems. A practical review of water law and policy for each case 
study is provided in Chapters 4 and 5. The literature review first defines terms relevant to 
the subject matter, then identifies important theoretical frameworks associated with each 
policy domain, and finally, covers literature that specifically relates to each domain.  
2.1 Integrated Water Resources Management and Water Governance  
 Traditional governance structures have changed in response to increasingly 
complex challenges, the dynamic nature of intergovernmental relations, trends toward 
deregulation, and political pressures for a limited and less intrusive government. Water 
resources management, where scarcity and competing demands for limited resources 
increasingly dominate, presents a wicked public problem that has outgrown the siloed, 
vertical approach grounded in hierarchical authority. Governing water resources through 
vertical, top-down methods has resulted in a fragmented approach that is ill equipped to 
respond to increasing pressures due to competing demands, over appropriation, 
population growth, land use impacts, and climate change.  
  To promote more effective management of limited water resources, policy makers 
both in the U.S. and internationally have recognized the need for a new public 
management construct addressing challenges created by boundary problems (i.e., 
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working across jurisdictional and organizational boundaries) and silo effects. This 
approach, known as Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), emphasizes 
collaboration and cooperation instead of command and control, and recognizes the 
interconnectedness of water resources, resource managers, stakeholders, and resource 
decisions in promoting comprehensive planning and management (USACE, 2010).  
 First, it is important to distinguish between the terms “water management” and 
“water governance,” as these terms are used throughout the research. The term “water 
management” refers to “operational activities including the operation, monitoring, 
strategic planning, and implementation of measures,” whereas the term “water 
governance” comprises “the rules under which a management system operates and the 
different actors and networks that help develop and implement water policies” (Pahl-
Wostl, 2009, p. 1).  
  Water governance refers to the process through which government and non-
government actors and citizens interact to produce rules, practices, and behaviors through 
which water is managed and outcomes are achieved. More specifically, water governance 
can be described as: 
 deciding who gets what water, when, and how 
 
 a range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that         
are in place to develop and manage water 
 
 determining the delivery of water services at different levels of society  
 





 The Global Water Partnership defines water governance as “the range of political 
social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to regulate development 
and management of water resources and provisions of water services at different levels of 
society” (Rogers & Hall, 2003, p. 88). Water governance is a set of collective actions 
aimed towards a common goal and coordinated among diverse stakeholder groups 
(Lubell & Fulton, 2008). Wiek and Larson (2012) suggest that water governance is 
“explicitly distinguished, on the one hand side, from government activities, and on the 
other hand side, from management activities (e.g., by water utilities), both of which 
indicate activities of specific actor groups and goals” (p. 3156).  
 IWRM represents a management framework that was developed to deal with 
water complexity and improve natural resource management outcomes (Medema, 
McIntosh, & Jeffrey, 2008). IWRM’s origins can be traced back to the first UNESCO 
International Conference on Water in 1977 and the early works of Carl Walters (Walters 
and Hilborn, 1978). Coined as a tool for an “integrationist agenda” (Medema et al., 
2008), IWRM promotes the integrated and coordinated management of water and land as 
a way of balancing resource protection while meeting social and ecological needs and 
promoting economic development (Odendaal, 2002).  
 Following from that early UNESCO work, the Dublin principles were formulated 
through an international consultative process culminating in the 1992 International 
Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin. The principles to promote changes 
in those concepts and practices that are considered fundamental to improved water 
resources management (Global Water Partnership, 2000). The four Dublin principles are: 
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1) fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, 
development and the environment;  
2) water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, 
involving users, planners and policymakers at all levels;  
3) women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of 
water; and  
4) water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as 
an economic good (Global Water Partnership, 2000, pp. 13-14). 
These Dublin principles contributed to the Agenda 21 recommendations (included 
in Agenda 21 Chapter 18 on freshwater resources) adopted at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, 1992. Since 
then, these principles (referred to as the Dublin-Rio principles) have found universal 
support amongst the international community as the guiding principles underpinning 
IWRM (Global Water Partnership, 2000, p 14). 
  IWRM was endorsed by the Global Water Partnership (GWP) as: “a process 
which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related 
resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable 
manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (GWP, technical 
advisory committee report 2000, p. 22). IWRM emphasizes the following principles: 
 that water is a public good or common pool resource (as articulated by Garret 
Hardin in “The Tragedy of the Commons,” which describes the problem of 
collectively managing shared resources (Hardin, 1968) 
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 the need to create a government process that facilitates agreement among wide-
ranging stakeholders 
 the designation of water as public good involving public, private, and non-profit 
sectors. 
The key goal of IWRM is to promote integration and coordination as a means of 
achieving more holistic water management and improving the sustainable use of water 
resources. Similar to the concept of sustainability, IWRM involves a continuous process 
of balancing objectives and making trade-offs in an informed manner rather than an end 
state to be achieved (Medema et al., 2008). The IWRM approach is promoted as a more 
efficient, equitable, and sustainable tool for managing water resources and for coping 
with conflicting demands. For policy-making and planning, taking an IWRM approach 
requires that: 
 water development and management takes into account the various uses of water 
and the range of people’s water needs; 
 planning be integrated across spatial and temporal scales and disciplines; 
 stakeholders (those responsible for and affected by management intervention) are 
given a voice in water planning and management; 
 policies and priorities consider water resource implications, including the two-
way relationship between macroeconomic policies and water development and 
management; 
  water planning and strategies are incorporated into broader social, economic, and 
environmental goals (Global Water Partnership, 2004). 
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  IWRM also recognizes the value of local knowledge and collaborative learning in 
influencing decision making (Durette & Barcham, 2009). Scientific knowledge plays a 
large role in IWRM; however, local community and indigenous knowledge can help fill 
the gaps in scientific knowledge used in freshwater management (Durette & Barcham, 
2009). Successful implementation relies on three components: 
1) enabling legislation and a policy environment that sets up and empowers effective 
mechanisms for multi-stakeholder cross-sectoral dialogues at the country, 
regional, and local level; 
2) an appropriate institutional framework composed of a mixture of local, river-
basin-specific, and public-private organizations that provide the governance 
arrangements for administering; and 
3)  a set of management instruments for gathering data and information, assessing 
resource levels and needs, and allocating resources for use (GWP-TAC, 2004). 
  There is general recognition among practitioners and scholars that IWRM was 
spurred by the need for a paradigm shift in water management and governance because of 
climate change, variability, and growing uncertainty (Pahl-Wostl, 2007). Dealing with 
extremes in water management is not new, especially in the Western United States. In the 
past, technical infrastructure approaches were employed to address water variability 
issues; however, as Pahl-Wostl, (2007) observes, limits on the ability to control water 
variability by technical means created a need for adaptive management approaches such 
as IWRM. Government institutions utilizing an iron triangle mentality are not prepared to 
deliver innovative approaches or engage broadly with stakeholders. An integrated 
approach shifts the discourse from speaking of government to governance (Pahl-Wostl, 
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Holtz, Kastens, & Knieper, 2010), which is where many different institutions contribute 
to water policy development and implementation. This integrated model is characterized 
as polycentric, with horizontal and vertical interplay that involves both state and non-
state actors. 
  Critics of IWRM suggest that many barriers to success exist between the theory 
and practice of IWRM. Barriers include the ambiguity of definitions (Odendaal, 2002; 
Varis et al., 2006) and the lack of prescription for effective implementation (Medema et 
al., 2008). For example, integrated water resources management is not universally 
defined, and therefore lacks a common understanding among water policy actors, 
managers, and decision makers. Biwass and Kirpich (2004) raise the issue of institutional 
barriers and questions whether a single water management framework can be universally 
expedient across different physical, economic, social, cultural, and legal conditions. For 
example, overlapping governance, fragmented regulatory frameworks, legal constraints, 
or cultural issues may act as institutional barriers to a more integrated approach to water 
resources management.  
  Scholars have raised questions about the effectiveness of the cross-sector, 
multiple stakeholder approach given challenges such as ambiguous boundaries and 
complex links; difficulties with objectives, alternatives, and consequences; pervasive 
uncertainty; and multiple stakeholder conflict (Ohlson, 1999). Regarding capacity, 
Koudstaal, Rijsberman, and Savenije (1992) recognized that effective water governance 
is necessary for the successful implementation of IWRM plans. Whereas, Medema et al. 
(2008) assert that implementation challenges may preclude IWRM from serving as a 
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useful tool unless strong underlying political, institutional, governance, and financial 
arrangements are present.  
According to a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) report on collaborative 
water governance (2010), the goal of IWRM is to manage water sustainably, which 
involves balancing objectives, coordination, and holistic management. Recognizing that 
water management must balance multiple objectives of different interests, the rationale 
for the IWRM approach has been accepted internationally as a more efficient, equitable, 
and sustainable management tool for managing water resources and for coping with 
conflicting demands (UNEP, 2009). Under the IWRM process, local stakeholders from 
all water use sectors are encouraged to participate. Finally, holistic management 
recognizes the interconnectedness of land and water, surface water and groundwater, 
water quantity and water quality, freshwater and coastal waters, and rivers and the 
broader watershed (USACE, 2010). 
 Recent literature on water management and governance frameworks identifies the 
need for a more integrated and holistic approach to water management due to increasing 
global uncertainties about water. Cortner and Moote (1994) observed that traditional 
water management regimes have focused on sustained yield of water supplies 
(predictable amounts of water) and are ill equipped to deal with emerging problems and 
uncertainties due to scarcity. They expressed the need for a new water paradigm that 
included two principles, including ecosystem management and collaborative decision-
making. Gleick (2003) provides a characterization of the changes needed in water 
management approaches as a “soft path” approach. This implies a shift from the 
engineering-focus of building new water infrastructure to meet demands to “soft 
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measures” such as pricing that involve changes to institutional mechanisms and new tools 
for allocation.   
 Mitchell (2005) characterizes IWRM as a holistic approach that attempts to work 
against the silo effect of existing water management programs that exhibit both vertical 
and horizontal fragmentation. He speaks to the need for devising mechanisms or 
processes that address the difficulties created by institutional boundary issues. In order to 
ensure legitimacy, he asserts that the process must be conceived, developed, and 
implemented with connection to statutory basis, meaning grounded in law (Mitchell, 
2005). 
  Integrated and holistic water management approaches, like IWRM, are one 
avenue for addressing the complexity posed by climate and global change. Pahl-Wostl 
contributes extensively to the water governance literature. The author posits that 
traditional water management interventions that focus on water resource optimization 
using supply side solutions (e.g., building new storage) are no longer adequate to address 
changing global conditions (Pahl-Wostl, 2007). The author explains that historic 
approaches to solving complex water problems that utilize technical fixes are reaching 
their limits and a new water management paradigm is needed. Transition from a top-
down, command and control water governance model to a horizontal, integrated, and 
polycentric approach with broad stakeholder involvement is warranted (Pahl-Wostl, 
2007). The author suggests that a shift is occurring from a scientific management 
paradigm to one of collaborative governance to address complex water problems. This 
transition from technically-based management towards a more integrated approach 
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typically involves a wide range of actors representing diverse interests and perspectives 
(Pahl-Wostl, 2015). 
Pahl-Wostl (2009) developed a management and transition framework for 
addressing the dynamics and adaptive capacity of resource governance regimes as multi-
level learning processes. In developing this framework, the author considered the 
influence of formal and informal institutions, the role of state and non-state actors, the 
nature of multi-level interactions, and the relative importance of bureaucratic hierarchies, 
markets, and networks. Pahl-Wostl (2009) tested this framework by reviewing 29 cases in 
Europe. Insights from these water governance studies suggest that the structural 
constraints from command and control governance arrangements and an iron triangle 
mentality are inadequate for dealing with uncertainties due to climate and global changes 
(Pahl-Wostl, 2009).  
  Broader stakeholder participation can help reduce uncertainties in policy 
implementation by bringing different perspectives and sources of knowledge to facilitate 
innovative solutions to water problems. The literature emphasizes that an important 
condition for improving performance is striving for more decentralized and polycentric 
governance structures. Pahl-Wostl , Lebel, Knieper, and Nikitina (2012) characterized 
IWRM as a “bold step forward in the direction to embrace complexity” which allows for 
the integrated and coordinated management of water and land (p. 25).  
 Medema et al. (2008) provide an extensive review of IWRM history, 
development, and efficacy. The authors compare IWRM to the concept of sustainability. 
IWRM promotes coordination and integration as a means of achieving more holistic 
water management and improving water resources’ sustainability (Medema et al., 2008). 
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Similar to the concept of sustainability, IWRM involves a continuous process of 
balancing and making trade-offs between goals in an informed manner rather than 
positing an end state to be reached (Medema et al., 2008). The authors caution that 
IWRM is primarily concerned with reform of water governance arrangements; however, 
effective water policy changes may require some degree of institutional reform (Medema 
et al., 2008). 
 Ludwig, Van Slobbe, and Cofino (2014) present a historical framework for the 
IWRM approach and explain that the process was introduced to better optimize water 
uses between diverse water-demanding sectors. However, since IWRM was introduced, 
water systems have become more complicated due to changes in the global water cycle 
from climate change. The realization that climate change will have a significant impact 
on water availability and flood risks has driven research and policy-making 
adaptation. Ludwig et al. (2014) assert that water problems are best understood as a 
product of human constructs and, in order to achieve success, planners and decision 
makers must consider alternative framings by different actors. Underlying norms and 
values are often not included in the planning and decision making process, thus posing 
challenges for public acceptance. The authors conclude that the IWRM model needs 
updating in order to effectively address uncertainties (Ludwig et al., 2014).  
  Olmstead (2014) conducted a comprehensive literature review on the role of 
water management institutions in addressing climate adaptation, with particular attention 
to economic impacts. As water tends to be managed at the local and regional scale, 
Omsted warns that national or sub-national institutional adaptations may or may not be 
ultimately adopted and implemented at the local or regional scale. The issue of 
 21 
 
appropriate scale is one that will be explored as part of the case study research.  
  In summary, several dominant themes emerge from the literature on IWRM and 
water governance. The literature speaks to the challenge of command and control 
approaches to water governance and suggests it is an inadequate method to respond to 
growing pressures on water resources. Scholars assert that historically, water resource 
management focused on technical solutions to well-defined problems; however, 
contemporary problems require a transformation of water management principles and 
policies to deal ever-growing and changing water resource challenges. The literature 
identifies a crisis of governance rather than of technical management of water, thus the 
need for a paradigm shift in water governance (Pahl-Wostl, Jeffrey, Isendahl, & 
Brugnach, 2011). Gaps in the literature exist around detailed case studies assessing 
integrated water management network governance. This research and case study analysis 
will attempt to address this gap in policy research. 
2.2 Network Governance  
  The role of collaborative network governance in integrated water management is 
a central focus of this dissertation along with exploration of tensions around the 
intersection of vertical and horizontal processes. This section includes definitions of the 
terms used to describe networks, presents prominent network theories, and reviews 
important contributions to the network governance theory policy domain.   
  A network is defined as “a set of goal-oriented interdependent actors that come 
together to produce a collective output (tangible or intangible) that no one actor could 
produce on his or her own” (Keast, Mandell, & Agranoff, 2014, p. 16). Public sector 
networks are defined as “structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations, 
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or part thereof, where one is not merely the subordinate of others in some hierarchical 
arrangement” (Keast et al., 2014, p. 16). Both of these definitions are relevant for this 
research.  
  Network theory represents the first attempt to move beyond depictions of 
networks as a simplistic model of threads and nets (Keast et al., 2014). A key point of 
differentiation is that network theory “emphasizes relationships between actors rather 
than individual characteristics” (Keast et al., 2014, p. 17). It is grounded in the work of 
Moreno and Jennings, (1934), who introduced the “socio-gram” that depicts individuals 
as a set of nodes connected by lines in order to diagrammatically isolate relations among 
people and guide interventions (Keast et al., 2014, p. 17). Several decades after Moreno, 
Cartwright, and Harary (1956) connected social network theory with mathematics and 
graph theory, giving rise to a structured approach that remains current today (Keast et al., 
2014, p. 18). An important aspect that differentiates network theory from other theories is 
the emphasis on the relationships between actors rather than on their individual 
characteristics. Social network theory posits that the position of the actors, and the type 
and nature of their relationship with other network actors, determines the outcomes 
(Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Kilduff and Tsai, 2003). 
  Several theorists have focused their efforts on network theory development and 
research on network management and performance. Most notably, Agranoff, and 
McGuire (2003), McGuire (2002), Mandell (1994), Meier and O’Toole (2001, 2005), and 
Koliba, Meek, and Zia (2011) have made significant advances in the field by explaining 
the differences between conventional management and network management (Keast et 
al., 2014). Around the same time, new theories about the role of networks in governance 
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began emerging. Networks were likened to a new form of governance “arising in 
situations where hierarchical forms of command and control were no longer the most 
effective methods for policy development or implementation” (Keast et al., 2014, p. 22). 
This signified a shift from top-down government to governance by self-organizing 
interorganizational networks (Rhodes, 1997, p. 35). Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan (1997) 
defined governance networks as “more or less stable patterns of social relations between 
interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or policy 
programmes” (p. 6). Koppenjan and Klijn (2000, 2004) have made significant 
contributions in theorizing the role of networks actors and managers in shaping the 
conditions and context for effective network performance.   
  Powell (1990) was an early researcher of governance networks and conducted an 
in-depth comparative analysis of networks, markets, and hierarchical governance 
structures. He asserts that networks are more suited to entities involved in an “intricate 
latticework of collaborative ventures with other firms” (Powell, 1990, p. 303). Powell 
posits that “hierarchies are reliable and thus are suited to transactions that involve 
uncertainty, recur frequently, and require substantial transaction-specific investments” 
(Powell, 1990, p. 303). Markets, however, are suited to exchanges that are 
straightforward, non-repetitive, and require no transaction-specific investments. Powell 
observes that network organizations are more social than markets and hierarchies; they 
are dependent on relationships, mutual interests, and reputation. Some networks are less 
guided by a formal structure of authority and successful networks involve 
“complementarity and accommodation” (Powell, 1990, p. 304). Reputation, friendship, 
interdependence, and altruism are integral parts of the relationship (Powell, 1990). The 
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author emphasizes that the most useful information comes from parties with pre-existing 
relationships and trust, rather than from the formal chain of command (Powell, 1990). 
  Network governance is emerging where hierarchical forms of control are no 
longer an effective method for policy development (Keast et al., 2014). Shifting from top-
down governance to self-organizing interorganizational arrangements, networks provide 
a way to tackle complex problems in a multi-dimensional and flexible manner (Keast et 
al., 2014). The two main conceptualizations of networks, as suggested by Keast et al. 
(2014) are 1. interorganizational networks of independent organizations that come 
together for the purpose of advancing their own organizational goals (due to the self-
interest focus, these arrangements are mostly about cooperation and coordination); and 2. 
networks based on “interpersonal relationships, trust, mutuality and reciprocity with 
defining collaborative outcomes that move towards a more transformational network 
where new systems are created” (p. 8).  
 Koliba et al. (2011) provide an important theoretical and empirical foundation for 
network governance theory in their book, Governance Networks in Public Administration 
and Public Policy. The authors define governance networks as, “interorganizational 
networks comprised of multiple actors, often spanning sectors and scale, working 
together to influence the creation, implementation, and monitoring of public policies” 
(Koliba et al., 2011 p. xxv). Networks often involve actors, who relate to each other 
through a variety of ties, often with competing interests and priorities (Koliba et al., 
2011). The authors present a conceptual framework of network governance and detail the 
skills and functions of public administrators in the context of networked relationships. 
They also present the theoretical foundations to analyze governance networks. Finally, 
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Koliba et al. (2011) identify reforms and trends that led to governance networks, explain 
the roles that various actors take on through networked relationships, highlight the 
challenges involved in the failure of networked activities, and illustrate how policy tools 
are mobilized by these relationships.  
  Several key theoretical constructs outlined by Koliba et al. (2011) are relevant to 
this research. First, networks offer an approach to governance that can navigate 
complexity and address wicked public problems such as integrated water management to 
produce effective results. Second, networks provide a new framework for determining 
how government interacts with for-profits and NGOs to design and deliver public goods 
and services. Third, networks are aimed at coordinating strategies of actors with different 
goals and preferences, and often include a mixed form of administrative authority that 
involves both vertical and horizontal elements. Finally, Koliba et al. (2011) propose a 
conceptual framework for effective governance networks that engages all forms of public 
administration including command and control, competition, concession and 
compromise, collaboration, and cooperation.  
  This research study focuses on networks that are “designed to influence the 
framing of public problems and derivation of policy solutions” (Koliba et al., 2011, p. 
23). The authors refer to this type of network as “interest group coalitions” which are 
“interorganizational networks of organized interest groups, advocacy organizations and 
collective interest groups” (Koliba et al., 2011, p. 23). The coalitions coordinate action to 
“influence the framing of public problems, the design and selection of policies, or the 
evaluation of policy implementation” rather than implementation or service delivery 
(Koliba et al., 2011, p. 23). In order to lend legitimacy, however, networks need to be 
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democratically anchored (Koliba et al., 2011). Other elements of success include a high 
level of trust between network actors, strong ties within the network to assure 
accountability and performance, and the creation of social capital (Koliba et al., 2011). 
  Sorensen and Torfing (2005) posit that “governance networks are democratically 
anchored to the extent that they are properly linked to different political constituencies 
and to a relevant set of democratic norms that are part of the democratic ethos of society” 
(p. 201) The authors define democratic anchorage as comprising a combination of control 
by democratically elected politicians that are: 
 controlled by democratically elected politicians; 
 accountable to the territorially defined citizenry; 
 representative of the membership based on the participating groups and  
organizations; and 
 following democratic rules specified by a particular grammar of conduct.  
Regarding the role of social capital in networks, Putnam’s (1993) research centers 
on political arrangements of networks and asserts that social capital, as embodied in 
horizontal networks of civic engagement, bolsters the performance of the polity and 
economy. Social capital, as defined by Putnam (1993, p. 167), “refers to features of social 
organization, such as trust norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated actions.” He emphasizes that “voluntary cooperation is 
easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock of social capital, in the form 
of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement” (Putnam, 1993, p. 167). 
Social capital also refers to the bonds formed between actors in networks and allows for 
the development of human knowledge (Koliba et al., 2011). 
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 Scholars note that implementation challenges can occur under network 
government approaches. In a vertical governance model, state actors establish the rules 
and determine when and how they are to be enforced whereas, under a horizontal model, 
governance is more diffuse (Cooper, 2003). Cooperation is not based on the legal 
authority paradigm, but relies on collaborative management based on information rather 
than authority (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). State actors may perceive this type of 
governance as a hindrance if they no longer control all aspects of policy development or 
implementation. Under network governance, their authority to govern could be 
diminished or their ability to get the job done compromised. Conversely, their ability to 
deliver results may be enhanced by the additional resources brought to the table by the 
various network partners.    
In summary, several different schools of thought have evolved around network 
governance theory. The existing literature provides important insights to various 
frameworks; however, gaps exist around what role networks play in water governance 
and what factors influence their effectiveness.   
2.3 Collaborative Governance  
  Building on the previous discussion about network governance theory, 
collaborative networks are formed to deal with very complex problems that no single 
organization, agency, or group can deal with independently (Keast et al., 2014). 
Participants recognize that the current mechanisms are no longer working and new, 
innovative solutions that transcend information sharing and coordination are needed 
(Keast et al., 2007).  
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  The literature on collaboration highlights several common characteristics. First, 
collaboration involves a wide range of stakeholders representing a cross-section of 
organizations, interest groups, and people with a stake in the outcome (Healey, 1997; 
Innes & Booher, 1999). Second, collaboration engages the participants in an intensive 
and creative process of consensus building (Gray, 1989; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000), 
which leads to more creative solutions and increased likelihood of acceptance (Innes & 
Booher, 1999; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Weber 2003). Third, collaboration works 
to achieve consensus on problems, goals, and proposed actions (Innes & Booher, 1999; 
Sommarstrom, 1999; Weber 2003; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). Finally, collaboration 
requires a sustained commitment to problem solving (Gray 1989; Selin and Chavez, 
1995; Weber, 2003).  
Collaborative networks are formed to deal with complex problems that no one 
organization or group can solve on its own. They represent a unique type of network 
model that exhibits “complex reciprocal interdependencies and closer, denser 
relationships in which participants are engaging in system changes” (Keast et al., 2014, p. 
34). Participants recognize that the current mechanisms are no longer working and new 
innovative solutions that transcend information sharing and coordination are needed 
(Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Under a collaborative network, members are engaged 
in activities that go beyond making changes at the margins to creating “new collective 
value” by reframing the problem and developing alternatives that may not have been 
generated through existing interactions (Innes & Booher, 1999, p. 15).  
  Keast et al. (2014) developed a composite theory of leadership management in 
collaborative networks. This composite theoretical model centers on concepts of process 
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catalyst and strategic leveraging. The term “process catalyst” describes a new type of 
leadership that places greater value and emphasis on creating an environment for building 
strong relationships and securing a commitment to common goals rather than on 
achieving tasks (Keast et al., 2014). Strategic leveraging recognizes the worth of each 
participant and the importance of interactions among them (Keast et al., 2014). Most 
importantly, relationships must also be “mobilized, managed, and leveraged to secure 
value” (Keast et al., 2014, p. 227-228). 
  Benham et al. (2014) focus on factors for success in collaborative water 
governance frameworks. The authors lay out a theoretical frame for successful 
collaborative governance while utilizing the IWRM model. This includes the importance 
of building social capital and network linkages to effectively accomplish watershed 
activities. Benham et al. (2014) also research the effect of exogenous factors (i.e., 
historical, geographical, political and economic factors) on relationship development in 
collaborative IWRM planning. Their research shows that contextual factors must be taken 
into account if natural resource managers are to design collaborative processes that 
strengthen governance networks and improve water resources management outcomes. 
Kemmis (1992) describes the need for collaborative community and public life in 
the rural West. He laments the frontier mentality of rugged individualism that runs 
counter to public life (referring to community responsibility) and trust in government 
institutions. Kemmis espouses that, without connection to the public thing or res publica 
(p. 6), the success of place-based water resources management efforts is challenging. He 
describes a collaborative, grassroots approach, exemplified in local and regional 
watershed groups in which stakeholders coalesce around a shared responsibility for a 
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“public thing.” As people learn to relate to each other in a different way, they discover a 
new competency and an unexpected capacity to get things done. “Only cooperative acts 
of the affected community can solve a problem, which is consistent with the concept of 
citizenship or “polis” that requires taking responsibility within a shared space, creating 
the possibilities for a shared inhabitation” (Kemmis, 1992, p. 118). This is in stark 
contrast to relying on government actors to resolve watershed management issues. 
Kemmis concludes that a strong sense of civic capacity, community buy-in, and support 
are key factors to lasting success for place-based water governance.    
2.4 Collaborative Watershed Movement 
One of the most important efforts to integrate water management is the creation of 
locally-based watershed councils. Beginning in the 1980s, locally organized, 
collaborative, non-regulatory groups began forming to improve watershed conditions in 
their local area. In Oregon, these groups have focused on restoring water quality, 
recovering native fish populations, and improving land management practices within 
their local watersheds. In 1999, the Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board (OWEB) was 
created to disperse grant funding and oversee watershed restoration efforts and has been a 
key institutional step forward towards integrating water management efforts. Although 
OWEB is not directly involved in managing water resources, it provides significant 
funding, and thus has a role to play in influencing the water planning process (Amos, 
2009, p. 107). Described below are constructs around watershed-scale management that 
are relevant to this area of research. 
 Cortner and Moote (1999) advocate for a decentralized and participatory society 
organized around local ecological conditions. The authors raise the issue of appropriate 
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geographic scale for ecosystems management and observe that, “the watershed is a more 
tenable unit of analysis because it is geographically recognizable and its boundaries can 
be used as a basis for organizing participation and governance institutions” (Cortner & 
Moote, 1999, p. 46). The premise that decentralization, local control, and flexible 
management are the key to solving environmental problems underscores the watershed 
council approach.  
 In Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches to Watershed Management, 
Sabatier et al. (2005) focus on collaborative approaches to watershed management that 
have dominated the landscape in recent years. The authors describe how water resource 
management has shifted away from top-down government agency-directed decision 
making to a more collaborative approach of negotiation and problem solving. 
Collaborative governance approaches are particularly important for the integrated 
management of water resources, which often span jurisdictional boundaries and are 
managed by multiple organizations.  
The research and report findings outlined in Swimming Upstream make a 
significant contribution to the literature on water resources and governance in two ways. 
First, the study presents a fairly broad and elaborate conceptual framework for 
understanding collaborative watershed management. Second, the study analyzes a variety 
of collaborative watershed planning projects at the local and regional scale, using 
qualitative and quantitative mechanisms (Sabatier et al., 2005). The authors’ framework 
for watershed management purports that one consequence of collaborative watershed 
management is change in the civic community of a particular watershed. They look at a 
variety of projects across the United States exploring issues of trust and legitimacy to test 
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their hypothesis and present both normative and positive theoretical frameworks. This 
work contributed significantly to a broader understanding of collaborative water 
management mechanisms. 
 The National Policy Consensus Center (NPCC), located at Portland State 
University’s Hatfield School of Government, advances the use of collaborative 
governance methods through innovative services, research, and education. As part of 
their research efforts, two published reports around collaborative watershed efforts are 
relevant to this research. The first report, Watershed Solutions: Collaborative Problem 
Solving for States and Communities (Marsh, 2002) is an outcome from a colloquium 
NPCC hosted for practitioners involved in watershed collaborations. It identifies lessons 
learned from successful watershed initiatives and develops recommendations to state 
officials on ways to enhance the use and effectiveness of watershed partnerships. The 
report identifies watershed collaboration best practices, identifies lessons learned and 
barriers to success, and provides recommendations directed at state-level actors. 
  Another NPCC report of particular relevance to this research is Factors of 
Successful Collaboration: Oregon’s Watershed Councils as Collaborative Systems 
(Doherty, 2015). This research developed a construct for collaborative systems and tested 
it through application to Oregon’s watershed councils. The author conducted an extensive 
literature review and summarized the benefits and challenges of collaborative processes 
at the watershed scale. In addition, based on her research findings, the author provides 
recommendations for enhancing collaborative performance among watershed councils 
(Doherty, 2015). This research provides important insights into factors for successful 
collaborations at the watershed scale.  
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2.5 New Public Governance 
  The final area of literature reviews centers around a public administration 
framework known as New Public Governance (NPG). New Public Governance is one of 
two movements responding to questions about government’s capacity as the primary 
actor to solve society’s problems (Morgan & Cook, 2014). Launched in the 1980s, the 
first movement, called New Public Management (NPM), utilizes the business or market 
model for the basis for measuring government success. Under the second movement, 
New Public Governance, the importance of applying a collaborative approach to 
providing public services is emphasized through partnerships with public, private and 
non-profit actors (Morgan & Cook, 2014). NPG strongly builds upon governance 
network theory and developed as a response to shortcomings of New Public Management 
(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012). 
 New Public Governance emphasizes trust and legitimacy-building characteristics 
of public governance; it is value centered and emphasizes that the goal of government is 
to promote the larger common good (Morgan & Cook, 2014). Second, NPG underscores 
creation of government processes that facilitate agreements among diverse stakeholders. 
Under NPG, politics is viewed as the “politically mediated expression of collectively 
determined preference that the citizenry deems valuable” (Morgan & Cook, 2014, p. 5). 
Third, NPG facilitates the creation of a public good as a “co-production process involving 
the public, private and nonprofit sectors” (Morgan & Cook, 2014, p. 6). Under the NPG 
framework, non-state actors are more invested in shared ownership of a public good than 
under top-down governance models. This creates opportunities to build capacity and civic 
infrastructure in a more holistic way.  
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   Representing a shift from governance through vertical structures of authority to 
working with horizontal structures, NPG offers a framework for identifying and 
reconciling conflicting values that dominate discussion under water policy development 
and governance. NPG emphasizes civic engagement and the role of engaging citizen and 
volunteer organizations to temper interest group conflicts and ideological differences 
(Morgan and Cook, 2014). (See Table 2.1 for key features of NPG framework.) However, 
many questions remain about what factors contribute to the success of “shared-power” 
arrangements under a NPG framework.     
   Some authors suggest that governance network theory has sparked ideas and 
management practices that have resulted in the rise of NPG. By building upon 
governance network theory, NPG has the potential to deal with the “complexities, 
interdependencies and dynamics of public problem solving and service delivery, which 
NPM failed to address” (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012, p 2). NPG may not replace 
hierarchical forms of government or network government arrangements created under 
NPM, but rather evolve into a hybrid arrangement combining these theoretical constructs 




Table 2.1 Characteristics of  New Public Governance (Morgan and Cook, 2014) 
 
 Theoretical basis: Institutional, network, theory of agency 
 Concept of state: plural and pluralistic 
 Management focus: values that are coproduced by networks and partners 
 Leadership actions: interest-based conflict resolution 
 Leadership scope: forging collective horizontal leadership 
 Leadership archetype: strategic leadership  
 Leadership results: agreement on actions  
 Value orientation: limited explicit value conflicts 
 Value arbitration: networks and relational contracts 
 System orientation: mini-centric: external focus 
 Performance unit of analysis: conflict resolution 
 
2. 6 Summary 
In summary, several different schools of thought have evolved around network 
governance theory. The existing literature provides important insights to various 
governance networks models; however, gaps exist around what role networks play in 
water governance. The research builds upon these existing constructs by examining two 
cases of integrated water governance. The aim is to gain a better understanding of the 
governance network dynamics in water resources policy development and governance.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
3.1 Introduction   
  This research study utilized case study and comparative analysis methods to gain 
a better understanding of collaborative, network governance approaches to integrated 
water resource management. I choose a comparative case study methodology to gain 
insights into and explain real-life situations in integrated water management. Through 
this study, I reviewed two collaborative water governance cases (New Zealand and the 
State of Oregon, USA) in order to assess how successful these institutional arrangements 
were in delivering an integrated approach to water management. Both cases were 
premised on an IWRM approach but with different legal and institutional frameworks. 
The practical goal for conducting this research was to gain a better understanding of 
network governance frameworks as applied to integrated water management. The 
intellectual goal was to gain insight into what was happening in these two integrated 
water case studies and why. By understanding the key defining elements, necessary 
conditions for collaboration, institutional barriers, and the primary factors for success, I 
aimed to expand knowledge about governance arrangements that can deliver integrated 
water management.  
  Working from the literature and the researcher’s personal experience and 
knowledge on water policy issues, this study focused on the following seven research 
questions: 
1. How are the different governance networks structured and how are their 
boundaries determined?   
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2. How do the collaborative processes work, and what role do state and non-state 
actors play in setting water policies in New Zealand and Oregon?  
3. What functions do they carry out? How are the networks governed, and how are 
policies developed in the collaborative?   
4. How are these networks held accountable? To what extent are the networks 
democratically anchored? 
5. How fully are surface water and groundwater, water quality and quantity, and 
land use integrated in management systems under New Zealand and Oregon 
governance structures?  
6. What are the legal, political, and institutional barriers affecting water 
governance in New Zealand and Oregon? 
7. How do issues such as climate change and water scarcity influence approaches to 
water management?  
3.2 Proposition at Risk 
  Based on a review of relevant literature, personal experience, pre-research 
discussion, and related theoretical reasoning, I developed the following hypothesis for 
testing: I posit that the historic approaches to water governance approaches are 
inadequate to address wicked water problems, and thus collaborative networks 
involving public, private, and non-profit actors are better equipped to develop effective 
and durable outcomes. This involves a shift from a top-down, vertical command and 
control governance approach to a shared governance network that employs horizontal 
ties with partner organizations and interest groups.  
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 3.3 Case Study Methodology  
  I selected the case study approach for the following two reasons. First, this 
approach is pertinent when research addresses a descriptive or explanatory question such 
as “how or why did something happen.” Second, it allows the researcher to cover 
contextual conditions and gain a better understanding and explanation of real-life 
situations (Maxwell, 2013, p. 97). Maxwell (2013) explains that the case study 
methodology serves to “elucidate processes, meanings, and contextual influences in 
particular cases” (p. 97). Furthermore, case studies provide a picture of “very complex 
interactions between interdependent actors with divergent interests and perceptions about 
desirable solutions” (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012, p 6). 
  According to Yin (2003), case study research “is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13). It is also 
appropriate “when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being asked about a contemporary set 
of events, over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin, 2003, p. 9). Thus, I 
utilized the case study methodology to gain an in-depth understanding and develop 
insightful explanations of real-life situations that may not arise using other research 
methods.   
  The study consisted of a multiple-case design with the case serving as the unit of 
analysis. As Yin (2003) points out, the multiple-case design is more challenging to 
implement; however, the ensuing data can provide greater confidence in the findings. The 
search for appropriate case studies began with a review of the best practices landscape 
around collaborative network governance and integrated water management. This 
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included a review of the literature and conference proceedings, current journals, 
discussions with academic peers, and discussions with academic advisors. The aim was to 
examine case studies in collaborative network governance using the analytical lens of 
network theories to unpack factors for success. 
3.4 Case Selection 
  Two case studies were selected in New Zealand and Oregon, USA, that utilized 
IWRM principles, had comparable timeframes for adoption, and had similar geographic 
scales. Another key factor in the case study selection process was a practical one for the 
researcher -- I considered studying institutions where I had established contacts and 
access to information, and where government officials and other parties had expressed an 
interest in participating in case study research.  
 For the first case, I spent nine months in New Zealand, as a Fulbright Fellow, 
studying and researching their freshwater policy reforms. Traditional water management 
efforts in New Zealand were aimed at protecting water quality and managing water 
quantity through regional-level basin planning efforts. This research focused on 
reviewing the extensive work of a national level, independent-led group, called the Land 
and Water Forum, which had convened specifically to revisit New Zealand’s existing 
water management framework and propose new water management policies that were 
“fair, efficient, and accountable” (Land and Water Forum Report, 2012a).  
  To gain a better understanding of the institutional arrangements and key decision-
making drivers for integrated water management in New Zealand, this research focused 
on 1. documenting the collaborative, network national-level planning process led by the 
Land and Water Forum; 2. researching how the collaborative governance decision 
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making process unfolded in New Zealand at both the national and regional scale; and 3. 
examining what counts for success in these governance networks.  
  The second case involved the study of Oregon’s Integrated Water Resources 
Strategy (Strategy), a collaborative framework for developing a state water blueprint. As 
a former Oregon legislator, I had been directly involved in the development of the 
enabling legislation for the Strategy and the early years of policy development. The 
Strategy assessed the state of existing water resources management in Oregon, along with 
the impact of present and future demands on those resources.   
3.5 Case Study Design     
  The first step in designing an effective case study involved developing a research 
design or plan. Research design is the logic that links the data to be collected, and the 
conclusions to be drawn to the initial questions of study (Yin, 2003). Every empirical 
study has an implicit, if not explicit, research design or articulating “theory” (Yin, 2003, 
p. 19). Yin’s guidance on how to conduct case studies helped frame this research. I 
utilized Yin’s (2003) five components of research design including (1) a study’s 
questions, (2) a study’s propositions, (3) a study’s unit of analysis, (4) the logic linking 
the data to the propositions, and (5) the criteria for interpreting findings (p. 21).  
 Defining these five research design components served as an essential step for 
constructing preliminary theoretical concepts related to this research. Yin explains that 
the role of theory development prior to collecting data is a major difference between case 
studies and other related research methods such as ethnography and grounded theory. 
These methods typically avoid outlining theoretical propositions at the outset of an 
inquiry (Yin, 2003). In conducting these case studies, the choice of theory aided in 
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defining the appropriate research design and data collection methods (Yin, 2003). 
  In order to ensure the quality of the research findings, I utilized the following four 
tests as outlined by Yin (2003):  
  1. Construct validity establishes the correct operational measures for the concepts 
being studied. Yin (2003) recommends applying multiple sources of evidence, keeping 
clear chains of evidence to connect the data with the concepts being scrutinized, and 
asking key informants to review case study analysis and findings. I employed all of these 
concepts to ensure construct validity. I relied on multiple sources of data to check the 
veracity of facts, and interviewed people with a range of perspectives to ensure that I was 
capturing events from different vantage points. The chain of evidence was comprised of 
case-organized field notebooks and databases that compiled information from multiple 
data sources to detail chronological histories, record meeting notes, and document my 
observations and reflections for each case study. Finally, I asked two key informants 
from each case to review draft dissertation sections for accuracy.  
  2. Internal validity refers to the accuracy of the causal relationships in each of 
these case studies. Do study findings make sense and are they credible? In order to 
promote internal validity, I employed the following methods as suggested by Miles and 
Huberman (1994). First, I utilized context-rich meaningful descriptions of the case by 
gathering evidence through semi-structured interviews. This provided a richer description 
and a greater contextual understanding than available through other data sources such as 
document and archival reviews or personal observation. Next, I employed triangulation 
of complementary methods and data sources to ensure converging lines of evidence. In 
addition, I sought rival explanations to test the validity of my findings and explore areas 
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of uncertainty. Finally, I asked key informants to check the accuracy of the research 
conclusions and to ensure that the findings were internally coherent. 
  3. External validity references the domain to which a study’s findings can be 
generalized. Yin (2003) discusses two types of generalizability: A) statistical 
generalizability draws inferences from the sampling data to a population; whereas B) 
analytical generalizability compares the case study findings to an established theory. This 
research focused on the latter, and Yin (2003) recommends using at least two case studies 
to show analytical generalizability. Specifically, the case study research tested the 
application of collaborative and network theories under two different cases. Qualitative 
data provided an in-depth understanding of collaborative and network theoretical 
processes in each case. Although use of only two case studies limits the explanatory 
potential of this research, trade-offs occur when including more cases. A multi-case 
analysis may have offered a greater range of collaborative network examples, but the 
opportunity to collect detailed and rich qualitative data would be more limited.  
 In order to promote external validity of the research findings, I employed several 
strategies. First, I provided ample ‘thick descriptions’ for readers to assess the potential 
transferability or appropriateness for their own setting (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Second, I also attempted to describe the narrative sequences (antecedents, settings, 
histories) in a transparent manner so others could clearly understand the unfolding of 
events and causalities. Third, this research suggests settings where the theoretical 
findings could be fruitfully tested further in a case-to-case transfer. 
 4. Reliability pertains to whether the study process is consistent and can be 
repeated by other researchers with similar results. I employed a number of procedures to 
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assure reliability and dependability of this research. First, I made sure that the research 
questions were understandable and that the study design features were congruent with the 
questions. Second, I engaged in a data collection process across a full range of 
appropriate settings, times, and respondents (to ensure a variety of perspectives). Third, a 
database was developed for each case study that included relevant documents, field notes 
of observations and reflections, memos, audio transcripts, and meeting notes to allow for 
other researchers to replicate study research procedures and assess case study findings. 
Fourth, data quality checks were used to address potential researcher bias (described in 
more detail later in this chapter) and informant reliability. Finally, I employed peer 
review of the coding process for each case study to check the dependability of coding 
results.   
  The next step in conducting the case study research involved preparing for data 
collection. Factors for success included prior research skills of the researcher, training 
and preparation for the specific case study, development of the case study protocol, and 
conducting a pilot case study (Yin, 2003). The case study protocol contained the 
following information: 
 an overview of the case study project (project objectives, case study issues, 
relevant readings) 
 field procedures (credentials and access to case study sites, sources of  
information, procedural reminders) 
 case study questions (specific questions to consider when collecting data, 
sources  of information) 
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 case study guide (outline, narrative format, documentation of information) 
(Yin, 2003, p. 70). 
 The heart of the protocol was the case study research questions reflecting the 
actual area of inquiry (Yin, 2003). Case studies differ from other research methods in that 
the questions are posed to the investigator rather than to a respondent. These questions 
served as a reminder to me as the researcher about information that needed to be 
collected and why. In addition, I associated each question with a list of probable sources 
of evidence such as individual interviewees, documents, or researcher observations (Yin, 
2003).  
  Evidence for the case study research was gathered from the following sources: 
documents, archival records, key informant and participant interviews, direct observation, 
and participant-observation (detailed in Table 3.1). The case study research followed 
formal procedures to assure quality control during the data collection process. I applied 
the following three key principles of data collection in conducting the case study 
research: 
 use of multiple sources of evidence – that is, evidence from two or more sources, 
but converging on the same set of facts or findings 
 case study database – a formal assembly of evidence distinct from the final  case 
study report 
 chain of evidence – explicit links between the questions asked, the data  collected, 
and the conclusions (Yin, 2003). 
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Prior to conducting any research, I submitted a Human Subjects Review plan to the 
Portland State University Institutional Review Board and received approval for an 
exempt status in December 2015.  
3.6 Data Collection 
  Employing Yin’s suggested case study data collection techniques for conducting 
case study research, appropriate evidence was gathered to address the study research 
questions. Table 3.1 summarizes the data sources utilized for each case study. More 







Table 3.1 Research Data Sources for Case Study Analyses 
 
New Zealand Principle Data Sources  
 
Oregon Principle Data Sources 
 Key informant interviews (audio 
recordings and field notes) 
 
 Semi-structured interviews (audio 
recordings and field notes) 
 
 Land and Water Forum information 
including: reports, protocols, 
agendas, meeting notes, presentation 
materials, videos, speeches from 
chair, government submissions, press 
releases 
 
 New Zealand Government 
information including: ministerial 
reports, briefing papers, ministerial 
letters, parliament websites and 
archives, legislative committee 
hearing minutes 
 
 Ministry for the Environment 
database, archives, and website 
 
 Media sources: newspapers, websites, 
blogs 
 
 Academic literature and reports 
 
 LAWF meeting observations 
 
 Parliamentary select committee 
observations 
 




 Key informant interviews (audio 
recordings and field notes) 
 
 Semi-structured interviews (audio 
recordings and field notes) 
 
 Oregon Legislative information 
including: legislation/amendments, 
committee staff reports, video and 
audio recordings of committee 
hearings, agendas, presentation 
materials, and legislative voting 
records 
 
 State of Oregon information 
pertaining to integrated water 
management including: Water 
Resources Commission meeting 
minutes and materials, OWRD staff 
reports and presentations, staff 
presentations,State of Oregon 
database, archives, and websites 
 
 Policy Advisory Committee meeting 
agendas, materials, and minutes 
 
 Public meetings notes and survey 
results 
 
 Media sources: newspapers, 
websites, blogs 
 
 Academic literature and reports 
 
 Policy Advisory Group observations 
 
 Journal documentation, field notes 
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3.6.1 Document Review 
   In addition to reviewing scholarly literature as outlined in the literature review in 
Chapter 2, I conducted a thorough public document and archival review for each case 
study. The intent of this document review was to gather background information and 
familiarize myself with the past and current water policy landscape for each case study.  
  New Zealand. During the New Zealand case study, I was hosted by the Ministry 
for the Environment as part of a 2016 Fulbright Fellowship. Through this fellowship, I 
was afforded access to internal databases containing extensive amounts of current and 
archival information. Current materials reviewed include water-related legislation and 
rules, administrative records, ministerial reports and briefing papers, internal memos, 
policy papers, meeting minutes, ministerial briefing papers, select committee reports and 
presentations, and websites. Archival data included electronic and hardcopy versions of 
archived meeting minutes, draft reports, briefing memos, legislative history, newspapers 
articles, newsletters, and other similar materials.  
  I also reviewed Land and Water Forum-related published reports, plenary and 
small group meetings minutes, conference proceedings, Power Point presentations and 
videos, protocols, and internal briefing documents. I utilized databases from the Ministry 
for the Environment, New Zealand Parliament, New Zealand National Library archives, 
University of Victoria at Wellington, and New Zealand science-based research 
institutions as primary research sources. Documents relevant to the New Zealand case 
study were reviewed, summarized, and coded for content. The result of this analysis was 




 Oregon. For the Oregon case study, I was more familiar with background 
information due to my direct legislative and professional experiences. However, since I 
had not worked directly in that space for a few years, I conducted a thorough document 
review to re-familiarize myself with all the information and materials associated with the 
Strategy. Documents reviewed included integrated water-related legislation and rules, 
legislative meeting minutes, agency reports, policy papers, memos, and newspaper 
articles. Oregon Water Resources Commission archival information included electronic 
and hard-copy versions of meeting minutes, memos, staff reports, issue papers, and other 
similar materials. Oregon legislative and agency databases accessed via the internet along 
with printed documents served as primary sources for this information. Information 
relevant to the Oregon case study were reviewed and synthesized, entered into a database, 
and analyzed for content.  
3.6.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
    Semi-structured key informant interviews served as the primary data-gathering 
method to learn about the perspectives of state and non-state actors, gain a better 
understanding of collaborative network processes, fill data gaps, and triangulate evidence 
for both cases. During the early stages of the research, I started with key informants 
interviews, which were particularly valuable sources of information as they provided me 
with detailed knowledge about history, processes, and institutions, along with suggestions 
about other potential interview participants during the early stages of the research. 
Sampling was not designed to be random, but rather selective sampling of a range of 
policy makers and stakeholders involved in development of water policies. An effort was 
made to interview a variety of representative interest groups including: elected and 
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agency officials from different levels of government; tribal interests; private interests 
from agriculture, industry, power generation, horticulture, forestry, tourism and 
recreation; non-governmental organizations from environmental, conservation, and 
fisheries, groups; and citizen groups.  
 The literature and document review aided in construction of the interview 
questions. Both scripts began with introductory questions to establish a rapport with the 
informant. When conducting interviews, I employed probing open-ended questions with 
follow-up prompts to focus the discussion, where needed. Interview protocols contained 
key questions and topics that I wanted to cover; however, I followed the participant’s 
lead and let the interview veer “off topic” if a particularly interesting and relevant topic 
surfaced that was not included in the original set of questions. I listened intently to what 
the informant was saying, while attempting to view experiences through their eyes as 
much as possible. Throughout the process I asked clarifying questions if I was unsure 
exactly what they meant, or when they used a phrase or word that seems “loaded” with 
meaning for them. In order to unpack a loaded word or phrase and gain a better 
understanding of where they were coming from, I followed up with prompts such as 
“could you tell me a bit more about what you mean by xxx?” (See Appendices A and B 
for interview protocols.) The principle aim in collecting interview data was to let 
respondents tell their own story in their own terms.  
   New Zealand. In developing the New Zealand interview protocol, I consulted 
with Ministry for the Environment policy officials, Victoria University academic 
advisors, and other Ministry staff. The protocol consisted of twelve questions divided into 
four sections. The questions I posed to informants included a brief description of their 
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background and how their interests or work experience relates to New Zealand water 
policy. I asked them to describe their involvement with the Land and Water Forum, their 
organization’s role and how the Forum process has worked. Interviewees were asked 
about successes and challenges of the process as well as lessons learned. A series of 
questions about collaborative networks governance processes and outcomes were posed, 
and finally, the role of climate change in shaping the water reform process was explored.  
 Rather than employing random sampling techniques to select interview 
participants, I utilized intentional sampling. I began with interviewing the Land and 
Water Forum Chair, Alastair Bisley, and asked for his suggestions regarding other Land 
and Water forum participants to contact. I also used personal judgment and knowledge 
about the case history, context, and review of relevant information to develop a list of key 
informant interviews. I asked government officials and my New Zealand academic 
advisors to review the draft list to ensure that interview participants represented a range 
of interests, perspectives, and ideologies involved in water issues. Once the interview 
process was initiated, I used snowball sampling techniques to augment the interview list.  
  I conducted 24 interviews of Land and Water Forum members, indigenous 
leaders, central and regional elected officials, central and regional governement staff, and 
key interested parties as part of the research process. The interested parties represented a 
range of groups including: national and regional government, agriculture (dairy, 
ranching, horticultural, and irrigated agriculture), private energy providers, Maori, 
environmental and conservation, fishing, forestry, recreation, and scientific communities. 
Of the 24 people interviewed, half were audio recorded. For those not recorded (due to 
requests by interviewees or because they were via phone), detailed field notes were taken. 
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After each interview, I drafted a memo documenting interview details and analytical 
insights for assistance during the data analysis phase. All interviews were transcribed and 
entered into a database for later coding analysis. (See New Zealand interview protocol 
attached as Appendix A). 
  Oregon. As I was more familiar with Oregon’s history, context, and key players, I 
drafted a preliminary interview protocol based on personal knowledge and experience. In 
order to validate the objectivity of the interview protocol, I asked members of my 
dissertation committee, along with professional and academic peers familiar with Oregon 
water policies to review and provide feedback on the interview questions. The protocol 
consisted of eleven questions divided into four sections. To start off the interviews, I 
asked participants to share a brief description of their professional or personal 
background, and how their interests or experiences relate to Oregon water policy. Next, I 
asked interviewees to describe their involvement with the Integrated Water Resources 
Strategy, their organization’s role, and how the Strategy design and development process 
had worked in their view. The next set of questions focused on successes and challenges 
of the process, and lessons learned. And finally, I posed a series of questions about 
collaborative network governance processes and outcomes and the role of climate change 
in shaping the water reform process. (See Oregon interview protocol attached as 
Appendix B).   
  For the Oregon case, I utilized intentional sampling techniques and interviewed 
25 participants with past or current association with the Strategy process. Since I had 
been directly involved with the enabling legislation policy design, drafting, and ultimate 
adoption, I was already familiar with the key players, policy makers, and stakeholders. 
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Although I had ideas about potential informants, I wanted to ensure that a range of 
interests were represented including government (tribal, state, and local), agriculture, 
ranching, environmental and conservation, recreation, and civic organizations. The first 
wave of interviews focused on the Policy Advisory Group members, as they had been 
deeply involved with development and updating of the Strategy. The next wave of 
interviews included the Governor’s staff, state agency personnel, and other stakeholders. 
Finally, I interviewed Water Resources Commission members who played a key role in 
the Strategy policy guidance and development process.  
  Of the 25 participants interviewed, 22 were audio recorded. For those not 
recorded (due to requests by interviewees or because they were via phone), detailed field 
notes were taken. After each interview, I drafted a memo documenting interview details 
and analytical insights for assistance during the data analysis phase. All interviews were 
transcribed and entered into a database for later coding analysis. I began data analysis 
after the first interview, and continued to read and analyze interview data throughout the 
research process. 
3.6.3 Direct Observation  
  I utilized direct observation of policy meetings for both cases to gain a better 
understanding of collaborative, network processes. In New Zealand, I attended six Land 
and Water Forum meetings and three public meetings on the freshwater reform process as 
a non-participant observer. I also attended two regional-level collaborative water forums. 
I documented all meetings, interviews, public forums, and one-on-one interactions with 
detailed field notes. Documentation in the form of notes, minutes, and memos were 
utilized for later coding. I utilized a recording device to document direct observations, 
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where appropriate, and assist with the formal documentation process.  
  In the Oregon case, I engaged in both participant and non-participant 
observations. During my previous tenure in the Oregon Legislature, I was directly 
involved in policy development related to integrated water resources management.  
I attended meetings associated with development of Oregon’s Integrated Water Resource 
Strategy in 2000-2002; however, at that time I was not engaged in active research for this 
dissertation. During field research conducted in late 2016, I attended policy meetings as a 
non-participant observer. Issues around potential bias as a participant observer are 
addressed in the validity section later in this chapter. 
3.6.4 Reflective Journal 
   Use of a reflective journal helped capture my thoughts and insights while 
conducting research. Through journaling, I reflected on personal observations and 
analytical considerations of the research whether it was reviewing literature, conducting 
interviews, attending meetings as an observer, or during the writing and analysis phases. 
For example, I noted comments related to the sampling rationale, who to contact next, or 
which documents to search for. I also made extensive notes related to ideas under 
development, network graphics for the case studies, or comments regarding current 
practices. The use of a reflective journal helped add rigor to the qualitative analysis by 
recording assumptions, reactions, expectations, and biases throughout the research 
process. Field notes also afforded additional data for analysis.  
3.7 Data Analysis 
  I employed a reflexive process in conducting the case study research focused on 
analyzing the case study evidence to facilitate answering the research questions. A good 
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analysis should utilize all the relevant evidence, consider alternative interpretations, 
address the most significant elements of the case study, and draw on the researchers prior 
knowledge and experience (Yin, 2003). The analysis involved systematically organizing 
and transcribing interviews, document summaries, observations, field notes, and journal 
entries for later analysis. I looked at linkages to themes in literature and for emerging 
themes from the informant interviews.  
Inductive Coding Process 
 For coding and analyzing the data, I employed an iterative, inductive process to 
observe what new insights, themes, or theories emerged from the data (Starks & 
Trinadad, 2007). Inductive reasoning is based on learning from experience, thus I looked 
for patterns and consistent themes that emerged in order to generate theoretical 
constructs. Throughout the research process, I made adjustments and modifications as 
new evidence was collected. The graphic below depicts the inductive reasoning approach 
I utilized for the case study analyses (See Figure 3.1).  




  I began the data analysis process by reading through interview transcripts and 
field notes repeatedly to achieve greater familiarity and total immersion with the research 
data. After gaining a big picture perspective, I reviewed the data line by line to derive 
codes by highlighting the exact words and phrases that captured key themes or concepts. 
Coding is a process for assigning “units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential 
information compiled during a study” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 56).  
  I utilized Dedoose, an online qualitative coding software program, to assist with 
the coding process. I identified units of narrative data that seemed important or 
meaningful, or captured new insights, and assigned codes to the highlighted text. I 
endeavored to let ideas and themes emerge from the data alone, rather than imposing 
structure or a framework on the data. I adopted a “grounded approach,” as I did not pre-
code datum until I had collected it and observed how it nested in context (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994, p. 58). The advantage of using a grounded theory approach was that, as 
the researcher, I was more open-minded and “context sensitive” (Miles & Huberman, 
1994, p. 58). The objective was to match observations with constructs found in network 
governance theory, or identify new themes that arose “in situ” or from the data alone to 
create a map of what was happening and why. Through this iterative process, labels for 
codes emerged that reflected key themes. I created a code book containing an exhaustive 
list of codes developed from this process (See Appendix C). 
 Following the initial data sorting and coding, I developed categories based on 
how the different codes were related and linked. I deconstructed and reconstructed data 
into categories to facilitate comparison and aid in development of theoretical concepts. I 
also examined the codes for patterns and distilled the textual data into a set of categories 
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or concepts. This was an iterative process where I started with an extensive listing of all 
codes and eventually reduced this list to a smaller number of categories. I looked for 
“saturation,” meaning that no significantly new explanations emerged from the data 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 74). I identified major themes and sub-themes, ordinary 
themes, and unexpected and hard to classify themes. These final themes were intended to 
be exhaustive, sensitive to what was contained in the data, and reflect the purpose of the 
research (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Next I looked at the relationship between these 
themes to help construct a narrative to explain what was emerging from the data. 
 Throughout the coding process, I documented impressions, thoughts and initial 
analyses, mainly in the form of memos. This technique proved especially helpful in tying 
together different pieces of data during the coding process. In order to be systematic and 
transparent, I followed the same steps and procedures throughout the data analysis 
process. The themes that emerged from the coding results for each case study are 
described in Chapters 3 and 4.  
Case Study Qualitative Comparative Methodology  
  Once the data was analyzed for each of the two case studies, I initiated a 
comparative case study analysis process using Ragin’s (2014) comparative method.  
Ragin (2014) describes that a key goal of comparative analysis is to interpret a common 
historical outcome or process across a limited range of cases. Comparison provides a 
basis for making statements about empirical regularities and for evaluation and 
interpreting cases relative to substantive and theoretical criteria (Ragin, 2014). This 
knowledge provides the basis for “understanding, explaining, and interpreting diverse 
historical outcomes and processes and their significance for current institutional 
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arrangements” (Ragin, 2014, p. 6). 
  With the use of only two case studies, I was able to examine each case 
holistically, meaning that the casual significance of an event or structure was viewed in 
context, rather than a sum of collective parts (Ragin, 2014). In particular, I was interested 
in understanding historical sequences, the role of state and non-state actors, causal 
conditions, institutional barriers, decision-making process, and the role of leadership in 
each case. From the onset, both case studies appeared to be similar, yet they experienced 
different outcomes. Thus, I focused the analysis on how different conditions or causes fit 
together in the New Zealand case and contrasted them with how they fit together in the 
Oregon case (Ragin, 2014).  
 In conducting the case study comparison, I employed several elements of Ragin’s 
comparative methodological approach. First, I recognized the holistic, case-based nature 
of comparative research and treated each case as a complex entity, rather than a sum of 
parts, throughout the course of analysis (Ragin & Zaret, 1983). For each case, I studied 
the configuration of conditions to determine how the different combinations of conditions 
were associated with specific integrated water management outcomes. The effects of 
variables were also assessed in the context of the case, rather than detached from it, to 
facilitate linkage of causally relevant conditions to outcomes (Ragin, 2014). 
Second, I adapted the use of Ragin’s “truth table” to enable exploration of 
similarities and differences among the two cases. A “truth table” is an “analytical device 
that displays data in a matrix of logically possible configurations of causal conditions” 
(Ragin, 2014, p. xxi). The use of a truth table created a visual display of data that helped 
facilitate the analytical process through a side-by-side comparison for each research 
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variable. This also helped uncover any patterns of invariance or consistent association 
(Ragin, 2014). By bringing the two cases together, I was able to assess where there was 
congruence or dissimilarities among causally relevant conditions in each case.  
  Third, I developed an explanatory model in an iterative, inductive manner (as 
described earlier in this chapter), to enable a dialogue between theory and evidence 
(Ragin, 2014). Through use of a truth table I was able to identify the presence or absence 
of certain conditions for each case. The goal was to identify the different causalities that 
were responsible for outcomes in each case. I used theory to aid in the identification of 
relevant differences and tested this with evidence generated for each case. Through a 
robust back-and-forth dialogue process between ideas and evidence, I was able to 
formulate a general explanatory model for each case. 
3.8 Validity 
 In order to address research validity and reliability, I employed several strategies 
as outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994), including checking for representativeness, 
triangulation, addressing researcher effects or bias, checking for outliers, rival 
explanations, and soliciting feedback from informants. Table 3.2 depicts a summary of 





Table 3.2 Methods Used for Addressing Quality and Validity Threats 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994) 
 
 
 Checking for representativeness: assess whether findings are 
typical for the case 
 
 Checking for researcher effects: methods to address possible 
researcher bias  
 
 Triangulation: findings are more reliable if they can be buttressed 
from several independent sources 
 
 Checking for outliers: strengthen and test findings by carefully 
examining exceptions or outliers 
 
 Rival explanations: testing alternative explanations for the 
phenomena 
 
 Soliciting feedback from informants: evaluation of major case 
study findings by key informants 
 
 
  Checking for Representativeness. Since I was not conducting random sampling 
for interviews, I needed to avoid drawing inferences or generalizing from a select group 
that was not representative of a wide range of viewpoints. First, in order to avoid this 
pitfall, I interviewed 24-25 people in each case from a wide range of interest groups to 
ensure that the data wasn’t skewed towards one perspective or another. I purposively 
contacted participants from industry, agriculture, forestry, tribes, conservation, tourism, 
recreation, public interest, and government to ensure a balance of perspectives in the 
interview process. Second, I asked colleagues to review the list of interviewees to 
confirm that a purposive sample represented a wide range of actors. This also held true 
for information gleaned from meeting observations. Since I was unable to personally 
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observe all meetings for either case study, I reviewed available meeting minutes for each 
case. Under this scenario, I was able to compare and calibrate patterns or inferences 
developed through direct observations with information about other meetings that I was 
unable to attend. 
  Triangulation. Triangulation of evidence is “supposed to support a finding by 
showing that independent measures of it agree with it or, at least, do not contradict it” 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 266). Triangulation of data sources using different 
methods, with varying biases and strengths, helped confirm findings and facilitate a 
greater level of confidence in the research findings. For both case studies, data was 
triangulated from a variety of information sources (i.e., written documentation, interview 
data, observations, field notes, reflective journals, and peer review). In addition to 
reviewing copious reports, documents, and archival data for background information, I 
conducted semi-structured informant interviews to allow for participants themselves to 
provide rich data about the case. Attending meetings and workgroups allowed me to 
observe firsthand network governance processes in both cases. I also compared meeting 
notes with other peer observers to ground truth the observations. In addition to attending 
a variety of meetings, I carefully read and coded past meeting minutes and summaries. 
By using interviews, observation, and document reviews, I established a triangulation or 
converging lines of evidence to make certain there was a greater level of confidence in 
the study conclusions. 
 Addressing Researcher Bias. As a researcher, I brought personal experience and 
knowledge around water resources management and policy development to this research 
project. Additionally, I served as an elected official in the Oregon Legislature for over 
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twelve years in both the Oregon House and Senate, where I was personally involved in 
developing water resource policy, legislation, and budgets. Direct experience with 
Oregon’s Strategy helped inform this research and provide valuable insights and access to 
information about the Strategy’s legislative history, policy development process, 
institutional and governance framework, state and non-state actor involvement. However, 
it also posed a potential objectivity challenge for the research and analysis process.  
  To address potential researcher bias, I used experiential knowledge as part of the 
inquiry process, but I did not view it as a license to impose personal values or 
assumptions on this research. I acknowledged that my prior professional and elected 
experiences, along with my personal values and beliefs, had the potential to affect the 
research in multiple ways. This is true not just for me, but for all researchers in general. 
Some sources (England, 1994; Rose, 1997) refer to this as “positionality” where 
researchers must especially take account of their own position in relation to the research 
participants and research setting. Thus, I took the following steps to ensure that the 
research was balanced and not considered biased by personal perspectives or political 
viewpoints.  
  First, I was cautious to keep an open mind, and listen carefully during interviews 
and meetings to capture important insights into what was happening in each case study, 
especially in Oregon where I had personal experience. In particular, I paid special 
attention during the interview process to my own internal filters and perceptions as I 
served as the data gathering instrument. By audio recording the interviews, I could check 
back and compare my field notes with the actual language used by interview participants. 
When conducting interviews for New Zealand, bias was not as much as an issue since I 
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had not been previously involved in New Zealand water policy. For the Oregon case, 
however, potential bias was more of an issue. I was forthcoming about my background 
and past personal role in Oregon’s water policy development in order to ensure 
transparency.  
  Second, when documenting the interviews, I carefully reflected on my own 
reactions and thoughts about the process and its content via detailed memos and log 
notes. For example, I considered ways in which my prior involvement may color an 
interviewee’s response and how I interpreted them. To assure credibility and address 
concerns about potential bias, I tried to set aside my a priori knowledge and assumptions 
to listen to key informants’ accounts with an open mind (Starks & Trinadad, 2007).  
  Finally, through consultations with colleagues and mentors and drafting memos to 
keep track of emerging impressions, I was able to examine how my thoughts and ideas 
evolved as I dove deeper into the data. I exercised extensive reflection while proceeding 
through interviews, direct observation, data review, and data analysis phases of the 
research process. Also, I solicited direct feedback from my academic committee, and 
sought peer review input when interpreting findings. These actions helped identify and 
deter any biases or skewed logic that could threaten the study conclusions. 
 One final observation around potential bias is that throughout the interview 
processes for both case studies, I was struck by the candor and openness of key 
informants to share their stories and perspectives. Anticipating greater caution from the 
Oregon informants given my past personal experience, surprisingly, I found this not to be 
the case. Researchers conducting interviews sometimes face the naturally-occurring 
challenge of participants wanting to please interviewers by saying what they believe the 
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interviewers want to hear, and thus I took this into account when analyzing the data. In 
particular, triangulation of data helped address this potential validity threat.  
 Checking for Meaning of Outliers. Throughout the research process, I looked for 
exceptions or outliers to test the generality of my findings and build a better explanation. 
When outliers in the research data arose, I attempted to work out the meaning of them by 
reviewing other different data sources to test what I knew about the case. It was important 
to understand what the outlier represented rather than discount it as an anomaly. For 
example, in both case studies, it was important to interview informants who had walked 
away from the collaborative network to understand why they were dissatisfied or had 
rejected the process rather than rely on informants that supported the collaborative 
processes. 
  Exploring Rival Explanations. Employing the tactic of searching for rival 
explanations offered another way to test my explanations for each case. When conducting 
field work, several possible explanations were developed to explain observations from 
the emerging research data. I evaluated the data and asked what kind of alternative case 
this information could build (Miles & Huberman, 1994). These possibilities were 
maintained until one of them appeared increasingly more compelling due to additional 
sources of evidence. Once the most plausible reasoning was identified, it was validated 
by examining supporting evidence. Throughout this process, I sought to keep rival 
explanations in play for a practical period of time to avoid foreclosing too early on 
alternative reasoning.  
 Soliciting Feedback from Informants. Corroborating research findings with key 
informants served as another method for evaluating case study findings. For both case 
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studies, key informants were asked to evaluate the accuracy of the research findings. I 
checked with these key informants throughout the data collection process, and after final 
analysis. This process proved extremely helpful for soliciting feedback on main factors, 
causal relationships, and on interpretive conclusions. In addition, informants’ comments 
and responses provided an opportunity for further reflection on my case study research 
findings. In sum, by utilizing multiple sources and modes of evidence, I collected and 
double-checked findings throughout the data collection and analysis process to buttress 
the explanatory power of my research findings.  
3.9 Limitations of Research Design and Methodology 
  It is important to recognize limitations in the research design and methodology of 
this comparative case study analysis. First, this research involved two case studies and 
thus lacked the explanatory power of a multiple case study analysis. With that said this 
research was not focused on generalized theories but rather on understanding and 
applying theoretical concepts in two particular case study contexts. I applied a previously 
developed theory, network theory, as a template with which to compare the empirical 
results of my case study (Yin, 2003). The comparative analysis focused on adding to 
collaborative and network governance theory, rather than providing arguments 
challenging the validity of these theories.  
  Second, potential limitation pertains to the shorter amount of time I had to study 
and immerse myself in the New Zealand case versus the Oregon case. Put simply, given 
the shorter duration of my observations for the New Zealand case, was the data reliable 
and dependable? To overcome this possible weakness, I took extra care to employ a 
variety of data sources and conduct regular quality checks. Perhaps the most useful 
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quality control method was engaging peers and academics familiar with the New Zealand 
case in a regular review process throughout the data collection and analysis process. The 
potential weakness pertains to objectivity and potential researcher bias due to my role as 
a participant observer in the Oregon case study. This limitation was discussed previously 
in Section 3.8 under Validity. 
3.10 Summary 
  In this chapter, I presented my research questions, proposition at risk, and 
research methodologies for a conducting comparative case study analysis of how 
collaborative network governance performs in the integrated water management space. I 
laid out my case study selection rationale, case study design, and data collection 
techniques. Finally, I provided a detailed account of the data analysis process, methods 
for addressing research quality and validity, and limitations of my research design and 
methodology. In the next chapter, I present the first of my two detailed case studies by 




CHAPTER 4: NEW ZEALAND FRESHWATER REFORMS CASE STUDY 
 
 This chapter provides an in-depth case study of New Zealand’s approach to 
integrated water management. As described in the literature review (Maxwell and 
Delaney, 1990; Yin 1994), the primary interest in studying this case was not to create 
generalizable research, but rather to develop rich description, interpretation, and 
explanation. The case study examines New Zealand’s institutions, policies, and actors 
involved in integrated water management. Please note that in instances where I am 
quoting from a New Zealand source, I followed the New Zealand spelling. 
  In particular, the aim was to explore and understand the key institutions and actors 
shaping and constraining New Zealand’s freshwater reform discussions. First, I set the 
stage by providing background information and a chronological history of New Zealand’s 
integrated water management regime, including legislative and institutional frameworks. 
Next I unpack the collaborative Land and Water Forum process, an exemplar of network 
governance that focused on framing and developing integrated water policies and 
outcomes. Finally, I present an in-depth analysis and discussion of this case, including 
key findings and lessons learned. 
4.1 New Zealand: Clean and Green?  
  New Zealand is located over 1000 miles south east of Australia (See Figure 4.1). 
Its three main islands are the North and South islands, and Stewart Island situated due 
south of the South Island. New Zealand is an archipelago with over 700 offshore islands; 
most are small and lie within 30 miles off of the coast (The New Zealand Encyclopedia).   
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Figure 4.1 New Zealand Location Map (Source: World Atlas) 
 
 
  For a small country (103,517 square miles), New Zealand’s geography is quite 
diverse. The North Island is mainly rolling hills, much of which is in agricultural 
production. A series of narrow mountain ranges run north-east along the North Island 
creating high country rising up to 5,500 feet (McLauchlan, 1989). The South Island is 
divided by the Southern Alps, which traverse most of its length and rise over 9,800 feet. 
To the west of the Alps lies coastal rainforest, and to the east, the Canterbury Plains 
formed by rivers flowing from the mountains (McLauchlan, 1989). This area supports 
extensive farmland and grazing areas. The climate is temperate, although weather in the 
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far north is often subtropical during summer (December–March), and inland areas of the 
South Island can experience severe frosts in winter (June–August). 
 New Zealand supports a total population of approximately 4,766,700 (New 
Zealand’s population clock, February 2017) and the majority of its residents live in urban 
areas on the North Island. Auckland is the largest city, with a population of about 
1,415,550 (Statistics New Zealand, 2013 census). A multicultural country, New 
Zealand’s population consists of the following ethnic groups: European descent (about 77 
percent), Māori (15 percent), Asian (12 percent), and Pacific Islander (7 percent) (New 
Zealand Census, 2013). New Zealand is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary 
system of government comprised of three branches of government: the legislature 
(Parliament), the executive branch (government), and the judiciary (judges and courts).  
 New Zealanders are generally well educated and healthy, with a high standard of 
living. The country supports a market economy with a $U.S.182 billion gross domestic 
product (New Zealand Statistics, September 2016). For many years New Zealand’s 
earnings were mainly from agriculture, primarily wool and dairy products. More recently, 
New Zealand’s economy has diversified with industries such as tourism, film production, 
and winemaking becoming significant contributors to the economy. The country depends 
heavily on international trade, especially with Australia, China, the European Union, and 
the United States (Statistics New Zealand, 2016). 
  Plentiful water is an essential component of New Zealand’s identity, and it is one 
of its greatest natural and economic assets. Geographically, water represents a large part 
of New Zealand’s landscape, with over 264,000 miles of rivers and streams, 4,000 lakes, 
and approximately 200 groundwater aquifers (Ministry for the Environment, 2007). 
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Freshwater is a key component of New Zealand’s economy for urban water supplies, 
energy generation, agricultural production, viticulture, horticulture, and tourism. 
Freshwater is also critical to New Zealand’s identity and unique ecosystems. New 




  Freshwater management is a highly contested issue in New Zealand in terms of 
both water quality and quantity. Despite its “100 percent Pure” image, New Zealand 
faces challenges when it comes to managing its freshwater resources. According to the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (PCE), New Zealand’s deteriorating 
water quality has become of great concern to many New Zealanders over the past two 
decades (PCE Water Quality Report, 2015 a). Water quality has been declining due to 
land use intensification, mainly from agricultural intensification and urban sprawl. Forest 
land conversions and large-scale dairy industry expansion has created pressures on 
surface and groundwater quality, and water quantity. Freshwater resources in the 
populated and intensely farmed areas of New Zealand will soon be fully “allocated” with 
limited ability to transfer water due to programmatic constraints.  
 Freshwater pressures have been exacerbated by increasingly variable weather 
patterns resulting in increased temperatures and higher rainfalls in the west, and less 
rainfall in the north and east (Royal Society of New Zealand, 2016). New Zealand has 
also experienced increased runoff from flooding due to increased rainfall and changing 
                                                 
4 Tourism New Zealand’s launched it “100 percent Pure New Zealand” marketing campaign in 1999 
(Tourism New Zealand, n.d.). 
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hydrological regimes, with increased drought in other areas (Royal Society of New 
Zealand, 2016). It is important to note that impacts of climate change on water resources 
are being discussed at both the regional and central levels of government; however, it 
does not appear to be the major driver for reform in New Zealand, but rather one of many 
key factors. 
4.2 New Zealand’s Institutional Framework, Legislation, and Policies 
 New Zealand, like the United States, shares an English common law
5
 heritage. 
The common law tradition emerged in England during the middle ages and was applied 
within British colonies across continents. Regarding water use, medieval common law 
treated a stream as fixed, so adjacent landowners owned their portion of a stream and had 
full rights to the water (Guerin, 2003, p. 23). However, upstream diversion depriving the 
landowner of property allowed for damages to be sought (Guerin, 2003, p. 23). Rights 
gradually evolved from land-based to use-based, linked to the flow of the river rather 
than the presence of water on land (Guerin, 2003, p. 23). These approaches evolved to a 
reasonable use theory, a pre-cursor to what is now known as a riparian water rights 
system, similar to what is utilized in the Eastern United States. This policy continued in 
New Zealand (with the exception of mining rights) until the Water and Soil Conservation 
of 1967, which required the issuance of permits by regional governments for discharge 
and withdrawals. Under the Resource Management Act of 1991 (described in more detail 
                                                 
5 Common law refers to the body of law developed in England primarily from judicial decisions based on 
custom and precedent, unwritten in statute or code, and constituting the basis of the English legal system 




later in this chapter), a permitting system was established where water resource consents 
(equivalent to permits in the United States) were issued on a first come, first served basis 
(Guerin, 2003).  
New Zealand represents one of a small number of countries that have organized 
governing institutions around natural catchment boundaries (with catchment being 
equivalent to the term watershed in the United States) and consider IWRM principles. 
New Zealand initiated IWRM principles to address early erosion and flood control 
problems in its newly colonized lands in the later part of the 19th Century (Davis and 
Threlfall, 2006). As early as 1868, New Zealand began to organize around river basins 
with the establishment of river boards (Davis & Threlfall, 2006). Erosion and flood 
problems in the 1930s led to the 1941 Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act, one of 
the first pieces of legislation worldwide to link land and water resources (Davis & 
Threlfall, 2006). Continuing soil erosion problems, non-point source pollution, and land 
use intensification created the need for more expansive legislation, and led to 
promulgation of the 1967 Water and Soil Conservation Act (Davis & Threlfall, 2006). 
This Act introduced water quality as a water management objective and established 20 
regional watershed-based boards (Davis & Threlfall, 2006). By the 1980s, New Zealand 
had a plethora of laws directed at managing the environment, including fresh water 
(Warnock & Baker-Galloway, 2015).  
 In 1991, the government enacted the Resource Management Act, which repealed 
over 60 Acts and amended more than 150 others, becoming New Zealand’s primary 
environmental legislation (Davis & Threlfall, 2006). Water in New Zealand is managed 
as a public resource. The Resource Management Act provides the legal framework for 
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managing freshwater, both quality and quantity, with the intent to create a more 
sustainable, integrated, and holistic regulatory framework that covers air, land, and water. 
The Resource Management Act’s emphasis on holistic resource management constitutes 
a strong foundation for IWRM (Davis & Threlfall, 2006). At the time of its adoption, the 
Resource Management Act was lauded as a far-reaching approach to planning and 
environmental management (Warnock & Baker-Galloway, 2015); however, 
implementation challenges have arisen. 
  The Resource Management Act is effects-based (impact-based) legislation that 
created a framework to manage and mitigate adverse environmental impacts of activities 
(Davis & Threlfall, 2006). Permits for water uses and discharges are based on the impacts 
of the use (Howard-Williams, Bisley, & Taylor, 2013); however, cumulative effects are 
not necessarily taken into account. The Act was also designed on the principle that 
decision-making is best carried out at the governance level closest to the resources 
affected, which better enables public participation in resource management decision-
making (New Zealand Environment Guide). Consequently, responsibility for water 
resource management in New Zealand is shared between central government and local 
governments. The resulting governance structure is highly decentralized – with local 
planning and implementation at the district and regional level – guided by national-level 
directives (e.g., national policy statements or national environmental standards) that 
direct and bind local authorities’ actions (Warnock & Baker-Galloway, 2015). This was 
in line with many other reforms that were occurring in New Zealand government under 
the guise of New Public Management in the early 1990s. The government at the time 
focused on minimizing government functions, privatizing state-owned businesses, and 
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relying on the market (Schick, 1996). It also resulted in a highly devolved system of 
environmental management in New Zealand, with limited direction from central 
government. 
 Until central government issued the National Policy Statement on Freshwater 
Management in 2011 (Sinner, 2011), New Zealand lacked mandatory nationwide water 
quality standards, except for drinking water. Prior to adoption of national-level guidance 
and regulations, each regional council established its own policies and regulations in 
order to implement to the Resource Management Act, with variable results. Central 
government preferred to grant regional governments the autonomy to tailor water policies 
to their watersheds. However, in the absence of national-level regulations and guidelines, 
a fragmented patchwork of regional water policies evolved. The lack of central 
government direction made it challenging for regions to effectively manage water 
resources, especially for those regions with limited financial resources. Listed below are 
the central government policy tools focused on freshwater regulation and management 
that have been issued to date:  
1) National Policy Statement on Freshwater Management (NPS-FM 2011  
and 2014) incorporating National Objectives Framework (NOF);  
2) draft National Environmental Statement (NES) on Ecological Flows; 
3) Water Conservation Orders (WCOs); 
6
 
                                                 
6Water Conservation Orders (WCOs) are a national-level planning tool for recognising and protecting 
outstanding amenity and intrinsic characteristics of water bodies. Applications are made to the Minister for 
the Environment, but decisions on applications are made by special tribunals and may be appealed to the 
Environment Court and High Court. They can prohibit or restrict a regional council issuing new water and 
discharge permits, although it cannot affect an existing permit until it expires and the applicant applies for a 
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4) Resource Management Regulations 2010 (Measurement and Reporting of    
    Water Takes).  
New Zealand’s institutional water framework is depicted in Figure 4.2. The 
central government provides overarching directives through legislation, policy 
statements, and guidance, whereas regional and local councils are responsible for 
planning and directly administering most aspects of freshwater management, including 
water quality and water quantity allocation.  
                                                                                                                                                 
















































































































































































The role New Zealand’s central and regional governments’ play in freshwater 
management are described below. 
  Central Government Role. Under the Resource Management Act, the Minister for 
the Environment has the authority to promulgate regulations to guide and direct regional 
councils in their freshwater planning process. The Ministry for the Environment 
(Ministry for the Environment), established under the Environment Act of 1986, serves as 
the Government’s principal adviser on environmental issues and, as the lead agency for 
freshwater policy development, holds primary responsibility for developing national 
policy statements and standards. MfE’s mission is “Environmental stewardship for a 
prosperous New Zealand.” Since 2009, the Ministry has operated under a collaborative 
governance model called the Natural Resources Sector (NRS). The NRS serves as a 
leadership team for central government natural resources policy work, and is led by the 
Chief Executives of the following government agencies: 
 Ministry for the Environment 
 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 
 Ministry for Primary Industries  
 Land Information New Zealand 
 Department of Conservation 
 Ministry for Māori Development 
 Department of Internal Affairs 
The Ministry of Health, although not part of the NRS, holds primary responsibility for 
setting drinking water standards.  
  An interesting feature of New Zealand government is the office of the 
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Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (PCE). The PCE is an independent 
officer of Parliament with functions and powers granted by the Environment Act of 1986. 
Their role is to provide Parliament with independent advice on matters regarding the 
environment. On freshwater issues, the PCE has issued several reports examining 
different aspects of the government’s reform process. In November 2013, the PCE issued 
a report entitled Water Quality in New Zealand: Land Use and Nutrient Pollution based 
on extensive research and scientific modelling. In that report, the Commissioner 
identified a clear link between expanding dairy farming and increasing stress on water 
quality. Subsequent reports have examined and made recommendations on the 
government’s 2014 National Policy Statement, and have provided updates to the 2013 
water quality report.  
  Another central government player in New Zealand’s freshwater realm is the 
Environment Court (formally called the Planning Tribunal). Established under the 
Resource Management Act, this special court provides an avenue for citizens or parties to 
bring an appeal against the local government on environmental decisions (Warnock and 
Baker-Galloway, 2015). The Environment Court has fairly broad powers as it can make 
decisions on applications directly referred to it by the applicant (where agreed by the 
council), and proposals of national significance referred to it by the Minister for the 
Environment (Ministry for Environment, 2009). The Environment Court’s jurisdiction 
includes Resource Management Act enforcement and the Court may issue enforcement 
orders to a citizen or an organization. The Court is comprised of environment judges and 
commissioners who possess knowledge and experience in areas such as local 
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government, resource management, environmental science, and the Treaty of Waitangi 
(see section below on indigenous water rights). 
  Regional Council Role. As mentioned previously, the Resource Management Act 
created a decentralized planning structure with local plan-making and implementation 
powers at the regional and local levels, and provided legislation and guidance nationally. 
There are 11 regional councils in New Zealand with boundaries broadly coinciding with 
water catchment areas. In addition, six unitary authorities function with combined 
regional council and district council duties. With regard to water, regional council 
responsibilities include managing the effects of using freshwater, coastal waters and land; 
developing regional policy statements; issuing of consents (e.g., for water takes or 
discharges to water); and managing rivers, mitigating soil erosion, and flood control. 
  Regional Councils must prepare Regional Policy Statements, which set the basic 
direction for environmental management in the region and “give effect”
7
 to National 
Policy Statements. Regional and district plans specify which activities are permitted and 
which activities require a consent. Under the Resource Management Act, regional 
councils and unitary authorities hold jurisdiction to make decisions about consent 
proposals. They must consider the environmental effects or impacts, which, as defined in 
the Resource Management Act, include effects on social, economic, and cultural 
conditions. Decisions are based on policy direction and rules specified in National Policy 
Statements, National Environmental Standards, Regional Plans, District Plans, and 
                                                 
7 The words ‘give effect’ to are intended to convey that plans should actively implement a higher order plan 
or policy statement (e.g., a regional policy statement ‘giving effect’ or ‘actively implementing a national 
policy statement) (Quality planning). 
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Regional Coastal Plans. 
  Regional councils and unitary authorities authorize the resource consents
8
 for 
water takes and discharges into water unless plans specify otherwise. These consents are 
processed on a first-in-first-served basis, with the maximum duration of consent being 35 
years. Consent-holders can apply to renew their consents on expiry. In 2004, this 
legislation was amended to give priority to existing consent holders in the event of a new 
entrant seeking access to a limited resource. 
4.2.1 Indigenous Water Rights  
“Ko au te wai, ko te wai ko au…I am the water, the water is me…” – Māori Proverb 
New Zealand’s Resource Management Act created, inter alia, a framework for an 
integrated  approach to freshwater planning. However, the incorporation of Māori 
perspectives in freshwater planning and implementation poses one of the greatest 
challenges for effective water management in New Zealand (Durette & Barcham, 2009). 
The New Zealand Government has publicly acknowledged that iwi
9
 have rights and 
interests in fresh water; however, the government’s position is that no one owns fresh 
water, and that freshwater resources need to be managed locally on a catchment-by-
catchment basis within the national freshwater management framework. This section 
provides background information on iwi values and perspectives in freshwater planning, 
                                                 
8 A resource consent is the authorization given to certain activities or uses of natural and physical resources 
required under the RMA s77B (1). It is similar to a permit in the United States. 
9 Iwi are extended kinship group, tribe, nation, people, nationality, race - often refers to a large group of 





including a brief overview of key statutes providing a framework in the freshwater space: 
the Treaty of Waitangi and the Waitangi Tribunal, and the Government’s engagement 
with iwi in the freshwater reform process.  
Treaty of Waitangi, Statutory, and Policy Framework  
  The Treaty of Waitangi (Treaty), signed in 1840 between over 500 Māori chiefs 
and the British Crown, provides the foundation for the Crown-Māori relationship in New 
Zealand. The Treaty contains three articles that were written in both English and Te Reo 
Māori (Māori language). Translation issues have resulted in different interpretations of 
the two versions of the Treaty, a discrepancy that has underpinned long-lasting conflict 
between Māori and the Crown. According to the English version, Māori ceded to the 
Crown absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of sovereignty 
(Article 1) but retained full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands and 
estates, forests, fisheries and other properties (Article 2) (Ruru, 2009). Under the Māori 
language version of the Treaty, Māori ceded only governance to the Crown (Article 1) 
but confirmed and guaranteed the chiefs “te tino rangatiratanga’”– the exercise of 
chieftainship – over their lands, villages and “taonga katoa” – all treasured things (Ruru, 
2009). Article 2 granted the Crown a pre-emptive right to deal with Māori over land 
transactions, and Article 3 granted Māori the same rights and privileges as British citizens 
living in New Zealand (Ruru, 2009). In regards to fresh water, Māori argue that under 
Article 2 of the Treaty they never ceded ownership or governance rights over water 
during the process of nineteenth century land sales to settlers; therefore, their customary 
water rights are still intact (Memon & Kirk, 2011). 
  In the years following the signing of the Treaty, settlers expanded in areas 
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throughout the country, altering New Zealand’s landscape by clearing native forests for 
agriculture production and pastures, draining wetlands, dredging waterways for mining, 
urban development, and diverting water for drinking water, irrigation, and hydropower 
schemes. Along with settlement, Māori land was confiscated or purchased, displacing iwi 
from their land and nearby rivers, disrupting their sense of place, along with their 
economic, social, and cultural vitality.  
   Waitangi Tribunal. In the 1960s and 70s, Māori began organizing politically and 
exerting demands for redress from the Crown for land that was unjustly confiscated or 
bought without observation of agreed terms of sale (King, 2003). These amends were not 
fully realized until years later, when in 1975, under the Treaty of Waitangi Act, the New 
Zealand Government created the Waitangi Tribunal, a legal avenue for Māori to seek 
redress for Treaty breaches by the Crown (New Zealand Encyclopedia, accessed May 12, 
2016). Set up by the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, the Waitangi Tribunal is a permanent 
commission of inquiry that makes recommendations on claims brought by Māori relating 
to Crown actions which breach the promises made in the Treaty of Waitangi (New 
Zealand Ministry of Justice, Treaty of Waitangi website). 
  The Waitangi Tribunal’s recommendations are mainly non-binding; however, 
Tribunal reports can assist parties in their settlement negotiations (New Zealand Ministry 
of Justice, Treaty of Waitangi website). Rights of individual iwi vary according to Treaty 
negotiations that reflect historical, cultural, and geographic features unique to an area 
(Ministry of Justice, Treaty of Waitangi website). It is important to note that, although 
New Zealand’s Treaty settlement process provides redress for grievances, which may 
include the transfer or returns of land to iwi within their areas of interest, including the 
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beds of lakes and rivers, water allocation has not been a feature of that process. To date, 
no iwi-specific water allocation has been promulgated as part of the Treaty settlement; 
however, over twenty-five co-governance and co-management arrangements have been 
agreed between the Crown and iwi, including joint committees, statutory boards, regional 
council committees, and WCOs (Ministry for Environment/Ministry for Primary 
Industries Report, 2014, p. 40).  
  Currently before the Tribunal is the National Freshwater and Geothermal 
Resources claim (WAI 2358), an important claim in regards to Māori economic rights 
and interests in fresh water. Under WAI 2358, a claim brought forward by the New 
Zealand Māori Council in response to the Government’s proposal to partially privatize 
state-owned power-generating enterprises (approximately 75 per cent of New Zealand’s 
energy comes from hydropower and geothermal energy), the claimants assert that Māori 
have unrecognized proprietary water rights that should be recognized by the Crown or 
compensated economically. Māori claim that there is an ongoing breach of their residual 
proprietary rights, which were guaranteed and protected by the Treaty of Waitangi from 
1840 onwards. The inquiry was split into two stages with the Tribunal finding under 
stage one: 
…that the proprietary right guaranteed to hapū
10
 and iwi by the Treaty 
in 1840 was the exclusive right to control access to and use of the water 
while it was in their rohe (territory). The closest English equivalent in 
                                                 
10 Iwi are extended kinship group, tribe, nation, people, nationality, race - often refers to a large group of 
people descended from a common ancestor and associated with a distinct territory. Hapū are kinship group, 
clan, tribe, subtribe - section of a large kinship group and the primary political unit in traditional Māori 




1840 was ownership; the closest New Zealand law equivalent today is 
residual property right. (Ministry of Justice, Treaty of Waitangi) 
 
The Tribunal had initiated the second stage of WAI 2358 as of the writing of this 
report. Under stage two, it has stated that it will consider whether the rights found to exist 
in stage one are adequately recognized and provided for in current and proposed laws and 
policies (including the freshwater reforms).  
  To date, the government’s response to the stage one findings and stage two 
approach has been to acknowledge that iwi have rights and interests in freshwater 
resources (Wai closing submission Wai 2358, #3.3.15, Crown Closing Submissions for 
Stage One, 20 July 2012), albeit not ownership of the water itself. The government has 
been discussing appropriate mechanisms for redress of breaches around iwi water rights 
and interests, and proposes strengthening the role and authority of iwi in the freshwater 
planning process, rather than developing a separate framework for proprietary water 
rights. For a more detailed report on New Zealand’s approach to freshwater management 
and indigenous water rights, please refer to this Fulbright report: 
http://fulbright.org.nz/publications/new-zealands-approach-to-integrated-freshwater-
management-with-a-focus-on-indigenous-interests/.  
4.3 Setting the Stage for a Collaborative Process in New Zealand 
 New Zealand’s Resource Management Act provides the foundation and 
framework for managing water in a sustainable and integrated manner. However, the 
government initially delegated its policy-making role, as well as implementation, to the 
regional councils. This resulting lack of central government direction and strategic 
guidance led to fragmented water policies, with each region producing different water 
 84 
 
quality regulations and water allocation outcomes. Over the past two decades, non-point 
(diffuse) source pollution from urbanization, agriculture practices, dairy intensification, 
and conversion of forest lands accelerated, thereby degrading freshwater quality in New 
Zealand’s rivers, streams, and lakes. In addition, certain parts of the country faced over-
allocation of water resource consents to private users due to competing demands of 
population growth, irrigation, economic development, and hydropower generation. 
Pressure from New Zealand farmers, businesses, and the public grew in response to these 
issues.   
  New Zealand has engaged in a series of efforts over the past two decades to 
address water issues. In 2000, the Minister for the Environment at the time, Marion 
Hobbes, gave a call to action at the Water 2000 conference in Auckland. The Minister 
emphasized the need for a new governance approach around water management that 
balances the environment with economic development: 
We need to think about water and the environment differently. For too long we 
have thought about water and the environment as a problem, as a constraint to 
development, something that stood in the way of progress in New Zealand. We 
need to turn this thinking on its head. We need to think of the environment as one 
of New Zealand’s strategic opportunities. We need to think about the concept of 
sustainable development. I put this change of thinking to you as a challenge today 
and ask you to think through how we can put into effect this paradigm shift that is 
needed (New Zealand Parliament website).  
 
  In response to growing pressures and concerns about water quality and quantity, 
New Zealand’s Government recognized a need for a more effective freshwater 
governance framework. Government Ministers proposed the “Sustainable Water 
Programme of Action” in 2003 as a priority under the “Sustainable Development 
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Programme of Action,” a government-led approach to sustainable development in New 
Zealand. The Sustainable Water Programme of Action identified three national outcomes 
for freshwater: 
1. Improve the quality and efficient use of freshwater by building and enhancing 
partnerships with local government, industry, Māori, science agencies and 
providers, and rural and urban communities. 
2. Improve the management of the undesirable effects of land-use on water 
quality through increased national direction and partnerships with communities 
and resource users. 
3. Provide for increasing demands on water resources and encourage efficient 
water management through national direction, working with local government on 
options for supporting and enhancing local decision making, and developing best 
practice (Ministry for the Environment, Briefing Paper, 2007). 
The program recommended specific actions for achieving national outcomes including: 
fostering leadership and partnership, providing national direction to regional and local 
governments, and setting national priorities. The strategy recommended a government-
led process developed in consultation with stakeholders.  
 Government officials developed policy proposals and held public consultations 
on the proposals in 2004 and 2005. According to former government officials who were 
involved in the process at the time, the proposals failed to garner strong support from 
stakeholders on either end of the political spectrum. Environmental and conservation 
organizations called for more stringent regulations from central government. Industry and 
agricultural users were concerned about tough new regulations, but they recognized that 
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with growing concerns about water quality and over-allocation, some type of action was 
needed. Regional governments were hesitant to give up control to central government, 
and Māori were beginning to assert their interest in freshwater planning and access to 
water rights.  
 The Government’s Sustainable Water Programme of Action failed to gain 
political traction, and implementation stalled in 2008. Interviews with former government 
officials suggested a number of reasons for this failure. First, the proposal was crafted 
mainly by public officials and Ministers with limited input from outside groups. Buy-in 
from the public and water user community was minimal, with little support for moving 
forward. Second, the freshwater reform process operated under limited agency staffing 
and resources for a complex and demanding task. This hindered the staff’s ability to fully 
vet the proposals, especially given the complexity and political sensitivity of water issues. 
Third, the proposal was criticized by influential environmental and conservation groups 
as producing “an insipid and an environmentally ineffective document” (Logan, 2013). 
And fourth, competition among governmental agencies and bureaucratic inertia was a 
factor in poor reception of the proposal. “There seemed to be intra-government 
constraints in departments’ capacities to advance the environmental components of water 
policy” (Logan, 2013). Reflecting on this effort, the program was re-dubbed by observers 
as the “National Programme of INaction.”  
  Meanwhile, politically charged efforts highlighting non-point source pollution 
issues (e.g., the “Dirty Dairying” and “Choose Clean Water” campaigns) continued to 
raise public awareness about and interest in freshwater issues. Litigation challenging 
resource consents also become more commonplace, escalating concerns about increasing 
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costs and longer resource consent processing timeframes. Public concern about New 
Zealand’s degrading water quality and competing demand for limited resources continued 
to grow. 
 In 2008, a new center-right Government took the helm in New Zealand. In 
response to New Zealanders’ growing frustration around the lack of progress on 
freshwater reforms, a new stakeholder-led approach was initiated called the Land and 
Water Forum (LAWF). This collaborative approach was sparked by a small group of 
influential leaders concerned about freshwater issues who had convened at an 
Environmental Defence Society conference.  
  Guy Salmon, a well-known and widely respected environment advocate, had been 
observing Scandinavian collaborative approaches to resolve complex and contentious 
environmental issues. He suggested that it might be applied in New Zealand to address 
freshwater management (Howard-Williams et al., 2013). Other NGOs, including the 
Environmental Defence Society, supported Guy Salmon’s suggestion for creating a 
collaborative forum around freshwater policy development. At the same time, the 
government recognized the need to respond to public demands for action around 
freshwater management; however, reaching consensus on polarizing water issues was 
challenging. There was a sense that unless a network of interested parties participated 
actively and directly with each other, conflict and stalemate would persist, with damaging 
consequences for the environment and economy (Howard-Williams et al., 2013). Thus, 
LAWF grew out of this agreement by the Minister for Environment, environmental, and 




4.4 The Land and Water Forum: A collaborative, network approach to water policy 
development and governance 
  The Land and Water Forum Trust is an incorporated entity that was created “for 
the understanding of land and water use in New Zealand including social, economic, 
cultural and environmental implications of land and water use and effect of such use...” 
as laid out in the Land and Water Forum Terms of Reference document (2011, p. 1). 
LAWF was “established in the belief that the stakeholders in water management need to 
directly engage directly with each other if a sustainable way forward was to be found for 
better water management in New Zealand” (LAWF Terms of Reference, 2011, p. 1). 
LAWF brought together an array of stakeholders from industry groups, agriculture, 
power generation, environmental and recreational NGOs, iwi, forestry, horticulture, 
tourism and urban water interests to “develop shared outcomes, goals and long-term 
strategies” for freshwater management in New Zealand (LAWF Terms of Reference, 
2011, p. 1.).  
  LAWF’s Terms of Reference document (2011) states that the government Cabinet 
“agreed to a new strategic direction for fresh water, including a stakeholder-led 
collaborative process run by the Forum.” Hence, the Cabinet Ministers at the time 
provided political support and legitimacy for LAWF. It is important to note, however, 
that with respect to decision-making and implementation responsibilities, the document 
emphasizes that “for the avoidance of doubt, the design of specific policy instruments, 
detailed design and drafting of legislative amendments or regulations, and the actual 
implementation of government decisions are specifically excluded from the scope of the 
project” (LAWF Terms of Reference, 2011, p. 2). 
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 LAWF’s structure consists of 67 organizations assisted by central and local 
government active observers
11
 and members of New Zealand’s academic, scientific, and 
policy community. (See Appendix C for a list of LAWF members.) Alastair Bisley, a 
former foreign trade negotiator with extensive government experience, was selected to 
chair the Forum. Mr. Bisley characterized LAWF as “an exercise in collaborative 
governance – addressing complex and intractable issues by bringing together the 
principal stakeholders, including from the private sector and civil society, to seek 
agreement/consensus on a way forward”
 
(Eppel, 2013). Protocols for participation were 
established and all LAWF participants were required to accept these protocols as the 
basis for their involvement. 
  A smaller group of 30 major stakeholders was formed to generate specific policy 
proposals around key issues, report back regularly to the larger plenary group on 
progress, and assist in preparation of LAWF reports. Participants in the small group 
include representatives from agriculture (pastoral and horticulture), iwi, forestry, power 
generation, environmental groups, recreationalists, and tourism, and (See Appendix D for 
the full LAWF member list.) This small group proved instrumental in working through 
and achieving consensus on tough water policy issues. Recommendations brought forth 
from the small group were presented to the full LAWF for vetting and ultimate approval. 
                                                 
11 “Active observers” are parties that attend the LAWF meetings but are not directly involved in the 
consensus process. Central and local government representatives served as active observers (LAWF 




The chair and three members, representing iwi, conservation interests, and New 
Zealand’s primary industry sector, serve as the trustees for LAWF.  
 Cabinet Ministers tasked the Forum with conducting a stakeholder-led 
collaborative process to recommend freshwater policy reforms and provided partial 
funding and staff resources to help LAWF implement its charge. LAWF approached their 
work by setting up seven “flexi-groups” that were tasked with unpacking key policy 
issues and reporting their findings to the smaller group. Unlike the smaller group, the 
flexi-groups were not required to reach consensus. The following policy focused groups 
were established as part of the LAWF collaborative process: 
1. Core elements and the nature of water rights 
2. Water quality allocation 
3. Water quantity    
4. Urban Issues 
5. Implementation of water allocation  
6. Stock exclusion 
7. Water quantity over-allocation    
LAWF established suggested terms of reference for these working groups specifically 
outlining operating procedures, administrative functions, detailed scopes of work, and 
membership requirements for each flexi-group. 
 LAWF has been meeting regularly since 2009 and to date has issued four reports. 
The first phase of the Forum’s work lasted from August 2009 to August 2010 and 
resulted in A Fresh Start for Freshwater. This report, issued in September 2010, 
identified a set of outcomes and goals for freshwater management and recommends a 
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number of policy changes to achieve those. Public meetings to present and discuss the 
Forum’s recommendations were held around the country in late 2010 and the beginning 
of 2011, and involved 1,200 people (Land and Water Forum, 2011).  
A Fresh Start for Freshwater, lays out why a new form of governance was 
needed: 
The Land and Water Forum came together because we knew that 
water provides great opportunities for all of us – our ecologies and our 
environments, our farms and our cities, our recreation and our tourists, 
and for energy production and industry. It is a source of life and food, 
and for iwi it is also central to their identity. To maximise these 
opportunities for us all, and for future generations, we needed a better 
way to manage water in New Zealand – less confrontational, more 
collaborative, and more effective. (Land and Water Forum, 2010, p. v.) 
 
It also explained the importance of reaching consensus around freshwater policies: 
It has become increasingly difficult to establish a consensus in New 
Zealand about what constitutes sustainable land use and its 
implications for freshwater. This difficulty hampers our economic 
development and damages our environment. It also creates 
antagonisms between different groups in our society. (Land and 
Water Forum, 2010, p. 59.) 
Regarding the process, the report stated: 
The Forum will use a collaborative governance process to carry out 
the project. Membership of the Forum comprises stakeholders outside 
of the government with a major interest in fresh water. (Land and 
Water Forum, 2010, p. 59.) 
 
  In their first report, LAWF offered 53 recommendations, including setting limits 
for water quality and quantity; achieving water quality targets; improving water quantity 
allocation; establishing a National Land and Water Commission on a co-governance basis 
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with iwi and developing a National Land and Water Strategy; and seeking science and 
knowledge for water management.  
  The government issued a response to the Forum’s recommendations in September 
2011, and asked it to carry on its consensus-building work and develop recommendations 
on the methods, tools and governance processes required for setting and managing limits 
on water quality and quantity (Land and Water Forum, 2016). The Land and Water 
Forum was given a second mandate and reported to Government in 2012 through two 
subsequent reports. These reports provided more detailed recommendations on how 
freshwater objectives and limits should be met, approaches for improving land and water 
management practices, strategies to address allocation of both water discharges including 
changes in the resource consenting system and the facilitation of water transfers and 
trades of both water and discharges, along with detailed recommendations for 
collaborative processes in freshwater management at the local level.  
 LAWF met regularly in 2013 and 2014 to assess the government’s response to 
their reports. It also considered what future role, if any, it might seek to play in relation to 
land and water management, and how it might best constitute itself in order to do so 
(Land and Water Forum, 2016). The Forum issued its fourth major report in 2015. This 
report focused on maximizing the economic benefits of fresh water while managing 
within water quality and quantity limits established under the 2014 National Policy 
Statement on Freshwater Management. Recommendations called for exclusion of 
livestock from waterways on plains and lowland hills and presented a number of 
recommendations regarding urban water issues. LAWF was able to reach consensus on 
options for addressing iwi rights and interests in freshwater, and the use of market 
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mechanisms to address water transfers and over-allocation of water. According to LAWF 
staff, the only major issue on which the Forum did not reach consensus was water 
pricing. (See link to Analysis of LAWF recommendations: 
http://www.landandwater.org.nz/Site/Resources.aspx for a 2016 status report on 
government implementation of LAWF’s recommendations.) The Forum is engaging 
through 2017 on Phase 3, which entails formulating advice to Ministers on managing 
within water quality and quantity limits, further development of the National Objectives 
Framework, and review of overall changes to water policy and implementation.  
 4.5 New Zealand’s “Fresh Start” to Water Governance Reform  
  Soon after the LAWF process was underway, the Government embarked on a 
series of reforms known as the “Fresh Start for Fresh Water” program (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2013). Policy work on the reforms, co-led by the Ministry for the 
Environment and the Ministry for Primary Industries, was focused on improving the way 
New Zealand manages its freshwater resources. Although New Zealand’s central 
government led the reforms, ministers underscored that local communities, through their 
directly-elected councils, are best suited for making decisions about freshwater 
management in their region as they take into account local conditions, needs, and 
aspirations (Ministry for the Environment, 2013). 
  As described in the previous section, in 2009 the New Zealand national 
government tasked LAWF with developing recommendations for overhauling New 
Zealand’s land and water management scheme. In response to LAWF’s 
recommendations, the government developed and issued the first National Policy 
 94 
 
Statement for Freshwater Management in 2011 (NPS-FM 2011) that identified five 
matters of national significance:  
1) over-allocation of fresh water 
2) contamination of fresh water  
3) loss of wetlands 
4) incomplete integrated management 
5)  protection of wetlands.  
It directed regional councils to manage water in an integrated manner while 
providing for economic growth within set water quality and quantity limits (Ministry for 
the Environment, 2013). Specifically, the NPS-FM 2011 mandated that regional councils 
set objectives for freshwater bodies that reflect national and local goals as well as 
establishing flow, allocation, and water quality limits to ensure those objectives are 
achieved. It also required councils to ensure iwi involvement in freshwater planning, and 
that their values are reflected in decisions about freshwater management (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2013). 
  Prior to the release of the NPS-FM 2011, the government introduced the Resource 
Management Regulations (Measurement and Reporting of Water Takes) to collect better 
information about how much water New Zealanders are using. These regulations apply to 
about 98 per cent of total national volume of water use authorised through resource 
consents (Ministry for the Environment 2016). Water diversions of more than 5 litres per 
second were required to install water meters by November 2016 (Ministry for the 
Environment 2016). 
  In 2013, the government initiated a process to amend the NPS-FM 2011, once 
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again based on LAWF’s recommendations, to improve the freshwater management 
system, and to provide clarity around a number of issues. These reforms are outlined in 
the March 2013 proposal paper “Freshwater reform 2013 and beyond.”  The key elements 
in the proposal included: 
1) strengthening national direction through amendments to the National Policy 
Statement on Freshwater Management to introduce a National Objectives 
Framework and better water accounting; 
2) improving scientific and economic information to support community discussions 
on fresh water; and   
3) improving the quality of decision-making through collaborative planning. 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2013).  
   In 2014, the NPS-FM was amended to adopt the National Objectives Framework 
(NOF), built on LAWF’s recommendations and the work of a Science Review Panel. 
This effort established a list of national freshwater values and described attributes 
associated with them. The NOF establishes numeric values, or minimum standards, for 
ecosystem health and human health. It was intended as a decision support tool to assist 
regional councils in setting freshwater objectives and limits in their regional plans. Under 
the NPS-FM 2014, all councils are required to set quality and quantity objectives and 
limits for water bodies by 2025, although some exceptions do apply. 
  In February 2016, the government released another consultation document, Next 
Steps for Fresh Water, proposing additional freshwater reforms including the use of a 
Macroinvertebrate Community Index as a measure for water quality; a phased stock 
exclusion requirement from waterways; technical efficiencies and development of good 
 96 
 
management practices for non-point source water pollution; a $100 million freshwater 
improvement fund; and policies intended to improve iwi  participation in freshwater 
decision-making. All of these proposals were informed by policies discussions developed 
through the LAWF process. The Environment Minister and Ministry for the Environment 
staff held a series of public forums and hui (public meetings hosted by local iwi) around 
the country to solicit feedback on the proposed reforms.  
4.6 New Zealand Regional Planning Framework 
  It is important to note that LAWF’s work focused on policy changes that needed 
to occur at both the central and regional levels. New Zealand’s integrated management 
framework is primarily delivered at the regional level by the 11 regional councils and six 
unitary authorities, who are responsible for planning, implementing, and enforcing 
policies and programs around fresh water, land use, soil conservation, and the coastal 
marine area (RMA §14(1)).  
  For the first two decades of the Resource Management Act’s operation, part of the 
statutory regime that was meant to guide regional councils in freshwater planning and 
management was not yet in place (Warner & Baker-Galloway, 2015). This meant that, 
prior to the promulgation of the first NPS in 2011, each regional council established its 
own policies to enact the Resource Management Act—with variable results (Eppel, 
2016). The NPS-FM was introduced in 2011 to give national direction to regional 
councils managing freshwater resources. It required that overall water quality must be 
“maintained or improved” within a region (Ministry for the Environment, 2016, p. 8). It 
also required that councils adopt water quality and quantity objectives and limits for 
water bodies by 2025 (or 2030 in certain circumstances) as part of their regional plans. 
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The consequence of not having limits was a failure to protect in-stream interests, over-
allocation of water quantity, and a reduction in water quality (e.g., assimilated capacity).  
  Prior to promulgation of the NPS-FM, almost all regional councils had developed 
regional plans or proposed plans relating to freshwater. However, it is significant to note 
that very few regional councils had established numerical freshwater objectives or limits 
as part of their plans. Research on reasons for lack of progress revealed that local 
governments struggled to undertake their water planning functions on account of lack of 
resources, capacity, and political capability (Memon & Kirk, 2011).  
  The success of freshwater reforms relies heavily on the buy-in and support of 
regional governments. LAWF included representatives from regional governments to 
ensure that their perspectives were included. Capacity and adequate resourcing of 
regional government efforts was an issue that was arose frequently at LAWF discussions. 
LAWF emphasized that New Zealand’s integrated water management framework relies 
heavily on a partnership of central government guidance and support with regional 
government implementation. 
4.7 Discussion and Analysis of New Zealand Case Study Findings 
  A key focus on this case study research was to gain a better understanding of the 
role of New Zealand’s collaborative governance network in transforming integrated water 
management policies. I was particularly interested in understanding the determinants that 
led to the success of the Land and Water Forum when previous attempts by the 
government had failed. In order to gain a more in-depth understanding of the Land and 
Water Forum process, extensive document and archival research was conducted along 
with direct observation through attendance at multiple LAWF meetings (both of the 
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plenary and small groups), public meetings, and agency discussions around the 
freshwater reform process. I conducted 24 key informant and participant semi-structured 
interviews to provide an additional source of evidence to test my initial observations and 
interpretations. A detailed description of specific methods is provided in Chapter 3. 
Outlined below are the research findings, key themes, and lessons learned that emerged 
from the research evidence. 
   To validate findings gleaned through direct observation, extensive document 
research, and archival research, I conducted semi-structured interviews to gain a more in-
depth understanding of New Zealand’s freshwater reform process and the role of 
networks in water governance. As described in Chapter 3, Research Design and Methods, 
a purposive sample of key informants and government officials involved in freshwater 
policy development was employed for the interviews. This involved sampling a broad 
cross-section of Land and Water Forum members to ensure a diverse range of viewpoints 
and perspectives including the following interests areas: agricultural (horticultural, 
ranching, and dairy operations); forest management; hydropower generators; Maori 
(indigenous perspectives); environmental and conservation; science researchers and 
academics; and regional governments. Ten public officials (policy makers and regulators 
from central and regional governments) who served as “active observer” participants in 
the LAWF process were also interviewed.  
  To develop the interview protocol, I relied upon the information gleaned through 
extensive document reviews, direct observations from attending LAWF meetings, 
consultation with public officials familiar with the Forum process and players, and input 
from academic advisors in New Zealand. Semi-structured interviews provided rich data 
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about the LAWF process and network governance approach to freshwater policy 
development in New Zealand. The following key themes emerged from the LAWF 
interview data: 
 legitimacy and authority of the LAWF governance network  
 mutual learning and knowledge transfer fostered through the collaborative 
processes 
 the importance of building trust and social capital  
 the essential role of leadership  
 limitations and constraints on decision-making  process 
Drawing on information from the interviews, I discuss these key themes in more detail 
below. 
Legitimacy and Authority  
  As noted in the background section above, New Zealand’s government-led 
freshwater reform process had stalled around 2008. Key informants and all interviewees 
spoke to the creation of LAWF’s network governance approach as a key turning point. 
As one interviewee noted: 
LAWF broke the political stalemate and created a mandate for the 
government to Act. LAWF was instrumental in getting the government 
to move on water issues. Before LAWF there was an inability for 
bureaucratic institutions to work collaboratively and they failed to bring 
together stakeholders. 
 
Although LAWF was a group of interested parties, it needed to be democratically 
anchored with power and authority (Koliba et al., 2011). Another LAWF member 
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observed that the Ministers bestowed LAWF with authority and thus provided the 
legitimacy LAWF needed to keep actors working together in the network:  
One of the most critical elements of the LAWF process was having a 
mandate from government. Previous efforts had waxed and waned 
depending on the government in power at the time. LAWF was 
autonomous and nested: two critical elements to LAWF’s success. The 
Ministers provided legitimacy for the process which was essential for 
making progress on freshwater reforms. 
 
Four interviewees noted the importance of LAWF’s autonomy as a critical element. One 
shared that:  
Government allowed LAWF autonomy which was critical to the process. This 
independence created the space to enable dialogue among key actors. LAWF 
helped move the freshwater reform process from inertia to action. 
 
The legitimacy of networks is a key theme that arose from both the literature 
(Koliba et al., 2011, Keast et al., 2014) and interview data. LAWF represented a 
collaborative network of mainly non-state actors that managed to achieve broader public 
goals. Political leaders created the charge and granted LAWF the authority and support it 
needed to function autonomously. The authority not only resided with LAWF as an 
organization, but with each group involved in the network. It is also important to note 
that LAWF addressed very similar problems that the New Zealand Government had 
failed to address almost a decade before. By involving stakeholders and the public in the 
design and development of integrated water policies, LAWF was able to break down 
institutional barriers and facilitate change in the policy making process.  
Collaborative Learning Process 
  A theme that strongly emerged from the interview data pertained to LAWF’s role 
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in fostering a collaborative forum for constructive dialogue, knowledge transfer, and 
mutual learning. The literature also points out that networks are regarded as a more 
effective means of governance with a potential to foster learning both on a collective and 
individual level (Schusler & Krasny, 2008). LAWF represented a wide range of 
organizations and interested parties with stakes in the outcome of integrated water 
management. The Forum engaged the participants in an intensive and creative process of 
consensus building (Gray, 1989; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000) that led to more creative 
solutions and increased the likelihood of reaching consensus. The interview data showed 
that LAWF participants viewed the collaborative learning process as beneficial for 
fostering a greater understanding of recognition of New Zealand’s water problems. The 
following quotes gleaned from interviews illustrate the high regard for the collaborative 
learning process: 
 Through LAWF, I recognized the need to work collectively instead of 
competitively. 
 It got people talking to each other instead of litigation.  
 LAWF created cross-sector conversations that fostered a greater understanding of 
each other’s perspectives on water management. This led to more meaningful 
conversations with a share language. 
 LAWF created a ‘safe space’ for dialogue and allowed us to walk in each other’s 
shoes. 
  This new governance paradigm in New Zealand demonstrated that a polycentric 
organization like LAWF, where multiple actors from different institutions contributed to 
water policy development, was a more effective way to move forward freshwater reforms 
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than through a single-decision making authority (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2011).  
  Mutual learning and understanding of each group’s value, interests and 
motivations created a space where collaboration was possible, even around challenging 
water issues. Based on discussions with key informants, interview data and direct 
observation, it appears that reaching a common understanding on water issues was a key 
factor in LAWF’s success in developing a wide array of consensus-based policy 
recommendations. By reading media accounts, attending public meetings, and 
discussions with key informants, LAWF appeared to be instrumental in changing public 
views about freshwater management across New Zealand. This is in stark contrast to the 
government-led efforts that were perceived as a “government knows best” approach and 
failed to garner public or stakeholder support. 
  Iwi involved in LAWF also identified collaborative learning as a key element to 
LAWF’s success. In the past, iwi had not been at the table with non-state actors but 
interacted predominantly with government officials. According to discussions with key 
informants, iwi rights and interests in water is a critical piece of New Zealand’s 
freshwater reforms that LAWF successfully reached consensus on. Two of the iwi 
interviewed for this research emphasized that a network governance approach proved 
beneficial in fostering a common language and more constructive conversations around 
integrated water management. One specifically commented:  
The LAWF process operates under a different paradigm that involves 
engaging, educating, deliberating, and deciding among the different 
stakeholders groups. LAWF clearly helped raise the profile of Māori 
engagement. Māori have real strength in collaboration and thus the 
LAWF process has worked well for Māori. We see a benefit to having 
everyone at the table engaged in policy formulation. The LAWF 
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process is different from business as usual where the government 
decides, announces, and then defends it method of decision-making.  
 
  Iwi viewpoints around managing water systems holistically, and balancing 
economic with ecological interests were incorporated into the LAWF’s governance 
principles and are reflected in many of their specific recommendations.  
LAWF Process Built Trust and Social Capital  
  LAWF built a pattern of trust and interdependence between actors to coalesce 
around water policy problems. It “emphasized relationships between actors rather than 
individual characteristics” (Keast et al., 2014, p. 17). Interview data revealed that the 
collaborative learning process broke down barriers and created new working relationships 
that fostered trust among the different actors. Actors were able to move beyond their own 
self-interest to promote shared interests. Consistent with the network literature, LAWF 
created a “purposive collaborative network to leverage relationship assets” (Keast and 
Mandell, 2014). Based on research findings from discussions with key informants, 
interview data, and direct observations, LAWF enabled development of social capital that 
lead to development of innovative solutions on tough water policies.  
  Respect for the process and the ability to build trust were important factors in 
LAWF’s ability to reach consensus on many challenging water policies. All but one 
person interviewed shared this perspective:  
Personal relationships formed between interested parties that broke 
down communication barriers. These relationships are important for 
building change over the long term. Collaboration is a relatively new 
process for New Zealand, and LAWF has proved more successful than 




 Prior to LAWF, many of the parties around the table were involved in 
contentious debates or litigation. LAWF provided a “safe space,” as one interviewee 
described, for conversations and deliberations on often divisive issues. Discussions with 
key informants revealed that the Forum created a more transparent process for decision-
making versus a “black box” government-led approach. This appeared to engender a 
greater sense of trust and acceptance on policy outcomes since all parties were informed 
and engaged throughout the decision making process. As one interviewee explained: 
LAWF was able solve the political compromise problem by having the 
right people around that table. It’s about talking to people you don’t 
necessarily agree with. These relationships took time to develop, but 
eventually the dividends paid off through mutual cooperation and 
collaboration. LAWF produced a socialization process that developed 
strong emotional connections among the member group. 
 
  Through this process of building trust and social capital, LAWF was able to 
generate more creative and viable outcomes than prior efforts. Grounded in a horizontal, 
network governance approach, LAWF reduced competitiveness and increased 
cooperation. 
Strong Leadership and Commitment  
  Strong leadership and vision surfaced as another important theme from the 
interview data. As a former foreign trade negotiator and public official, the chair of 
LAWF played an important role in keeping the collaborative network approach moving 
forward and ensuring a convergence of viewpoints. One interviewee shared that: 
The chair provided skilful leadership with expertise in negotiating and 
mediating that served the LAWF process well. Mr. Bisley kept the 
process moving forward even during some contentious discussions. He 
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served as the ‘broker of the collaborative’ and was paramount to 
LAWF’s ability to reach consensus on tough water policy issues.  
 
 Water issues are very politically sensitive and in order to succeed, the network 
needed a strong chair to ensure the integrity of the process, build a shared framework of 
understanding, and foster inclusive solutions. The chair’s previous experience of working 
on contentious and complex issues gave him the credibility to serve as a “change agent.” 
These skills were necessary to develop policies and decisions acceptable to all 
stakeholders. 
  LAWF reports, government documents, and media accounts detail that the 
Ministers for the Environment and Primary Industries granted power and authority to 
LAWF to develop freshwater reform policy recommendations. Key informants 
commented that government Ministers’ endorsement of the process was a key factor in 
keeping people at the table. In past efforts, the government made it clear that LAWF was 
the “only game in town,” and advised stakeholders not to lobby Ministers or government 
officials directly. The LAWF process was viewed as the “go to” body to resolve 
differences and develop freshwater policy recommendations. Although state actors 
primarily served as “active observers” in the LAWF process, it is important to note that 
the chair possessed behind the scenes credibility and direct connection with Ministers. 
This allowed the chair flexibility to steer the process since Ministers had full confidence 
in his ability to facilitate sustainable agreements and deliver outcomes.  
Constraints on Decision Making 
 According to LAWF reports and discussions with key informants, the Forum 
reached consensus on over 230 recommendations around freshwater policy reforms. 
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Central and regional governments have acted on some but not all of these policy 
recommendations. (See link to Analysis of LAWF recommendations:  
http://www.landandwater.org.nz/Site/Resources.aspx.) An unexpected finding that was 
not well defined in the network literature was the concern that Government was “cherry 
picking” recommendations rather than trusting the consensus-based collaborative 
process. The perception was that the “rules of engagement” had somehow changed and 
that a political lens was being applied to LAWF’s recommendations. This dynamic 
created tension between LAWF members and government officials during the later phase 
of the process, especially around the issue of water allocation. 
  Key informant discussions and interview data revealed that LAWF members 
recognized that policy trade-offs occur as part of a network, collaborative approach; 
however, there appeared to be a lack of clarity around the ultimate decision making 
process for moving recommendations forward. Four LAWF members interviewed 
expressed frustration with the lack of control over the implementation process at both the 
central and regional level. This raised questions, in their mind, about the legitimacy of the 
policy outcomes. Table 4.1 provides a summary of strengths and weaknesses of New 




Table 4.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of New Zealand’s Land and Water Forum 
Strengths of Collaborative Network 
Process 
Weaknesses of Collaborative Network 
Process 
 Broad range of stakeholders 
representing range of viewpoints; 
opportunities for knowledge 
transfer and shared learnings 
 
 Small groups served as steering 
committee to shape policies for 
vetting with larger group 
 
 Consensus decision making 
process  
 
 Strong leadership model with 
independent chair serving as 
“broker of the collaborative” 
 
 Long-term commitment by 
network members. Result in strong 
ties and interdependencies; builds 
social capital and high levels of 
trust that kept majority of parties at 
the table 
 
 Separate Secretariat; not dependent 
on Ministry for staffing 
 
 Developed extensive list of water 
policy recommendations 
 
 Democratic anchorage from 
elected leaders and interests 
represented on LAWF 
 
 State actors have limited role, 
mainly as active observers; creates 
tension between horizontal and 
vertical lines of control 
 
 Recommendations crafted mainly 
by select group of members; lack of 
transparency on how groups were 
selected and how decisions in small 
groups were made 
 
 Challenging to reach consensus on 
some issues like water pricing 
 
 Network not an elected entity – 
lines of accountability are unclear 
 
 Resources provided by Ministries; 
not completely independent 
 
 Reliant on government for 
prioritization and decision making 
 
 Recommended actions need 





4.8 Comparison of New Zealand Study to Network Governance Literature 
  Network theory and New Public Governance framework provided useful 
constructs for understanding the factors at play in the LAWF process. What I observed 
around the LAWF process is consistent with key themes that emerged in the literature; 
however, a few new themes surfaced through the interview data. The following section 
includes a discussion of how network governance theoretical constructs performed in the 
New Zealand case. For each topic below, I present a brief review of the applicable theory, 
an application of the theory in the New Zealand case, and the resulting lessons learned.   
Collaborative processes. This case study research revealed that, in regards to 
shaping New Zealand’s national water policy, LAWF’s collaborative network 
governance was highly influential in advancing their freshwater reform process where 
previous efforts by the government had failed. New Zealand’s government’s attempt to 
move water policy reforms forward had stalled for a number of reasons including: a 
delivery through a top-down, bureaucratic approach; lack of stakeholder involvement in 
crafting policies; weak political leadership; insufficient resourcing; and lack of political 
acceptance. The Land and Water Forum was subsequently created to deal with a very 
complex, “wicked problem” that no one agency, organization, or group could deal with 
independently (Keast et al., 2014). It proved successful in reaching consensus on 
challenging water issues where previous agency-dominated efforts had failed. The Forum 
was established in the belief that this collaborative effort should not be steered by 
government officials. Instead, stakeholders needed to engage directly with each other if 
they were to find a way forward (Land and Water Forum, 2010). 
  Building on network and collaborative theories, the LAWF process represented a 
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pluralistic, process model of public policy decision making that  was “democratically 
anchored” with power and authority by key government ministers to lend legitimacy 
(Koliba et al., 2011). The research proposition at risk posited that shared power and 
horizontal relations are better suited to dealing with “wicked problems” such as 
integrated water management than a more vertical, command and control approach. This 
New Zealand case study demonstrates a shift from an “Iron Triangle” bureaucratic-led 
policy model to a structure and process that facilitated more expansive participation by a 
wide range of actors and interests. The Land and Water Forum process emphasizes the 
importance of building relationships and shared learning among key policy actors 
involved in water use and management. It represents a mixed form of administrative 
authority, and works across horizontal and vertical lines (Agranoff & McGuire, 2010). 
This network governance approach changed the dynamics around New Zealand’s 
freshwater reforms and proved successful at developing broad consensus on a wide range 
of policy options, many of which have been adopted by regional and central 
governments. 
  Interdependencies and strength of network ties. The network governance 
scholarship emphasizes that policy is formed in a network of interdependent actors and 
that interdependency is the core factor that initiates and sustains networks (Koliba et al., 
2011; Klijn & Koopernjan, 2012). When two actors enter into horizontal relationships, 
they break the traditional principal-agent dynamic of vertically arranged relationships 
(Koliba et al., 2011). Network theorists have equated the development of interpersonal 




  Consistent with themes from the literature, participants in New Zealand’s 
collaborative process recognized that the current policy process mechanisms were no 
longer working and new innovative solutions were needed. After years of effort, 
government officials had failed to move freshwater policies forward in New Zealand. 
Political stalemate coupled with intense public pressure contributed to the conditions for 
establishing a collaborative, network approach.  
  The creation of LAWF shifted responsibility for developing policy 
recommendations to a network of influential non-state actors, although it did not exhibit a 
true power-sharing relationship as outlined in the New Public Governance literature as 
the government maintained decision-making authority. The LAWF process did, however, 
create interdependencies among actors that led to a new way of framing the problem and 
developing policy recommendations that differed from previous attempts.  
  Through its extensive collaborative process, LAWF built substantial agreement 
among national-level stakeholders for addressing long-standing fresh water policy issues. 
Members were engaged in activities that went beyond making incremental changes to 
policies and institutions. Rather than finding compromises or quid pro quo arrangements, 
LAWF was able to create “new collective value” through mutual understanding and 
deliberation (Innes & Booher, 1999, p. 15). By focusing on relationships, rather than 
positions, the LAWF collaborative network emphasized building trust and mutual 
understanding and created new frames that allowed participants to find a new way of 
working together. Collaborative networks can “leverage relationship assets” to meet 
future outcomes by developing more innovative solutions (Innes & Booher, 1999, p. 35). 
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LAWF was able to tackle complex problems in a more flexible and multidimensional 
manner.   
  Trust in networks. Trust is cited often in the literature as a core coordination 
mechanism of networks (Klijn & Koopernjan, 2012; Keast et al., 2011; Provan & Kenis, 
2007; Ansell & Gash, 2008). Trust is an important asset to achieve in networks as it 
“reduces uncertainty and facilitates investments in collaborative processes among 
interdependent actors with diverging and sometimes conflicting interests” (Klijn & 
Koopernjan, 2012, p. 8). The literature also stresses that trust enhances the possibility that 
network actors will share information and develop innovative solutions (Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2012).  
  My research findings revealed that LAWF built a high level of trust among its 
members. Essential to LAWF’s success was its autonomy from government and the 
ability to remove policy blind spots affording non-state actors the opportunity to develop 
innovative solutions through a collaborative process. I posit that LAWF represents a New 
Public Governance approach as a multi-actor network operating through collaborative, 
horizontal ties. Through LAWF, there was a shift in responsibility for developing policy 
recommendations from state to non-state actors. Government agencies were no longer 
steering but served as “active observers” throughout the LAWF process. This created 
tension as government officials preferred to be in the driver’s seat for developing policy 
options. In essence, LAWF constituted a new form of collaborative network governance 
created to solve problems that could not be solved by one organization. As one LAWF 
participant reflected, “one of the Forum’s greatest strengths is its ability to move beyond 
political and bureaucratic inertia.”   
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  Democratic anchorage. As noted in the literature, accountability plays a key role 
in the success of networks. Sorensen and Torfing (2005) posit that “governance networks 
are democratically anchored to the extent that they are properly linked to different 
political constituencies and to a relevant set of democratic norms that are part of the 
democratic ethos of society” (p. 201). New Zealand’s case did lend legitimacy to the 
policy network both formally (via elected officials) and informally (via bureaucrats) 
representing citizens as well as particular interest groups.  
  Research findings indicate that LAWF created a new legitimate claim to authority 
in the policy making arena. Interview data revealed that there was strong allegiance to 
this new networked institution and associated outcomes that were deficient in previous 
government-led incarnations. Diverse groups worked together with a commitment to 
solving problems that government could not solve on its own. The external situation 
around rapidly declining water quality and unresolved water allocation problems placed 
an intense amount of pressure on LAWF to reach consensus. Political leadership also 
played a key role in moving the process forward. The LAWF chair, a former foreign 
trade negotiator with extensive government experience, exerted influential leadership 
with stakeholders, government Ministers, and agency officials. At least at the beginning, 
the Ministers were committed to the LAWF policy process and saw it as a way to work 
through thorny water issues that government could not do on its own.  
  One area of tension that emerged involved the extent of public involvement. 
Initially, LAWF engaged in an extensive public consultation effort. Prior to the release of 
its first report, Report of the Land and Water Forum: A Fresh Start for Fresh Water in 
2010, the Forum conducted public hearings around the country to gain public input and 
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feedback on its recommended proposals. The Forum’s efforts helped educate New 
Zealanders about water issues and raise awareness about the Land and Water Forum’s 
efforts to reform freshwater management. However, public engagement efforts declined 
as subsequent reports were developed. Some participants interviewed expressed concern 
about how the LAWF process had become more insular over the years as the LAWF 
process was not easily accessible to the public. Through my own experience, I found it 
challenging to locate agendas and meeting locations on the LAWF webpage. Concerns 
that LAWF had become an elite body of special interests with direct connection to the 
government could jeopardize its future legitimacy. 
 Social capital. This is formed in the bonds between actors and linked to 
organizational learning and knowledge transfer (Keast et al., 2011). Social capital, as 
defined by Putnam (1993), “refers to features of social organization, such as trust norms, 
and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions” (p. 167). Koliba, DeMenno, Brune, & Zia (2014) refer to social capital as a 
byproduct of horizontal relationships in networks and acknowledge that it may be cycled 
back into the network as an input. The case study research revealed that New Zealand’s 
collaborative network process developed strong ties between non-state actors and in turn 
did generate high levels of internal (within network) social capital. This dynamic created 
opportunities to frame a wide range of recommendations around integrated water 
policies. 
  Although LAWF exhibited strong internal social capital among non-state actors, 
the process did not appear to engender strong social capital with the state actors. Thus, 
while LAWF played a significant role in policy development, its influence around final 
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adoption and implementation of policies appeared limited. Ultimately, decisions on what 
policies to adopt and move forward remained with the government ministers and officials 
who were responsible for adopting and implementing LAWF’s policy recommendations 
(See link to Analysis of LAWF recommendations: 
http://www.landandwater.org.nz/Site/Resources.aspx.) 
This dynamic created tension between LAWF and government officials. Even 
though LAWF viewed itself as an autonomous network governance institution with 
independent staff, it still relied on state actors as they maintained legal and fiscal controls 
and functions (McGuire & Agranoff, 2010). LAWF had been granted legitimate power 
and authority to develop a new strategic direction for fresh water, and it appeared that 
some members were under the impression that if they were able to reach consensus, the 
government would support their policy recommendations.  
4.9 Summary  
   This in-depth case study analysis demonstrated how a network approach to 
integrated water management moved the freshwater policy discussions forward in New 
Zealand. The research presented in this chapter supports the proposition that networks are 
better suited than bureaucratic organizations to deal with wicked issues like water 
management. Networks have a greater potential than hierarchies to function as complex 
adaptive systems with capabilities for coordination between many different actors and 
organizations (Bennington, 2011). In the next chapter, I will present my Oregon case 




CHAPTER 5:  OREGON CASE STUDY 
 
 This chapter presents an in-depth case study examining Oregon’s institutions, 
policies, and actors involved in integrated water management, including the development 
of a statewide integrated water resources strategy. A focus of this case study research is 
to gain a better understanding of factors for success in collaborative networks engaged in 
developing integrated water policies. In particular, the aim was to gain a better 
understanding of the key institutions and actors shaping and constraining Oregon’s 
integrated water policy discussions. First, I set the stage with background information on 
Oregon water policies including a chronological history of water management, and an 
overview of Oregon’s legal and institutional frameworks. Next I provide a detailed 
account of Oregon’s Integrated Water Management Strategy development process 
through a collaborative, network governance approach. Finally, I present an in-depth case 
study discussion and analysis, including key research findings, an assessment using 
network governance theoretical constructs, and reflections on lessons learned. 
5.1 Water Management Challenges 
 Oregon is a coastal state located in the Pacific Northwest of the United States and 
known for its diverse landscape of forests, mountains, rivers, and beaches. The Cascade 
Mountains stretch across the entire state from north to south, producing areas with two 
distinct climates. West of the Cascades, a mild, moist marine climate prevails, while east 
of the Cascades lies Oregon’s high desert country with sparse rainfall and an extreme 
climate (See Figure 5.1). With more than 100,000 miles of rivers and streams, 360 miles 
of coastline, and more than 1,400 named lakes, Oregon is renowned for its water and 
 116 
 
natural beauty (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2012). Oregon boasts ample public 
lands with the federal government managing about 53 percent of the land in Oregon 
(Oregon Water Resources Department, 2017).  
 
Figure 5.1 Map of Oregon, USA (Source: One World - Nations Online) 
 
 
  Oregon’s water resources are an essential part of the state’s ecological and 
economic well-being for drinking water, recreation, industry, agriculture, and fish and 
wildlife. However, Oregon is facing a number of significant water resource management 
challenges. More than 1,861 water bodies are impaired and not meeting water quality 
standards (Department of Environmental Quality, 2010). Degradation of water quality 
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impacts public and watershed health, and diminishes the amount of fresh water 
immediately available to water users and the environment, and water quality degradation 
also contributes to water scarcity (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2010).  
  Regarding water quantity, nearly all of Oregon’s surface water is fully allocated 
during the summer months (irrigation season), with declining groundwater resources in 
some areas of the state (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2010). Opportunities for 
additional groundwater uses are limited by hydrologic connection to fully appropriated 
surface water, declining aquifers, and water quality issues (Oregon Water Resources 
Department, 2010). Some water is available during the winter months for storage; 
however, opportunities may be limited by the need to ensure ecological flows, 
environmental protections and minimum impacts to endangered species (Oregon Water 
Resources Department, 2010). There are also threats facing Oregon’s watershed 
ecosystems. Oregon’s streams and lakes provide substantial habitat and are vital for fish 
and wildlife to reside and reproduce. However, 24 fish populations have been identified 
as threatened or endangered under the Federal Endangered Species Act, while another 31 
are listed as state sensitive species (Water Resources Department, 2010). Managing the 
state’s water resources to protect and restore these species needs to be considered as part 
of integrated water management. 
  Lastly, Oregon also faces governance challenges in that water is rarely dealt with 
at one spatial or institutional level, and current approaches to water resource management 
make integration across spatial scales and institutions challenging. In addition, lack of 
funding for data collection and management and adequate agency staffing presents a key 
challenge to adequately manage water in Oregon. In this next section, I will provide a 
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more detailed overview of the complexities and challenges of Oregon’s water governance 
framework. 
5.2 Water Governance in Oregon 
  Water resources in the United States are typically managed under the model of 
American federalism with a sharing of power between the federal and state governments. 
Water governance in the United States is highly complex and fragmented. At the federal 
level, multiple federal agencies oversee implementation of federal statutes including the 
Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act (U.S. EPA), the Endangered Species Act 
(U.S. Fish and Wildlife and the National Marine Fisheries Service) and the Harbors and 
Rivers Act of 1899 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). Even though these federal laws 
provide overarching policy directives, each state supports their own water governance 
framework due to differing state government structures, policies, and implementation 
mechanisms. In Oregon, multiple state and local entities operate under a combination of 
federal and state laws, policies, administrative rules, and case law.  
  Historically, all of the state agencies involved in natural resource and 
environmental management have been organized along traditional resource allocation, 
management, and regulatory lines: agriculture, energy, environmental quality, fish and 
wildlife, forestry, geology, parks, state lands, and water. To illustrate the complexity of 
Oregon’s water governance framework, ten out of these fourteen state natural resource 
agencies
12
 manage some aspect of water. In addition to following federal and state 
                                                 
12Water Resources Department, Department of Environmental Quality, Department of Agriculture, 
Department of Fish and Wildlife Department of Land Conservation Development, Department of Energy, 
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legislative and executive directives, these state agencies receive guidance and direction 
from a myriad of citizen boards and commissions that sometimes result in conflicting 
water policies.  
 At the local level, hundreds of authorities known as special districts are involved 
in water management; these districts include, for example, water control, domestic water 
supply, irrigation, sanitary districts, water improvement, diking, ports, and soil and water 
conservation districts (Special Districts Association of Oregon, 2016). Most special 
districts are directed by a governing board elected by voters with financing through 
property taxes, fees for services, or a combination of both (Oregon Blue Book, 2015). 
This fragmented approach to water governance, at both the policy level and geographical 
scale, has resulted in organizational challenges, inefficiencies of scale, and ineffective 
mechanisms for managing water resources in an integrated way. This is of concern given 
increasing pressures from a growing population, physical scarcity, and climate change.   
  Another factor at play is that Oregon’s geopolitical boundaries, similar to many 
Western states, are not well suited for fostering integrated water management. In 1878, 
John Wesley Powell published his landmark Report on the Lands of the Arid Region 
(Powell, 1878) where he laid out a strategy for settling the West to minimize conflicts 
over scarce water. Powell suggested organizing settlements around watersheds as he 
believed that would force water users to conserve scarce water resources. Powell thought 
this arrangement would also make communities better prepared to deal with attempts to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Marine Board, Department of Parks and Recreation, Department of Forestry, Department of Geology and 
Mineral Industries, and the Watershed Enhancement Board. 
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usurp their water. Unfortunately, policy makers ignored Powell’s advice and instead, 
organized Western states by political boundaries (i.e., township and section lines) that 
disregard natural river basin areas. The absence of planning on a basin scale has posed 
enormous challenges for managing water resources, especially in the Western United 
States. Many states lack a governance framework that integrates water resources (quality 
and quantity, groundwater and surface water) and land use policies, and Oregon is no 
exception. Land use policies are included in my analysis to recognize the strong 
connection between water and land use. Proper land use management plays a role in 
minimizing development impacts to protect water quality. Moreover, with the pressures 
of an increasing population, Oregon’s communities need to adequately plan and prepare 
for meeting growing demands on a shared resource (Oregon Water Resources 
Department, 2012). 
  By the late 1800s, concerns around water availability had already created 
contention among Oregon farmers, fisherman, ranchers, and growing urban areas 
(Bastasch, 2006). The legendary quote attributed to Mark Twain, “whisky is for drinking; 
water is for fighting over” rang true. In Oregon prior to 1909, two competing approaches 
to water use co-existed, the riparian system and prior appropriation (Bastasch, 2006). 
Under the riparian system, based on English common law and widely used in the Eastern 
United States, only landowners with water flowing through their property have claims to 
the water. Riparian systems worked well in humid growing areas like the Eastern United 
States and England, where access to flowing water was not essential, nor limited, for 
agriculture. However, it does not work well in Western arid areas of the United States, 
where land is often located far away from water sources and irrigation is needed to grow 
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crops (Bastasch, 2006). In order to optimize use of scarce water resources in the west, a 
different system of water use emerged.  
 Since 1909, the prior appropriation system has been in effect when passage of the 
first unified water code introduced state control over the right to use water (Oregon Water 
Resources Department, 2013). The principle of prior appropriation allocates water to 
users based on the order in which water rights were acquired. This means the first person 
to obtain a water right on a stream is the last to be shut off in times of low streamflows 
(Oregon Water Resources Department, 2013). Under drought or water-short times, the 
water right holder with the oldest date of priority can demand the water specified in his or 
her water right without consideration for the needs of junior users (Oregon Water 
Resources Department, 2013). If there is a surplus beyond what is necessary to fulfill the 
senior right, the water right holder with the next oldest priority date can take what is 
available to satisfy needs under his or her right (Oregon Water Resources Department, 
2013). This continues down the line until there is no surplus or until all rights are 
satisfied, and the water permit application date usually becomes the priority date of the 
right (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2013).  
  The Oregon water code established four general principles that still are valid 
today: (1) “water belongs to the public; (2) any right to use it is assigned by the State 
through a permit system; (3) water use under that permit system follows the prior 
appropriation doctrine under which older water uses are entitled to water before newer 
uses; and (4) permits may be issued only for beneficial use without waste” (Bastasch, 
2006, p. 55). When the water code was ratified in 1909, the code’s provisions pertained 
only to surface waters, not groundwater (Bastasch, 2006). Starting in 1927, the state 
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required permits to use groundwater east of the Cascades; however, the Oregon 
Legislature did not authorize a statewide groundwater permitting system until the passage 
of the Groundwater Act of 1955 (Bastasch, 2006). In 1975, the Oregon Legislature 
created the Water Policy Review Board and merged the State Engineer’s Office with the 
State Water Resources Board to create the Oregon Water Resources Department (Oregon 
Water Resources Department, 2013). 
 The Oregon Water Resources Department implements the water rights permitting 
process. First, Department staff reviews the water rights application to ensure it is 
complete. Next, staff at the Department’s water rights section reviews the application to 
determine: “whether a statute or rule restricts the proposed use; whether the requested 
amount of water is available; whether any other issues would preclude permit approval, 
and, in the case of groundwater application, whether the proposed use is located in a 
designated critical groundwater area and thus restricted” (Amos, 2009, p. 20). Third, after 
consulting with other state agencies, the Department issues a public notice that includes a 
request for comments (Amos, 2009). Following the public comment period, the 
Department completes its application review and, within sixty days of completing the 
initial review, issues a proposed final order approving or denying the application, or 
approving the application with modifications or conditions (Amos, 2009). 
  The Department also administers Oregon’s Conserved Water Rights program. 
An early proponent of in-stream protections, Oregon started enacting a minimum 
perennial stream flow program in 1955 (Amos, 2009). In-stream water right means “a 
water right held in trust by the Oregon Water Resources Department for the benefit of the 
people of the State of Oregon to maintain water in-stream for public use” (ORS 537.332). 
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In 1987, the Oregon legislature revamped instream protections by adopting the In-stream 
Water Rights Act that recognized the environmental value of leaving water in a water 
body (Amos, 2009). Under this Act, in-stream water rights were granted equal footing 
with all other water rights. Unlike agricultural, municipal, or industrial uses, which 
represent private out-of-stream applications of water, the Water Resources Department 
holds in-stream rights in trust, and the water remains in its natural stream for public use 
and benefit (Amos, 2009). The In-stream Water Rights Act fundamentally changed water 
use in Oregon by recognizing that in-stream water rights provide a public benefit and 
therefore satisfies the statutory beneficial use
13
 requirement (Amos, 2009). In particular, 
the Act recognized that public use includes, but is not limited to, the following: (1) 
recreation; (2) conservation, maintenance, and enhancement of aquatic and fish life, 
wildlife, fish and wildlife habitat and other ecological values; (3) pollution abatement; or 
(4) navigation (ORS 537.332). 
 Turning to water quality, pollution in Oregon’s major river, the Willamette River, 
was one of the first environmental issues raised by Oregon’s citizens. In 1938, Oregon’s 
first agency focusing on the environment was established: the Oregon State Sanitary 
Authority (Department of Environmental Quality website). The Oregon Legislature 
directed it to address point source discharges from industrial and municipal facilities, and 
                                                 
13 Beneficial use of water is defined in both Oregon statute and rule. In statute, beneficial use is defined as 
“municipal, domestic, irrigation, power development, industrial, fish and wildlife, recreation, and pollution 
abatement” uses (ORS 536.300). In rule, beneficial use is defined “as an instream public use or a use of 
water for the benefit of an appropriator for a purpose consistent with the laws and the economic and general 
welfare of the people of the state and includes, but is not limited to, domestic, fish life, industrial, irrigation, 





clean up pollution in the Willamette River (Department of Environmental Quality 
website). In 1969, the Oregon Legislature created a new, independent agency, the Oregon 
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), charged with cleaning up and protecting 
the state’s water, land, and air (Department of Environmental Quality website) 
   The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 was the first major U.S. law to 
address water pollution. Growing public awareness and concern for controlling water 
pollution led to sweeping amendments by Congress in 1972 (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency website). Congress amended the law in 1972, when it became 
commonly known as the Clean Water Act (CWA), and goal of making waters of the 
United States swimmable and fishable by 1985. These amendments established a water 
quality permit program focused on point sources,
14
 gave the U.S. EPA authority to 
implement pollution control program for industry, maintained existing requirements to 
set water quality standards for all contaminants in surface waters, and funded the 
construction of wastewater treatment plants (U.S. EPA) Under the CWA, U.S. EPA 
approves water quality standards for each state, and while Oregon has the ability to 
establish water quality standards, state standards must meet or exceed federal standards. 
Subsequently, in 1987, the CWA was amended to address non-point
15
 sources, and soon 
                                                 
14 Point source refers to when water pollutant comes from a single location,  such as discharges from the 
end of pipes or ditches. The term “point source” is defined as “any discernible confined and discrete 
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, 
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural storm water discharges and 
return flows from irrigated agriculture (CWA §502(14))  
15 Non-point source refers to diffuse sources of water pollution. The term is defined to mean “any source of 
water pollution that does not meet the legal definition of “point source” in section 502(14) of the Clean 
Water Act (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, n.d.).  
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after, DEQ began issuing permits requiring cities, counties, and sewerage agencies to 
comply with best management practices to control pollutants in stormwater runoff that 
ends up in rivers and streams (Department of Environmental Quality website).  
  At the state level, in 1971, the Oregon Legislature passed the Forest Practices Act 
that sets standards for the commercial harvesting of trees on Oregon’s forestlands, 
including a major focus on the protection of water resources (Oregon Department of 
Forestry). In 1993, the Oregon Legislature passed the Agricultural Water Quality 
Management Act, also known as Senate Bill 1010. This bill designated the Oregon 
Department of Agriculture to be the lead agency to address non-point source water 
pollution from agricultural sources. According to U.S. EPA, states report that non-point 
source pollution is one of the leading remaining causes of water pollution in the United 
States (U.S. EPA). The CWA was part of a set of federal environmental laws passed at 
the federal level with the goal of implementation at the state level.  
Another important piece of national legislation that affects water resources 
management in Oregon is the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). First passed by 
Congress in 1973, the ESA provides for “the conservation of species that are endangered 
or threatened throughout all or a significant portion of their range, and the conservation 
of the ecosystems on which they depend” (NOAA Fisheries, n.d.)  It affects public and 
private lands, although differently. On federal lands or for significant federal actions, the 
federal agencies have a positive mandate to restore listed threatened and endangered 
species. Non-federal lands and non-federal actions have a lesser standard to not “take” 
listed species.  
  Two federal agencies implement the Act: the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and 
 126 
 
NOAA Fisheries under the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. When 
species are listed as threatened and/or endangered, these agencies must designate habitat 
critical for species survival. Because Oregon’s rivers, streams and lakes provide critical 
habitat
16
 for listed species, the ESA plays an important role in shaping aspects of Oregon 
water policy. For example, the ESA has the potential to affect Oregon water policy 
including limiting water rights, increasing stream flows, and removing fish passage 
barriers, which in some cases are major dams. Fish passage must be addressed in 
locations where fish are currently or were historically present, and fish screens
17
 are 
encouraged on all water right diversions. In these instances, ESA requirements influenced 
state water policies, resulting in stronger management practices that addressed fisheries 
requirements.  
  Now that I have provided an overview and chronological history of federal and 
state laws affecting water governance, I will review Oregon’s institutional water 
framework along with the key state actors involved in managing the state’s water 
resources.  
5.3 Oregon’s Institutional Water Framework 
  Oregon’s institutional water framework includes a complex web of federal, state 
and local agencies involved in managing some aspects of Oregon’s water resources. (See 
Figure 5.2 Oregon Institutional Water Framework.) In addition, all but one of Oregon’s 
                                                 
16 Essential fish habitat describes “all waters and substrate necessary for fish spawning, breeding, feeding 
or growing to maturity (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, n.d.). 
17 Fish screens are designed to physically prevent fish from swimming or being drawn into a pipes, canals, 
hydropower turbines or other features that divert water. 
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water-related state natural resource agencies work with citizen boards and commissions 
that participate in developing water policy. In this section, I review the principal state 
agencies that are involved in managing Oregon’s water resources. In particular, two state 
agencies, the OWRD and DEQ, serve as the primary regulatory actors for water quantity 
and quality. The OWRD regulates water quantity, while the DEQ maintains primary 
jurisdiction over water quality.  
The OWRD, like most institutions, has adapted its mission over time to reflect the 
changing landscape. Their current mission is to “serve the public by practicing and 
promoting responsible water management through two key goals: (1) to directly address 
Oregon’s water supply needs; and (2) restore and protect streamflows and watersheds in 
order to ensure the long-term sustainability of Oregon’s ecosystems, economy, and 
quality of life” (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2013, p. 3). The Oregon Water 
Resources Commission, a citizen board appointed by the Oregon Legislature, uses its 
rule-making powers to set state water policy. OWRD implements the Commission’s rules 
and issues orders in the form of water right permits, transfers, adjudications, and other 
actions.  
The DEQ is responsible for protecting and enhancing Oregon’s water and air  
quality, managing the proper disposal of solid and hazardous wastes, and providing 
assistance in cleaning up contaminated properties and enforcing Oregon’s environmental 
laws (Oregon Blue Book online, 2016). Their mission is “to be a leader in restoring, 
maintaining and enhancing the quality of Oregon’s air, land, and water” (Department of 
Environmental Quality website, 2016). The citizen-based and legislatively appointed 






DEQ’s day-to-day work. As described in the section above, the DEQ implements the 
federal Clean Water Act; however, the Oregon Legislature delegated responsibility for 
water quality protection on agricultural lands to the Oregon Department of Agriculture 
and to the Oregon Department of Forestry for regulating water quality on non-federal 
forests. At the local level, cities, and counties are responsible for protecting water quality 
through comprehensive planning, stormwater management, and other programs (Oregon 
Water Resources Department, 2010).   
In addition to the water quality and quantity programs described previously, 
Oregon’s institutional framework encompasses many other facets of water management. 
The Public Health Division of the Oregon Health Authority administers the federal Safe 
Drinking Water Act, which regulates the quality of drinking water delivered through 
community water systems. The Department of Land Conservation and Development 
implements the Land Use Program that aims to ensure that land use policies take into 
account water availability prior to issuing new development permits. Department of State 
Lands administers the Wetland/fill Program, and the Parks and Recreation Department 
administers the state Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. Oregon’s Department of Fish and 
Wildlife (ODFW) plays a significant role in the water quantity allocation process, 
particularly as a commenter on water permits and transfer applications when the permits 
have an impact on fish and wildlife.  
  ODFW, the Parks and Recreation Department through the Oregon Scenic 
Waterway Act, and DEQ may request in-stream water rights to protect in-stream flows 
for fish and wildlife habitat, recreation or scenic values, or water quality purposes. 
However, the reality is that most of Oregon’s streams and rivers are over allocated, and 
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therefore limited water is available for in-stream purposes. When and if these in-stream 
water rights are issued, they are typically junior water rights, meaning senior out-of-
stream water rights must be met first before water can be allocated for in-stream uses. 
  Oregon’s land use planning policies also influence water management in Oregon. 
Oregon’s land use planning law, SB 100, enacted primarily to preclude unrestricted 
development of forest and farmland, established clear statewide goals (Oregon 
Department of Land Conservation and Development). Oregon’s planning laws define the 
“land” in “land use plan” to include “water, both surface and subsurface” (ORS 
197.015(5)). Although 15 of the 19 statewide land use planning goals specifically 
reference water resources, very little practical direction is provided to local planners to 
assist them as they develop their comprehensive plans as they are required to do under 
Oregon land use planning goals (Bastasch, 2006, p. 288). Consequently, most 
comprehensive plans are not well coordinated with local or regional water supplies or 
water management realities (Bastasch, 2006, p. 288). 
  In response to growing concerns about federal listings of threatened and 
endangered fish species, the Legislature created the Governor’s Watershed Enhancement 
Board (GWEB) in 1987 to offer lottery-funded state grants for fish habitat-improvement 
projects. GWEB was formed to foster locally-based approaches to improving watershed 
conditions and promoting better coordination and collaboration among state water 
agencies. In 1995, the Oregon Legislature unanimously passed House Bill 3441, which 
provided guidance for establishing these voluntary, non-regulatory watershed councils. In 
the following legislative session, Governor John Kitzhaber proposed the Oregon Plan for 
Salmon and Watersheds (the Oregon Plan), spawning an entire network of watershed 
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councils to restore watersheds by improving water quality and habitat for native fish. The 
Oregon Plan was endorsed and funded by the Oregon Legislature in 1997 through 
Oregon Senate Bill 924 (1997 Or. Laws, ch.7) and House Bill 3700 (1997 Or. Laws, ch. 
8). It represents a long-term, ongoing effort that began as a focused set of actions by 
state, local, tribal and private organizations and individuals in October of 1995 
(Executive Order No. EO 99-01). The Oregon Plan first addressed coho salmon on the 
Oregon coast, but was then broadened to include steelhead trout on the coast and in the 
Lower Columbia River, and later expanded to all watersheds supporting wild salmon 
populations throughout the state (Executive Order No. EO 99-01).  
  Implementation of the Oregon Plan created an entire new community-based, 
integrated approach to watershed management. Under the Oregon Plan, Governor 
Kitzhaber called for greater levels of collaboration and communication across water-
related state agencies. In 1999, the Legislature established the Oregon Watershed 
Enhancement Board (OWEB was the successor to GWEB) to administer grants and 
provide technical support to watershed councils. OWEB
18
 is led by a 17-member an 
interagency and citizen group that oversees watershed restoration efforts. Although 
OWEB is not directly involved in regulating or managing water resources, it plays a 
coordination role among federal and state natural resources agencies, and represents an 
                                                 
18Of OWEB’s seventeen members, eleven are voting members. Voting members include: At least 1 tribal 
representative, 5 citizen representatives, 1 member each from the following Oregon boards and 
commissions: Board of Forestry, Board of Agriculture, Environmental Quality Commission, Fish and 
Wildlife Commission, Water Resources Commission. Six are non-voting Board members. Five represent 
federal natural resource agencies with expertise in forest and agricultural land management, water quality, 
and salmon recovery, and one represents the Oregon State University Extension Service (Oregon 
Watershed Enhancement Board, n.d.).  
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institutional step forward towards integrating watershed management efforts. OWEB also 
provides significant funding for watershed restoration projects, and thus has played a role 
in influencing the water planning process (Amos, 2009). In particular, OWEB has 
adopted goals and priorities, both statewide and at the regional level, that form the basis 
of its funding decisions.  
  Next, as part of Oregon’s water governance framework, I will briefly touch upon 
the legal foundations of Indian water rights. Indian reserved water rights play an 
important role in Western water law, thus tribal involvement in integrated water 
management is included in this discussion of Oregon’s legal and institutional framework. 
It is also important to include the role of reserved rights given the importance of 
indigenous water management in the New Zealand case.  
5.4 Indian Reserved Water Rights in Oregon   
Although allocation of water resources is generally a matter of state law, the 
federal government also has the authority to allocate water rights (Congressional 
Research Service, 2011). In the United States, discussion around Indian water rights 
began with treaty negotiations carried out between the United States and Indian tribes in 
the Pacific Northwest (Mecham, 2016). In 1854 and 1855, a number of Pacific Northwest 
Indian Tribes entered into treaties with the U.S. Government (Mecham, 2016). A 
common feature of these treaties is the “express reservation of tribal hunting, fishing, and 
gathering rights on-and off-reservations” (Mecham, 2016, p. 9). In most of these treaties, 
tribes reserved the “exclusive rights of taking fish in all streams running through and 
bordering” the Reservation (Mecham, 2016, p. 9). The treaties also expressly reserved the 
right to fish at usual and accustomed fishing sites off the Reservation “in common” with 
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non-Indian settlers (Mecham, 2016, p. 9). Access to fishing and water rights, which does 
not necessarily mean exclusive use, is a contentious issue that has played out mainly in 
the courts.  
  In 1905, a major legal test of Indian reserved fishing rights played out in the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the case United States v. Winans (198 U.S. 371). The case attempted to 
resolve a conflict between members of the Yakama Nation who had been blocked from a 
traditional Columbia River fishing site by landowners who had obtained a patent for the 
land from the U.S. government. The Supreme Court held that “the treaty was not a grant 
of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them, a reservation of those [rights] not 
granted” (198 U.S. 381). Soon after, in 1908, the Supreme Court issued a landmark 
decision addressing tribal reserved water rights in United States v. Winters (207 U.S. 
564). Justice Joseph McKenna, in writing for the Court, opined that when a reservation of 
land for the Indians was established, adequate water to meet the needs of the reservation 
was also implied in that reservation (Mecham, 2016). The Court found, as in the previous 
Winans decision, that water was reserved for the tribes as part of the federal trust 
responsibility (Mecham, 2016). The federal Indian trust responsibility, one of the most 
important principles in federal Indian law, is a legal obligation under which the United 
States “has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust” 
toward Indian tribes as described in Seminole Indians v. United States (316 U.S. 286). It 
is also a “legally enforceable fiduciary obligation on the part of the United States to 
protect tribal treaty rights, lands, assets, and resources” (U.S. Department of Interior, 
Indian Affairs, n.d.). 
 The Winters and Winans Supreme Court decisions provide the legal framework 
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for Indian reserved water rights in Oregon. Although Indian tribes are entitled to water 
under the reserved rights doctrine as determined by the courts, Congress provided states 
with authority to adjudicate
19
 federal water rights under the McCarran Amendment (43 
U.S.C. 666), which waived the United States immunity from lawsuits (Anderson, 2006). 
States, including Oregon, are at the center of efforts to decide Indian reserved water 
rights (Anderson, 2006). These rights are determined on a case by case basis, usually 
through lengthy water right litigation or adjudication processes.  
 In all water right adjudications, the United States government, as part of their 
federal trust responsibility towards the Tribes, participates as trustee on behalf of any 
Tribe with reserved water right claims in the basin being adjudicated. In many cases, 
Tribes also participate in the adjudication on their own behalf. In addition, the United 
States Supreme Court has made it clear that if tribal reserved water rights are adjudicated 
in state courts under the McCarran Amendment, “[s]tate courts, as much as federal 
courts, have a solemn obligation to follow federal law” that applies to the Tribe’s water 
rights (43 U.S.C. 666). In addition, should the state court not follow federal law, “any 
state court decision alleged to abridge Indian water rights protected by federal law,” if 
appealed to the Supreme Court, “can expect to receive a particularized and exacting 
scrutiny” (Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983)).  
  Tribal water right claims frequently conflict with state law-based rights held by 
                                                 
19 Water right adjudication is the legal process to determine who has a valid water right. In Oregon, this 
entails a process by which pre-1909 vested water rights are quantified and documented through an 




non-Indians, and, in many river basins, there is insufficient water to satisfy both Indian 
and non-Indian water rights claims. For example, in 2013 the state of Oregon completed a 
lengthy adjudication process, culminating 38 years of work, to determine surface water 
rights in the Klamath River Basin (Oregon Water Resources Department, n.d.) The state 
determined that the most senior claims are held by the United States in trust for the 
Klamath Tribes as these claims carry a priority date of “time immemorial” (Oregon 
Water Resources Department, n.d.). The tribal claims were recognized for certain reaches 
of the major tributaries to Upper Klamath Lake, and for Upper Klamath Lake itself. Other 
tribal claims were denied for streams outside the boundaries of the former Klamath 
Indian Reservation (Water Resources Department). The exercise of the very senior water 
rights that were granted to the Klamath Tribes have required that junior non-tribal water 
right holders curtail or halt all water use such as irrigation or stock watering.  
  The uncertainties and complexities of both adjudication and legal processes have 
prompted many tribes to engage in settlement negotiations directly with the federal 
government to determine their reserved water rights (Anderson, 2006). In 1997, the water 
right claims of the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation in central 
Oregon were resolved through negotiations between the State of Oregon, the Tribes, and 
the federal government. The settlement made certain that the Tribes would have adequate 
water resources for current and future needs, clarified the sovereignty of the Tribes over 
the administration of their water rights and provided legal protections for non-tribal water 
right holders in the Deschutes River basin (American Indian Law Center, 2013). This 
settlement avoided the lengthy and contentious water right adjudication process described 
above. Also, at the request of the Oregon Governor and the Confederated Tribes of the 
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Umatilla Indian Reservation Chairman, the Department of the Interior established a 
federal negotiation team in 2012 to work with the State and the Tribes toward a 
negotiated settlement of unresolved claims for in-stream flows and consumptives uses 
such as irrigation; these negotiations are ongoing. (Personal communications with D. 
Mecham, U.S. Department of Interior, March 2, 2017.) 
  What this means is that as Sovereign governments, Indian Tribes play an 
important role in integrated water governance and management policies in Oregon. The 
recognition of this special relationship between the Tribes and the state was outlined in 
state legislation creating Oregon’s integrated water strategy. The next section provides a 
detailed account of the history and factors leading to formation of Oregon’s Integrated 
Water Resource Strategy.  
5.5 Oregon’s Integrated Water Resources Strategy  
  As the need for water grows in Oregon, tension around the allocation and 
regulation of scarce water has increased. Oregon faces growing challenges in managing 
its water resources with fully or over allocated surface water (during summer months), 
declining groundwater levels, impaired water quality, and threatened and endangered fish 
species. Changing conditions, including climate variability, population growth, land use, 
and other factors have heightened concerns around the future of Oregon’s water 
resources. The Oregon Progress Board’s State of the Environment Report 2000 identified 
a concern about the adequacy of Oregon’s water supply. Oregon Water Resource 
Commissioners and state lawmakers shared apprehensions about unresolved water 
resource management issues and the lack of strategic direction and vision. Starting in 
2007, the Water Resources Commission recognized the need for more adequate resources 
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for the Oregon Department of Water Resources. This included additional staff to 
implement existing programs and funding for additional water availability studies and 
monitoring data. At the time, Oregon was one of only two western United States without 
an integrated water plan.  
 It is important to note that this interest in integrated water planning was not new 
to Oregon. In 1955, the Oregon Legislature mandated a coordinated, integrated state 
water resources policy (ORS 536.220) and the Oregon Water Resources Department 
developed a basin program to implement this effort. Basin plans were developed for each 
basin and these plans acted as state administrative rules to establish “future allowable 
water uses in, and other water regulations specific to, Oregon’s eighteen major river 
basins” (Bastasch, 2006, p. 78). These basin plans were focused on future allocations and 
did not affect previously issued water rights or permits. The intent of the basin program 
was to balance existing and future water needs with the public interest for each basin. 
However, the plans became mired in bureaucratic requirements and were not widely 
supported by the local users. They focused on basin-by-basin classification and lacked an 
over-arching state water policy or strategic direction (Bastach, 2006). The state 
experimented with different forms of basin programs throughout the 1990s, but results 
and legislative acceptance were mixed (Bastasch, 2006). Given the challenges of 
implementing the basin plans and shifting budget priorities, OWRD abandoned basin 
programming in the late 1990s. 
   Being mindful of past efforts, the Water Resources Commission and Department 
began laying the groundwork for another water planning effort in 2007. Concerned about 
growing conflicts around limited water supplies, the Oregon Water Resources 
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Commission encouraged the OWRD to initiate a strategic planning process utilizing an 
integrated water management approach. At the same time, several legislators (including 
the author) expressed an interest in developing a comprehensive and integrated water 
strategy for Oregon. The Legislature provided funding for a data-gathering exercise to 
improve the state’s ability to forecast water demands, as well as to identify opportunities 
for conservation, water reuse, and water storage. In early 2008, the Oregon Legislature 
passed SB 1069 directing the Oregon Water Resources Department (WRD) to establish a 
statewide Water Conservation, Reuse, and Storage Investment Fund to provide grants for 
the planning and feasibility studies necessary to develop community water supply 
projects. The Legislature also provided cost-share funding for communities engaged in 
long-term water planning. 
Researcher Involvement in the Oregon Case Study 
  Before continuing, I wish to point out that, starting in 2007, the author served as 
an Oregon State Representative and later Senator, and in these roles, was involved in the 
policy making process as chair of the Environment Committee. The author, along with 
several other legislators, was concerned about Oregon’s siloed regulatory framework and 
the inability to manage Oregon’s water resources in an effective and efficient manner. In 
Oregon, water quality and quantity is managed separately and the complexity of water 
issues demanded a more coordinated approach. Also, Oregon did not have a long-term 
plan or vision for future water use and management.
20
  
                                                 




  As committee chair, the author approached the Institute for Water and Watersheds 
(IWW) at Oregon State University and the Oregon University System Institute for 
Natural Resources (INR) to lead workshops to gain input from Oregonians about water-
related challenges and their vision for water in the 21st Century. Oregon Sea Grant 
Extension (OSGE) joined the team to plan a series of water roundtables, as they came to 
be called, that were open to all interested Oregonians. Sponsors from government, private 
industry, nonprofits, and individuals interested in Oregon’s water future provided 
funding. In September-October 2008, the OSU team held five roundtables in Bend, 
Newport, Ontario, Medford, and Salem “to receive input and advice from Oregonians and 
develop information to inform efforts to identify and communicate a vision for water 
management” (OSU Institute for Water and Watershed, Oregon Sea Grant Extension, 
OUS Institute for Natural Resources, & Oregon House Committee on Energy and 
Environment, 2008, p. 5). Roundtable attendees were asked to respond to eight questions 
designed to identify their interests and the source of their water. They were also asked 
which of the following five factors – quantity, quality, economic, ecological, and social - 
they valued most about Oregon and its water (OSU Institute for Water and Watershed, 
Oregon Sea Grant Extension, OUS Institute for Natural Resources, & Oregon House 
Committee on Energy and Environment, 2008, p. 5). A final summary report synthesizing 
the roundtable results was issued in December 2008. These roundtables set the stage for 
subsequent discussions about integrated water management. Key themes that emerged 
from the water roundtables were: 
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 One size does not fit all; regions vary greatly and regional differences need to be 
recognized; 
 Public information and education about water use and management are needed; 
and 
 Oregon needs integrated water management and implementation. (OSU Institute 
for Water and Watersheds et al., 2008, p. 12). 
The data from the Oregon Water Supply and Conservation Initiative, along with 
feedback from the statewide roundtables, helped inform policy discussions at both the 
legislature and the Water Resources Commission regarding Oregon’s future water needs. 
The author co-led these discussions at the legislature along with two members of the 
House, Representatives Bob Jenson, and Jefferson Smith. This convergence of interests 
by both elected and appointed policy makers helped propel discussions about the need for 
a statewide integrated water strategy. During the 2009 Legislature session, legislative 
work groups were convened and ultimately, public hearings were held in the House of 
Representative and at the Joint Committee on Ways and Means.
21
 During these 
deliberations, Oregon’s Legislature posed two questions essential to Oregon’s water 
future: what is the current state of Oregon’s water supply relative to its needs; and what 
must Oregon do to ensure that sustainable supplies of clean and abundant water are 
available to meet future in-stream and out-of-stream needs? The result was a bi-partisan 
bill, HB 3369, intended to address Oregon’s water resource management challenges and 
                                                 
21 The Joint Committee on Ways and Means is the legislative appropriations committee that determines 
Oregon’s budget policy. Both Senate and House members serve on the committee to facilitate adoption of a 
biennial budget (Oregon State Legislature, n.d.). 
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account for coming pressures by developing an Integrated Water Resources Strategy 
(Strategy).  
  HB 3369 directed the Water Resources Department to develop a state-wide 
integrated water strategy to help Oregon meet its future water needs in terms of water 
quantity, water quality, and ecosystem functions. It also established a Water Investment 
Grant Fund for water-related infrastructure needs. The Oregon Water Resources 
Department was to work in close cooperation with DEQ and ODFW to develop an 
integrated water Strategy in consultation with other state, local, and federal agencies, 
other states, Indian tribes, stakeholders, and the public, with updates every five years. HB 
3369 passed both chambers of the Oregon Legislature with a 43-16 vote (one excused) in 
the House and a 20-9 (one excused) vote in the Senate (Oregon State Legislature). The 
bill was signed by the Governor Kulongoski and became effective on August 4, 2009 
(Oregon State Legislature). 
  At the same time that legislators were discussing and debating integrated water 
management at the Capital, Water Resources Commissioners conveyed the urgency and 
need for planning Oregon’s water future (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2010). 
To set the stage for discussion about Oregon’s Integrated Water Resources Strategy, four 
Water Resources Commissioners took the lead researching and writing seven “issue 
papers,” The issue papers provided background information for development of the 
Strategy and covered the following topics: a needs statement, water quantity, water 
quality, economic development, ecology and ecosystems, the implications of climate 
change, and culture, community, and water and were made available for public review 




  The Commission laid out the purpose of a strategic, integrated water plan 
including:   
 Encourage planning ahead  
 Balance competing needs  
 Promote wise use of water  
 Promote participation  
 Foster public health, safety & good will 
(Oregon Water Resources Commission Minutes, July 9, 2009) 
In addition, they crafted a vision for the Strategy: “A statewide integrated water resources 
strategy will bring various sectors and interests together to work toward the common 
purpose of maintaining healthy water resources to meet the needs of Oregonians and 
Oregon’s environment for future generations” (Oregon Water Resources Commission 
Minutes, 2009), and established a working group to guide the Commission through the 
Strategy development process. The Commission strongly recommended that the Strategy 
be developed through a collaborative process and stated that “a participatory approach is 
an effective means for achieving consensus and long-lasting agreement. Real 
collaboration takes place only when stakeholders and the interested public are part of the 
decision-making process” (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2010, p. 7). They also 
recognized that “incorporating the views of a wide variety of governmental agencies, 
stakeholders, and the public will be a challenge, but is a key component to the success of 
such a Strategy” (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2010, p. 7).  
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  HB 3369 directed the Oregon Water Resources Department to work in close 
cooperation with the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, Oregon Department 
of Fish and Wildlife, and Oregon Department of Agriculture to develop the Integrated 
Water Strategy. Staff from these four agencies formed the project team who led the 
Strategy development process through the following five phases which are described in 
more detail below:  
 Phase 1 (2009): Drafted issue papers and key principles, developed workplan and 
public involvement strategy, and appointed three advisory groups including the 
Policy Advisory Group; 
 Phase 2 (2010): Identified statewide water needs through 11 open houses, a 
survey, stakeholder workshops, and briefings;  
 Phase 3 (2011): Developed a recommended actions progress report with a public 
comment period held on a 2011 discussion draft; 
 Phase 4 (2012): Released Oregon’s first Integrated Water Resource Strategy. 
Additional public comment held, boards/commissions briefings, final draft 
adopted June 2012; 
 Phase 5 (2012): Water Resources Commission adopted final Strategy in August 
2012 (Bateman and Rancier, 2012); 
 Post-adoption phase (2012-2017): OWRD staff transitioned to implementation 
and evaluation of Strategy that laid the foundation for budget and policy packages 
in 2013, 2015, and 2017 legislative sessions. Implementation also included rule 
making, launch of various new programs, and scientific analysis. (Personal 
discussions with OWRD staff).   
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 In the first phase, a set of strategy guiding principles were developed that 
mirrored Integrated Water Resource Management concepts of sustainability, 
accountability, integration, and collaboration (Bateman and Rancier, 2012). The Strategy 
guiding principles (see Table 5.1), vision, goals, and objectives were developed in 
consultation with advisory groups consisting of Water Resources Commission members, 
stakeholders, and members of the public (Bateman & Rancier, 2012). The issue papers 
were distributed for public comment along with the Strategy work plan.   
  Also during Phase 1, OWRD convened a Policy Advisory Group (PAG) to assist 
with identifying priorities and developing recommendations for inclusion in the Strategy. 
The PAG included 18 stakeholders and partners representing an Indian Tribe, irrigated 
agriculture, industry, local government, recreational users, and conservation 
organizations. (See Appendix F for details on PAG advisory group members.)  They 
developed a group vision that guided the PAG’s work (see Table 5.2). The collaborative 
group process was facilitated by an independent contractor and operated under a 
consensus decision-making basis, meaning that the Strategy included only recommended 
actions where agreement could be reached, or there was no objection raised against 
inclusion of an action. PAG discussions and recommendations were instrumental to the 
successful development of the Strategy. The Water Resources Commission appointed one 





Table 5.1 Guiding Principles of Oregon’s Integrated Water Resources 
Strategy 
The Strategy’s guiding principles emphasized the following: 
 Accountability  
 Balance 
 Collaboration 
 Conflict Resolution 




 Public Process 
 Reasonable Cost 









Table 5.2: Policy Advisory Group’s Vision for the Strategy 
Everywhere in our State, we see healthy waters able to sustain a 
healthy economy, environment, cultures, and communities. 
Healthy waters...are abundant and clean. A healthy economy...is a 
diverse and balanced economy, nurturing and employing the State’s 
natural resources and human capital to meet evolving local and global 
needs, including a desirable quality of life in urban and rural areas. A 
healthy environment...included fully functioning ecosystems, 
including headwaters, river systems, wetlands, forests, floodplains, 
estuaries, and aquifers. Healthy cultures and communities...depend on 
adequate and reliable water supplies to sustain public health, safety, 
nourishment, recreation, sport, and other quality of life needs. 
(Source: Oregon Water Resources Department, 2012) 
 146 
 
Two additional groups were formed to facilitate communication and coordination 
among state actors involved in water resource management: (1) An Oregon Agency 
Advisory Group consisting of 18 state natural resources, economic development and 
public health agencies, and the Governor’s office; and (2) a Federal Liaison Group, 
comprising 10 federal agencies that manage water, land, and fish and wildlife (Oregon 
Water Resources Department, 2012). Both of these groups met quarterly and provided 
technical information, guidance, and peer review throughout the Strategy development 
process. 
  During Phase 2 in 2009 and 2010, the PAG met quarterly to discuss, deliberate, 
and develop policy guidance and recommendations for addressing integrated water 
issues. In the spring of 2010, eleven open houses were held across Oregon to solicit 
public input on integrated water strategies. Participants were asked to identify the key 
water issues facing their communities and suggest solutions (Bateman and Rancier, 
2012). OWRD also facilitated multiple government-to-government meetings, dozens of 
stakeholder workshops, seven rounds of public comment, and continual opportunities for 
online, written, and verbal input (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2012). Based on 
input from the before-mentioned sources, the Department released a Strategy discussion 
draft for public comment in December 2011 under Phase 3, with a revised draft in June 
2012, Phase 4. Ultimately, the Oregon Water Resources Commission adopted the final 
version of the Strategy on August 2, 2012 under Phase 5 (Bateman and Rancier, 2012). 
Governor John Kitzhaber shared his vision about the importance of the strategy in the 
preface. He stated that “Benjamin Franklin once said that when the well runs dry, we 
realize the value of water. The Integrated Water Resources Strategy is a long-overdue 
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assessment that reflects how we value water here in the state of Oregon. Fortunately, our 
well hasn’t run dry, and with this kind of strategic planning, it won’t” (Oregon Water 
Resources Department, 2012, p. v). The Strategy focused on the following four 
objectives: 
1) Understanding Oregon’s existing water resources (i.e., water availability, 
quantity, management (point and non-point sources) 
2) Assessing in-stream and out-of-stream needs 
3) Identifying future pressures that affect needs and supplies  
4) Meeting Oregon’s in-stream and out-of-stream needs. (Oregon Water Resources 
Department, 2012). 
 Evaluating the state of existing water resources management and the impact of 
present and future demands on those resources, the Strategy recognized that many factors 
influence the future availability and use of Oregon’s water resources. These include, but 
are not limited to, climate change, expanding population, land-use changes, and rising 
energy costs (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2012). Accordingly, the Strategy 
attempted to address pressures that affect both water quality and quantity needs, and 
determine how to increase supplies to meet actual in-stream and out-of-stream demands 
given the over appropriation of existing supplies. Recommendations focused on “new” 
water supplies that can be realized through aggressive water conservation and reuse, 
along with the more traditional approach of developing water supply storage and 
development projects. Watershed restoration and fish protection were also recognized as 
an integral component of Oregon’s water Strategy.  
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   The final 2012 Strategy recommended over 40 actions to achieve integrated water 
management. A number of these actions focused on filling data gaps to achieve a better 
understanding of Oregon’s water resources and institutions (Bateman and Rancier, 2012). 
Others focused on targeted efforts such as funding for infrastructure development, 
improving water efficiency and conservation, promoting water re-use, protecting and 
restoring in-stream flows and habitat for fish and wildlife, and dedicated funding for 
implementation.   
Place-based Planning  
  Recognizing the importance of local communities engaging in integrated, place-
based water planning efforts, the Strategy accentuated the following (Recommendation 
9A):  
Place-based planning allows these conversations to take place at a scale 
that a statewide strategy may not be able to achieve. Voluntary place-
based plans can “roll up” and inform the statewide Strategy. Place-
based plans can leverage technical and funding resources available 
through the Strategy to make more meaningful local impacts. This 
approach is meant to empower communities to conduct voluntary, 
place-based integrated water resources planning in consultation with 
the State. (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2012, p. 79) 
 
Place-based planning was recommended because water problems are perceived as being 
local in nature and best handled at the basin level. This approach was of particular 
importance to the Water Resources Commission as it responded to citizen and local 
community concerns about the need to recognize regional differences. The Strategy 
recommended that, at a minimum, the State should create a planning template to ensure 
recognition of the public interest in water, robust public involvement, and a “balanced 
 149 
 
representation of all interests” (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2012, p. 80). This 
recommendation was developed in response to concerns by some stakeholders that a 
community-led planning process could be dominated by local interests, thus under-
representing public interests.   
  After adoption of the Strategy, the Oregon Legislature enacted additional bills 
targeted towards implementation. In the 2013 session, the Legislature passed SB 839 to 
provide funding, through grant and loan programs for water conservation, reuse, and 
storage projects. SB 839 passed both chambers of the Oregon Legislature with a 60-0 
vote in the House, and a 19-1 Senate vote (Oregon State Legislature). In 2015, the 
Oregon Legislature passed SB 266 authorizing the Oregon Water Resources Department 
to issue grants and outlining specific requirements for place-based water resources 
planning efforts including:  “(a) be developed in collaboration with a balanced 
representation of interests; (b) balance current and future in-stream and out-of-stream 
needs; (c) include the development of actions that are consistent with the existing state 
laws concerning the water resources of this state and state water resources policy; (d) 
facilitate implementation of local solutions; (e) be developed utilizing an open and 
transparent process that fosters public participation; and (f) be developed in consultation 
with the department”(Oregon State Legislature, 2016). SB 266 passed both chambers of 
the Legislature with a 55-4 vote (one excused) in the House, and a 19-7 (four excused) 
vote in the Senate (Oregon State Legislature, n.d.).  
  OWRD issued draft guidelines describing five steps and key planning principles 
central to the place-based planning efforts: 
 Step 1: Build a collaborative and inclusive process; 
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 Step 2: Gather information to understand current water resources and identify 
gaps; 
 Step 3: Examine current and future water needs for people, the economy, and the 
environment; 
 Step 4: Develop and prioritize strategic, integrated solutions to meet water needs; 
and 
 Step 5: Create and approve a local integrated water resources plan. 
 These guidelines were developed by the Department through a series of 
stakeholder workshops, public input, and assistance from several natural resource 
agencies (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2016). After soliciting and evaluating 16 
letters of interest from around the state, the Oregon Water Resources Commission 
awarded grants to organizations in four areas: (1) Malheur Lake Basin; (2) Lower John 
Day Sub-Basin; (3) Upper Grande Ronde Sub-Basin; and (4) Mid-Coast Region (Oregon 
Water Resources Department, 2016). As of the writing of this dissertation in spring 2017, 
these local planning efforts were underway, with agreements in place with the Portland 
State University National Policy Consensus Center and the Association of Oregon 
Counties to provide collaborative training and technical assistance to the four pilot 
planning groups (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2016).  
In 2016, the Strategy reached its four-year anniversary. OWRD initiated a review 
and update process in March 2016, which included hosting public meetings and 
convening another 18-member Policy Advisory Group to advise OWRD during this 
update process. During June 2016, seven open houses were held around the state 
 151 
 
(Pendleton, Ontario, Salem, Newport, Medford, Bend, and Beaverton) to provide citizens 
with an update of progress made under the 2012 Strategy, and to solicit public input 
about priorities for the Strategy update. Approximately 200 people attended the open 
houses (OWRD Staff Report, August 18, 2016). OWRD also posted an online survey 
from mid-June to mid-July 2016 to solicit public input from those unable to attend the 
open houses. The Department received 66 survey responses (OWRD Staff Report, 
August 18, 2016). Themes that emerged from the 2016 public and stakeholder input 
process were as follows: 
 Groundwater: concerns were raised regarding declining aquifers in northeast  
 Oregon. 
 Place-based Planning: interests were expressed in several locations about  
 fostering place-based approaches to integrated water resource planning. 
 Monitoring: agencies were encouraged to improve water measurement and  
 collaborate with local partners on monitoring priorities. 
 Education: participants felt there was a general lack of understanding of water  
issues in Oregon. The state government should conduct more outreach and partner 
with local communities on water education. 
 Conservation: these efforts have helped buffer impacts of drought; however,  
 more disincentives for use of conservation methods need to be addressed.  
 In-stream demands: this area was identified as a key data gap that were not  
 been accurately accounted for in the Strategy (Oregon Water Resources    
  Staff Report to Water Resources Commission, August 2016)  
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 The second version of the Policy Advisory Group met four times throughout 
2016. This group was convened by OWRD to develop new recommended actions that 
were absent from the 2012 IWRS, and provide additional guidance to the Department. 
Only two of the original PAG members also served on the second version of the PAG. 
Under the second PAG, members were asked to serve as individual citizens rather than 
representing a specific stakeholder group or special interest. The effort was facilitated by 
OWRD staff, and operated under a consensus-based decision-making process. The PAG 
completed its work in January 2017, offering 23 overarching statements, new 
recommended actions, and confirming and supporting statements. These were intended to 
enhance the already-existing recommended actions from the 2012 Strategy. OWRD 
released a draft of the 2017 Integrated Water Resources Strategy on April 19, 2017 with a 
two-month period for public review and comment period. The updated Strategy 
introduces five new areas of focus along with supporting recommendations: planning and 
preparation for “extreme events” including droughts, floods, and the Cascadia 
earthquake; ensuring public safety/dam safety; providing an adequate presence in the 
field; strengthening permitting programs for water quantity and water quality; and, 
developing additional groundwater protections (Oregon Water Resources Department, 
2017).  
 To review, this section provided a history and overview of the legal and 
institutional arrangements around water governance in Oregon. This background helps 
build an understanding of the factors that lead to development of Oregon’s Integrated 
Water Resources Strategy. It also sets the stage for a discussion about the role of state 
and non-state actors in a collaborative network governance approach to developing 
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integrated water policies. Next, I present an in-depth discussion and analysis of the 
Oregon case based on in-depth interviews and other data sources.  
5. 6 Discussion and Analysis of Oregon Case Study Findings  
  A key focus of this case study research was to gain a better understanding of 
factors for success in collaborative networks focused on developing integrated water 
policies. In order to learn more about Oregon’s collaborative network process and 
augment my personal knowledge and experience of the case, I utilized several methods 
for gathering research evidence. This included extensive document and archival research, 
and review and categorizing of the following sources:  
 legislative information including legislative bills and amendments, legislative 
committee briefs, hearing summaries, and audio tapes, and House and Senate 
debates; 
 Water Resource Commission meeting agendas and minute, staff reports, and 
briefing documents;  
 Strategy-related public meetings and open house materials (agendas, staff reports 
and summaries);  
 media reports (newspaper and radio); 
 Policy Advisory Group meeting information (agendas, staff reports, presentation 
materials); 
 25 semi-structured interviews of state and non-state actors. 
  The semi-structured interviews helped provide a more in-depth understanding 
about the Integrated Water Resources Strategy policy development process, as I was able 
to triangulate information gleaned from the interview data with information gathered 
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from other sources such as personal knowledge and experience, document reviews, and 
participant observations. As described in Chapter 3, Research Design and Methods, a 
purposive sample of 25 state and non-state actors who had been involved in the 
development of Oregon’s Integrated Water Resources Strategy were interviewed. In 
order to ensure representation of a broad spectrum of interests and ideological 
perspectives, a cross-section of individuals and organizations involved in the Strategy 
development process were interviewed. These included participants in both versions of 
the Policy Advisory Groups (non-state actors), observers (those attending the meetings 
but not directly on the PAG), and state actors (state government agency directors and 
officials, state agency commission members, and Governor’s office staff). The interview 
respondents represented a range of interest areas including irrigated agriculture, ranching, 
non-irrigated agriculture, forest management, Tribes, environmental and conservation, 
recreation, fisheries, state and municipal government, policymakers, and special districts.  
  To develop my interview protocol, I relied upon information I had gained through 
direct experience and background knowledge, extensive document reviews, observations 
from attending Strategy meetings, and input from my academic advisors. The interviews 
were typically 45 minutes to an hour in length and recorded for later transcription and 
coding. The semi-structured interviews provided rich data about the collaborative 
network approach to integrated water policy development in Oregon. Each participant 
told a story, from his/her perspective that created a more comprehensive picture of the 
strategy policy framing and development process. Some of the themes that emerged from 
the research data were consistent with themes from the literature; however, new themes 
arose, in situ, from the research data.  
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Presented below are the areas of convergence and insights derived from the 
Oregon case study including key findings that emerged from the interview data: 
 Collaborative network processes create interdependencies between non-state 
actors through  knowledge transfer and shared learnings, foster relationships, and 
generate some levels of trust; 
 Fragmented institutional arrangements constrain Oregon’s ability to deliver 
integrated water governance; 
 Limited and unstable funding and resources constrain network processes; 
 Resolving value conflicts remains challenging despite collaborative networks;   
 Place-based approaches to integrated water management offer promise; 
 Climate change and water scarcity are key policy drivers. 
  The following is a detailed description of each of these key themes, including 
theoretical application and findings.  
Benefits and Challenges of Collaborative Network Processes  
  As described earlier in this chapter, the Integrated Water Resources Strategy was 
developed through a collaborative network approach involving a diverse set of state and 
non-state actors. Over half of the interview participants (out of 25) spoke at length about 
the benefits of the collaborative process, including fostering mutual learning and 
information sharing, knowledge transfer, relationship and trust building, identification of 
shared interests, and perceiving issues/problems through a similar lens. These findings 
were consistent with themes from the literature on collaborative and network governance.  
  All but two (out of 25) interviewees expressed support for the IWRS collaborative 
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policy process in that it fostered mutual understanding, a shared knowledge of issues and 
problems, and a greater level of trust among network actors. One respondent observed: 
There is recognition by all the stakeholders that we’re all in this 
together and need to find answers. Even though there are still fights 
around the edges, there is recognition of the value of the collaborative 
process. 
 
Another interviewee shared: 
A lot of this is learning what is important to other people, why it’s 
important to them, educating why our issues are important to us so we 
can all understand each other. I think once you understand each other 
then it is a lot easier to work towards common goals. 
 
 What emerged from the interview data is a general recognition that the 
collaborative network process helped move beyond stalemates that occur in the 
legislative and rulemaking process. From reading through the PAG meeting minutes, 
direct observation, and analyzing the interview data, there appeared to be general 
agreement on framing water problems, and identifying some solutions for future action. 
All but three interview participants shared that the IWRS process provided opportunities 
for relationship building and created greater levels of trust between stakeholders. 
Previously, many of the non-state actors around the table operated in the legislative or 
legal arena where it is a zero-sum game with minimal incentive for collaboration. A 
collaborative network created space for listening and mutual understanding that was 
lacking prior to the Strategy development. One respondent stated that: 
I feel my best work on this group has been meeting with people 
between meetings to find common ground and try to find solutions I 
hadn’t thought of, those sorts of things. So, I think the more people that 
are involved in these discussions, the better. If we’re actually trying to 
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carve a path forward and not put our gloves on and go our separate 
corner, that’s the way to do these things. Those are long, hard 
conversations but that’s how decent stuff happens.  
 
A couple of participants were more critical of the process. They pointed out that 
even though two years of deliberation produced a Strategy with general buy-in and 
support, they expressed disappointment that trust and relationships developed during the 
collaborative process were undone during legislative battles over prioritizing policies and 
funding. One participant observed:   
The Policy Advisory Group brought different perspectives together but 
it struggled to reach consensus on tough issues. With so many diverse 
interests, it’s a challenge to overcome entrenched interests.  
 
 Four interviewees shared that although they appreciated serving on the Policy 
Advisory Group, the process needed consistent membership over a longer time period to 
build stronger ties and more durable relationships. The PAG process was helpful for 
developing framing and formulating policies but could have been extended to assist with 
the Strategy implementation.  
  Planning documents, meeting minutes, and interview data revealed that the 
collaborative network process focused attention on the need for more integrated and 
robust data about Oregon’s water resources. This included the need for additional water 
quality and quantity monitoring studies, improved water measurement, water availability 
studies (both surface water and groundwater), and better integration of data between state 
agencies. Overall, there was recognition that additional data is necessary to make 
informed decisions. One interviewee captured the need for better and more coordinated 
data as follows: 
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So the data piece, data and research, really became a focus that 
everyone had some agreement on. Although there’s always the issue of 
what do you do before you have all the data you think you need? And 
how do you pay for the data? 
 
 In summary, the Integrated Water Resource Strategy collaborative policy 
development process represented a major shift from how water policies have been 
developed in the past in Oregon. Historically, water policies have developed through very 
contentious legislative and rule-making processes, top-down agency driven approaches 
(often created in silos), or through legal battles in the courts. Water issues are extremely 
complex, and having the right people around the table engaging in listening, knowledge 
transfer, and collaborative learning emerged as an important factor for a successful policy 
framing and formulation process. With a focus on trust, reciprocity and mutual 
understanding, this process represented a shift from conventional hierarchical command 
and control authority to processes that are more horizontal and relational in nature (Keast 
et al., 2014). However, the need for consistent engagement emerged as an area for 
improvement in Oregon’s collaborative process.  
Fragmented Governance Arrangements and Institutional Barriers 
 The Strategy seeks, among other key objectives, to integrate water quality and 
quantity, account for climate change impacts, and improve integration of land use 
planning and water resource management. Case study research gleaned through key 
informant discussions, interview data, and personal experience and observations revealed 
that although the Strategy has provided a framework for greater integration and 
collaboration among water-related natural resource agencies, Oregon’s siloed governance 
framework still poses a barrier to effective long-term integrated water outcomes. For 
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example, although OWRD is tasked as the central convener and implementer of the 
Strategy, it is unclear who is ultimately responsible for ensuring integrated outcomes. It 
appears that OWRD served as the primary motivator, yet the agency is dependent on 
other state actors to assist in program delivery. As one interviewee observed: 
OWRD has the responsibility to develop an integrated water strategy 
without the full set of tools or authority to implement it.  
 
The need for more coordinated water management was a recurring theme that 
emerged from the interview data. Fragmented and overlapping governance arrangements 
constrain Oregon’s ability to deliver integrated water governance. Integrated water 
resource management is challenging to deliver successfully if the underlying governance 
structures are not in alignment. One respondent noted: 
I think the way that in Oregon our natural resource agencies are these 
separate agencies from each other, so those silos definitely create 
institutional barriers to creating the integrated approach and 
understanding to how these issues impact each other.  
 
Another interviewee expressed frustration about the challenges of Oregon’s fragmented 
water management system:  
There is such a plethora of state agencies, and there is no coordinating 
natural resource body whose job it is to coordinate all of these agencies. 
So therefore, the agencies tend to feel their portfolio is their first and 
foremost thing. So to the degree that they are encouraged to work 
collaboratively to make certain things happen, including a lot that is in 
the Strategy, it may depend on many things including buy-in, agency 
resources, commission priorities, user groups...so it is a daunting 
process. 
 
Finally, one respondent summed up the need for changing Oregon’s underlying natural 
resource governance structure as follows: 
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I think this integrated water strategy is so important to get the right 
outcome. That the silo approach to getting there is not the right 
approach. Now, whether or not the agencies can exist and still get there 
or not is the question. I’m not sure it can without insuring that there’s 
some sort of integrated structure in place to show that the coordination 
is occurring with defined outcomes, targets to get to certain places, 
measuring our results, and making changes if we’re not getting there. 
But really, we need to change the way we are doing business. 
    
  As stated earlier in the chapter, water quality and quantity programs have 
developed with very different regulatory drivers, stakeholders, and political actors. The 
Governor’s office, through the Natural Resources Office, acts to coordinate these water 
programs through the Natural Resources Cabinet. The Cabinet is comprised of natural 
resource agency directors; however, there is no effort to institutionalize a formal 
coordinated water governing body. Research for this study revealed several other efforts 
led by the Governor’s Natural Resources Office. One was the Clean Water Partnership 
that focuses on improving water quality and watershed health by 2025, and includes state 
and federal agencies. Another is the Oregon Stream Team, created in 2013, and 
comprised of multiple state natural resource agencies working on coordinating water 
quality and quantity monitoring data. The Stream Team supports the intent of the 
Integrated Water Resources Strategy, and the work of the Stream Team does show 
promise for improving inter-agency data collection and coordination. One respondent 
commented on the Strategy’s efforts to help facilitate greater levels of interagency 
coordination and communication:   
I think some of the fundamental barriers or structures are still there. All 
the agencies have their statutory authorities and responsibilities. 
Sometimes those are in conflict. The budgets are all handled separately 
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by legislative committees. However, with the Strategy, the agencies are 
more apt to work together than prior to adoption.  
 
 Having shown that Oregon’s fragmented water governance system poses 
challenges to integrated water management, case study research revealed that 
development of the Strategy did make progress towards better coordination among 
Oregon’s natural resources agencies in the budgeting process. Key informants shared that 
agency officials viewed the Strategy as the “go to” document for developing their budget 
packages and funding requests. Although OWRD was tasked as the lead agency, three 
other state agencies (DEQ, ODA, and ODFW) played a significant role in policy input 
and development. Agency directors and staff attended the policy advisory and agency 
coordination meetings on a regular basis. In addition, agency liaisons were designated to 
attend board and commission meetings at other agencies to keep tabs on Strategy 
discussions. One respondent commented:  
In terms of successes, it did make some progress taking steps in 
overtaking silos between the different agencies that are involved in 
different aspects of water. I think they generated a more collaborative 
approach to monitoring, for example, between water quality and other 
aspects. This is sort of more coordination and communication between 
the agencies.  
 
 Another respondent observed that the Strategy has produced a more coordinated state 
agency funding process around water resources programs:    
Its biggest success has been a clear and consistent and coordinated 
message to the legislature about the funding needs for the variety of 
agencies in order to implement the Strategy. I think that has been a 




 An additional challenge lies with coordination of appointed natural resource 
agency boards and commissions; these citizen-led boards exhibit both oversight and 
policy-making functions that effect water management. Oregon’s natural resource agency 
boards and commissions set water-related policies, adopt rules, and influence the 
budgeting process. Again, there is no formal avenue for coordinating water policies 
among the different natural resource agency boards and commissions except through the 
Governor’s Natural Resources Office. Oregon’s boards and commissions tend to be 
dominated by organizations that have a vested interest in agency operations, regulations, 
and outcomes creating a dynamic where collaboration with other agencies is not 
necessarily rewarded.  
   Historically, OWRD staff controlled the water planning and implementation 
process where the emphasis was on meeting water supply needs and other water-related 
objectives were secondary. It is important to note that OWRD, which is in charge of 
managing water allocation, led the Strategy’s development process and is tasked with 
overseeing implementation. The interview data suggests that through the development of 
the Integrated Water Strategy, authority was more diffuse and other water management 
goals were introduced. Instead of one agency directing water resource planning functions, 
a variety of state actors and stakeholders were involved, requiring coordination of 
multiple agency missions, legislative mandates, regulatory and judicial requirements, 
plans, and actions for horizontal alignment.  
  As a key informant noted, one organization cannot effectively steer the Strategy, 
especially given the goal of fully integrating water quality and water quantity. Top-level 
leadership and political will is an essential part of the process to ensure successful 
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integrated water management. The issue of adequate leadership also arose from the 
interview data as an important factor of success in future implementation. As one 
interview participant stressed: 
You need to have leadership. Whether it comes from a particular 
subbasin, whether its strong leadership to solve some issue in a 
collaborative manner, or whether that’s at the legislature or at the 
governor’s office. To me, those things are really important.  
 
 The presence of this siloed approach to water management remains a key 
constraint in delivering integrated water management in Oregon. Based on personal 
knowledge and observations, along with interviews with key informants, special interest 
groups and constituencies still exert powerful control over agency agendas, budget 
processes and funding, and program priorities. As explained in this section, Oregon lacks 
a formal overarching department of natural resources and relies on the Governor’s 
Natural Resource office to serve this coordination function. Without an overhaul of 
Oregon’s natural resource agency management system, delivering integrated water 
management on a statewide level will remain challenging.  
  In addition, overcoming tensions between the top-down vertical controls of 
bureaucratic hierarchies with a horizontal, polycentric management system poses service 
delivery constraints. Under a horizontal governance model, cooperation is based on 
collaborative management where empowerment is grounded through knowledge and 
information sharing, rather than authority based on a legal paradigm (Agranoff and 





Consistent Funding, Data Needs, and Staff Resourcing 
  Not unexpectedly, the need for adequate funding and staff resources for natural 
resource agencies was raised as a cause for concern by all participants interviewed for 
this case study. Oregon’s natural resource budgets represent a small fraction of state 
expenditures, with combined agency budgets constituting about one percent of the state’s 
general fund budget. Over the years, Oregon’s natural resource agency budgets have 
become more reliant on federal funds and lottery dollars, which tend to support specific 
projects rather than core agency budgets (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2017). In 
addition, most natural resource agencies rely on permit fees and fees for service that do 
not cover the full cost of agency services (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2017). 
Although the Strategy has created a new sense of urgency for funding water-related data 
needs and staffing, stable funding and resourcing was cited as a consistent barrier to 
effective implementation of integrated water management programs and policies during 
the interviews.  
  Since the adoption of the Strategy, the legislature has set aside funds for capital 
projects, place-based planning projects, and several water studies, including groundwater 
analyses. One respondent argued that more funding needs to be set aside for monitoring, 
data collection, and data coordination between the agencies.  
But if you look at the state budgeting process, there is a fair amount of 
money going to grants and loans for actual projects, but there is far less 
money going to collection of the actual data we need to make sound 
decisions about things like groundwater management or demand for 
water. You could prioritize the goals of the plan along some rational 




Investing in adequate resourcing and capacity building for state and non-state actors 
involved in integrated water management was a recurring theme. Personal experience and 
observation, along with a review of historical budget planning documents, and key 
informant discussions highlighted an ongoing problem of inadequate and unstable 
funding, staff resources, and investments in Oregon’s water programs. Planning 
documents show that there is room for improvement around measuring and monitoring 
both water quantity and quality and greater coordination of water data among natural 
resource agencies. Interview data and discussions with key informants revealed concerns 
about inadequate state funding to support the necessary staffing or data to make informed 
decisions, especially around water allocation. Effective and efficient management of 
water resources is dependent on up-to-date information about existing conditions, and for 
projecting future use. In sum, the lack of solid data and staffing to track and manage 
water in an integrated manner were sentiments echoed throughout the interview process. 
Resolving Value Conflicts  
  Resolving value conflicts among actors to achieve workable solutions is 
challenging. Not surprisingly, Western water law (the doctrine of prior appropriation) and 
the constraint of balancing economic and environmental values emerged from the 
research as significant barriers to resolving water issues. Key informants acknowledged 
that discussions around changes to the Western water law were too politically challenging 
and therefore, a non-starter in the collaborative process. Meeting minutes show that the 
Policy Advisory Group (PAG) brainstormed discussion topics early in the process but 
this topic was not directly included. Thus, discussions around Western water law were 
deemed off the table. 
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 Although the collaborative network process did create a forum for conducting a 
broad comprehensive analysis of the integrated water domain, overcoming long-standing 
value conflicts remained challenging. Interview data revealed frustrations around the 
inability to resolve long-standing value conflicts. One interviewee summed up the 
situation as follows: 
The challenge is always the diverse set of stakeholders with highly 
diverse points of views and their perceived water needs. How can we 
address providing abundant, clean water for all while still respecting a 
variety of views? How do we balance regulatory versus voluntary 
actions to address those issues? How to move beyond the status quo of 
prior appropriation? 
 
 Balancing environmental and economic (in-stream versus out-of-stream 
consumptive) uses was also a significant point of tension that emerged in the PAG 
meeting minutes and from the interview data. Concerns were raised by environmental 
and conservation participants that the strategy development process was driven by 
economic interests with unequal attention given to ecological perspectives. Conversely, 
representatives from rural interests expressed frustration that in-stream and ecological 
flows dominated the conversation when livelihoods were at stake. These perspectives 
underscore the tension between urban and rural interests, and consumptive and in-stream 
water uses in Oregon. One interviewee characterized the challenge of resolving these 
conflicts through the collaborative process as follows:  
It’s [water] a finite resource and everybody wants it in one way or 
another. I’m not saying that there are winners and losers but there are a 
lot of conflicts that are hard to resolve. And that was the challenge in 
the Integrated Water Resource Strategy development; that’s just part of 




Another respondent described the situation in terms of prioritization of limited resources: 
There is the continual push-pull in terms of investment of state 
resources. How much should go towards improving protections for in-
stream resources versus how much should go towards more sustainable 
consumptive use of water?  
 
Yet, one respondent expressed optimism that the Integrated Water Resources Strategy 
was a positive step towards overcoming entrenched interests: 
...what I am trying to contribute to the effort is a recognition that this 
isn’t necessarily a zero sum game. By that I am meaning, I think there 
are multiple opportunities, that there can be coordinated work and 
efforts put forward that compliment not only the environmental 
concerns but also the economic concerns.  
 
Bottom-up Versus Top-down Approaches 
   Another policy area discussed by the PAG members and the Water Resources 
Commissioners during development of Oregon’s Integrated Water Resources Strategy 
was appropriate geographical scale for implementing integrated water management 
policies. From discussions with key informants, review of PAG and Water Resource 
Commission meeting minutes, and interview data it appears that there was widespread 
concern that implementing integrated policies on a statewide, one-size-fits-all manner 
was not an effective approach in Oregon. Discussions with key informant interviews 
revealed that local communities were concerned that a top-down state-led plan might 
endanger private water rights. This was not surprising, given Oregon’s strong populist 
history regarding water as a private property right, and the researcher’s personal 
experience dealing with water right ownership issues in the Oregon Legislature.  
  Rural-based interview respondents raised concerns about the urban/rural divide 
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and a general distrust of government, especially related to managing water rights. Place-
based water planning was identified by these respondents during the interview process as 
a beneficial way to recognize local needs and regional differences. They cited bottom-up 
initiatives as an opportunity for local communities to build capacity and work 
collaboratively with the state in order to understand their water resource challenges and 
needs, and to identify and implement potential solutions.  
  Place-based planning emerged as a crucial implementation piece of the Strategy. 
Under Recommendation 9A, the Strategy specifically lists undertaking place-based 
integrated water resource planning (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2012, p. 80). 
A key informant cited the 1980s state-led basin planning effort as an example of a failed 
attempt to deliver integrated planning in a top-down manner. Basin programs were 
Oregon’s first attempt at formulating a coordinated, integrated state water resources 
policy (see ORS 536.220) (Bastasch, 2006). These basin plans were prescriptive in 
nature, complex, and hard to understand (Bastasch, 2006). Key informants explained that 
the previous basin planning efforts also lacked local buy-in and support. In contrast to the 
previous state-led efforts, the PAG and Water Resources Commission encouraged 
adoption of bottom-up, place-based planning efforts. One interview participant shared 
that:  
As long as we have a good process for place-based planning where 
those things really get worked out around a particular geography and 
hydrology, I think that can work well. But it needs to be fundamentally 
ground-up around what is appropriate for a particular basin.  
 
Another respondent discussed how these place-based planning efforts work within the 
context of the statewide Strategy while empowering local communities:  
 169 
 
Place-based planning allows these conversations to take place at a scale 
that a statewide strategy may not be able to achieve. Voluntary place-
based plans can “roll up” and inform the statewide Strategy. Place-
based plans can leverage technical and funding resources available 
through the Strategy to make more meaningful local impacts. This 
approach is meant to empower communities to conduct voluntary, 
place-based integrated water resources planning in consultation with 
the State. 
 
Place-based planning has received widespread support from both state and non-
state actors; however, all the PAG members interviewed acknowledged that state 
guidance and oversight are essential. PAG meeting minutes and interview data revealed 
that initially, there appeared to be apprehension by some PAG members about the 
purpose and makeup of local collaborative efforts. These concerns centered on reaching a 
common understanding of what place-based planning efforts were intended to achieve. 
There was general support of local flexibility for solving water management issues, but 
unease about divesting state authority to manage water resources. Consequently, the 
Strategy incorporated a recommendation to “develop a template for place-based 
integrated water resources strategies.” The Strategy specifically recognizes that “a place-
based planning effort will need to comply with existing state laws and requirements” 
(Oregon Water Resources Department, 2012, p. 80). Since release of the Strategy, 
OWRD has issued agency guidelines to support implementation of place-based planning 
efforts. According to OWRD, these guidelines are a tool to support voluntary planning 
efforts aimed at meeting instream and out- of-stream needs, including water quantity, 
water quality, and ecosystem needs. 
  One interviewee summed up the benefits of place-based planning as thus:  
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In many ways, place-based planning makes sense, in terms of actually 
developing a plan for Oregon’s water resources and thinking about 
even the types of supply and development projects we were talking 
about funding. Those needs should come out of a more local or regional 
plan for water resources. I see the value in doing that kind of planning. 
Some of the folks in the conservation community have concerns about 
place-based planning because it could become a vehicle for more local 
control; there’s always the fear that there will be some effort not to 
follow state laws and regulations. 
 
The scholarship around water governance and watershed-scale collaborative 
processes also highlights the importance of implementing integrated water management 
at the appropriate spatial scale. Pahl-Wostl (2015) asserts that “governance and 
management at the watershed scale leads to a more holistic and integrated approach in 
terms of management goals and objectives, distribution of benefits, and decision making 
that results in balanced management” (p. 99). “Spatial scales for water governance have 
implications for both the biophysical boundaries and the actors involved in a governance 
system” (Pahl-Wostl, 2015, p. 99).   
Climate Change and Water Scarcity as Key Policy Drivers  
 Addressing climate change and water scarcity emerged as key policy drivers 
underlying the Strategy development process. Recognizing that impacts of climate 
change are very local, almost every respondent described how climate change is affecting 
water resources. All interview participants discussed the impacts of the 2016 drought and 
how that galvanized parties to work together to develop short-term solutions. One 
interviewee shared that climate change has created a greater level of awareness among 
the general public including an increased focus on conservation:  
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We have broad recognition that we have a finite amount of water and 
that climate change is happening, and that affects our water availability, 
so we are now seeing an increased focus on conservation by all the 
parties, all the users.  
 
One respondent highlighted more specific impacts they have observed around climate  
change:  
Overall, Oregon is experiencing warmer temperatures and more 
precipitation in the form of rain instead of snow. This raises concerns 
especially in the agricultural community that relies on snowpack as 
“natural storage” to deliver water over a longer period of time. 
 
Another respondent reflected on how climate change has elevated the need for a more 
sophisticated and resilient water management system with greater attention to the in-
stream needs: 
The main value is recognizing that our water resources is rapidly 
coming under more and more stress from several different sides. And a 
need to really start to modernize our management systems so that it’s 
more resilient in dealing with climate change and drought. Also, it has 
generated a greater awareness of the in-stream needs for water, a more 
refined understanding of in-stream needs than we have had previously.  
 
Concerns were raised that the state’s response to climate change and drought 
management focused on infrastructure investments, such as piping irrigation ditches and 
building water supply storage impoundments, rather than innovative and less costly 
alternatives such as water demand management or conservation. Not surprisingly, 
interview responses varied widely around preferred strategies for addressing climate 
change impacts. With that said, a clear consensus around the appropriate responses to 





  The case study findings show that in regards to shaping Oregon’s integrated water 
policy, a collaborative network approach created a more conducive environment for 
meaningful dialogue among vested interests, built some levels of interdependency and 
trust, thus generating a wider array of policy options than through previous legislative 
and bureaucratic efforts. However, long-standing political, legal, and institutional 
challenges continue to constrain effective integrated water management and the delivery 
of integrated outcomes in Oregon. Table 5.3 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of 







Table 5.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of Oregon’s IWRS Process 
Strengths of Collaborative Network 
Governance Process 
Weaknesses of Collaborative Network 
Governance Process 
 
 Engaged a broad range of stakeholder 
groups  
 
 Process created a forum for building 
relationships, and some  trust and 
social capital 
 
 Greater transparency and opportunity 
for stakeholder participation 
 
 Consensus decision making process 
 
 Collaborative process created shared 
learnings and greater understanding 
of different viewpoints 
 
 Created support for bottom-up 
collaborative approaches 
 




 Fragmented institutions and water 
governance structure  
 
 PAG was not a permanent body 
 
 Did not create interdependencies 
across stakeholder groups 
 
 Not strong incentives for special 
interests to stay at table; weak 
organizational learning  
 
 Challenging to reach consensus on 
balancing in-stream vs. out-of-stream 
flows 
 
 Lack of strong leadership due to 
tensions between horizontal and 
vertical governance structure 
 
 Difficult to reconcile competing 
values (i.e., economic vs. ecological)  
 
 Greater emphasis  on addressing 
water quantity needs vs. water quality 




5.6 Comparison of Oregon Case Study to Network Governance Literature 
 In this section, I revisit collaborative and network governance literature and 
compare my case study research results with the theoretical framework underpinning 
network governance. For this analysis, I focused on the collaborative policy network 
tradition which emphasizes pluralistic process models of public policy decision-making 
and focuses on the relation between the state and interest groups and the influence on 
policy making (Keast et al., 2014; Klijn & Koopernjan, 2012). The Oregon case study 
represented a collaborative network that was formed “to deal with very complex 
problems that no one organization or group is able to deal with on their own” (Keast et 
al., 2014, p. 34). In this case, a network of state and non-state actors convened to develop 
policies around integrated water management. The following section includes a 
discussion of how network governance theoretical constructs performed in the Oregon 
case. For each topic area, I present a brief review of the applicable theory, an application 
of the theory in the Oregon case, and the resulting lessons learned.  
 Strength of network ties has a bearing on how the policy network is governed. 
Social network exchange theory emphasizes that actors enter into a social network for a 
reason, usually some goal attainment or resource exchange (Koliba et al., 2011). The 
rules governing these resource exchanges “are shaped by the formality of the relations 
and the depth of coordination between two or more network actors” Koliba et al., 2011, 
p. 101). When two actors enter into horizontal relationships, they break the traditional 
principal-agent dynamic of vertically arranged relationships and facilitate new ways of 
thinking (Koliba et al., 2011). Strong ties between interdependent actors helps enable the 
policy framing and formation process (Koliba et al., 2011; Klijn & Koopernjan, 2012).   
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 The case study research findings illustrate that a collaborative, network approach 
to water policy development adds value by developing ties between network actors thus 
enabling new ways of problem framing and policy development. As the theory predicted, 
building interpersonal relationships and horizontal ties among non-state actors did result 
in higher levels of cooperative behaviors than what is generated through other policy-
making arenas (i.e., legislative or bureaucratic rule making). This was accomplished by 
fostering shared learning, knowledge transfer, and a greater understanding of different 
perspectives and viewpoints around water during Oregon’s collaborative process. 
  Having illustrated that, I posit that the ties between network actors in the Oregon 
case were still relatively weak due to the limited duration of the network, the opportunity 
for non-state actors to engage outside the collaborative process to shape policy, legal 
barriers, and Oregon’s fragmented institutional framework. Despite the weak network 
ties, the collaborative process did generate agreement on a number of important areas 
where previous efforts had stalled. Interview findings revealed that the network helped 
elevate the need for more robust water-related data collection and monitoring to inform 
decision makers. It also galvanized support for greater funding of water programs 
identified in the Strategy. Furthermore, the recognition of place-based integrated water 
planning efforts as an important tool for achieving integrated water management at the 
local level emerged from this process. Not surprisingly, however, network actors failed to 
reach consensus around how to fund or prioritize the many recommendations included in 
the Strategy or around highly contentious policy issues as balancing in-stream and out-of-
stream uses, water measurement requirements, and methods for resolving over-allocation 
of existing water rights.  
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 Trust between network actors is cited often in the literature as a vital component 
of successful governance networks (Klijn & Koopernjan, 2012; Keast et al., 2014; Provan 
& Kenis, 2007; Ansell & Gash, 2008). Trust is an important asset to achieve in networks 
as it “reduces uncertainty and facilitates investments in collaborative processes among 
interdependent actors with diverging and sometimes conflicting interests” (Klijn & 
Koopernjan, 2012, p. 8). The literature also stresses that trust enhances the possibility that 
network actors will share information and develop innovative solutions (Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2012).  
  Regarding building trust between actors in the Oregon case, interview findings 
revealed another key component of the story. It appears that Oregon’s collaborative 
network approach created a new forum for information exchange and mutual learning. 
This dynamic helped foster collaboration and trust necessary to develop consensus 
around water policies for the Integrated Water Strategy. Prior to this effort, non-state 
actors were frequently focused on protecting their own self-interests through the 
contentious legislative or regulatory process. Under these circumstances, there is little 
incentive to understand where other actors are coming from or to reach consensus on 
water issues. It also appeared that non-state actors on either end of the ideological 
spectrum were skeptical of state actors’ motives. Unfortunately, relationships and ties 
that formed among members of the Policy Advisory Group did not necessarily translate 
into reciprocity in the political or regulatory arena, especially once the policy formulation 
process convened. 
 Democratic anchorage and accountability play a key role in the success of 
networks. Sorensen and Torfing (2005) posit that “governance networks are 
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democratically anchored to the extent that they are properly linked to different political 
constituencies and to a relevant set of democratic norms that are part of the democratic 
ethos of society” (2005, p. 201). Oregon’s case did lend legitimacy to the policy network 
both formally (via elected officials) and informally (via bureaucrats) representing citizens 
as well as particular interest groups.  
  Oregon’s network formed in response to legislation passed by democratically- 
elected politicians. HB 3369 directed that a wide range of interests be included in the 
Integrated Water Resources Strategy development process. The policy network created to 
develop integrated water policies included non-state actors (organizations and interest 
groups) that were accountable to their constituencies, along with state actors (federal and 
state agencies) that were accountable to the public and the interest groups they serve. 
Government agencies represent state power and legitimacy, but also provided sources of 
information that helped inform network policy decisions and ensure that public values are 
represented. Furthermore, the network process followed democratic rules and norms by 
adopting a transparent decision-making process defining how decisions were made within 
the network (through a consensus-based process).   
  Social capital is formed in the bonds between actors and linked to organizational 
learning and knowledge transfer (Keast et al., 2014). Social capital, as defined by Putnam 
(1993) “refers to features of social organization, such as trust norms, and networks, that 
can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (p. 167). The 
case study research revealed that Oregon’s collaborative network process developed 
horizontal ties between actors and in turn did generate some level of social capital during 
the initial two-year process. This dynamic created opportunities to frame 
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recommendations around integrated water policies in a collaborative rather than 
adversarial manner.  
 It is important to recognize that since the PAG had not been institutionalized, the 
group disbanded once the Strategy development process was complete. The network 
policy process was short-lived, and thus preserving social capital outside of the PAG was 
challenging due to deep-rooted philosophical and value divides among non-state actors. It 
may be that in order to build upon the social capital created through the collaborative 
process, a more durable network institution was needed. Similarly, this holds true for 
interactions among state actors given the fragmented nature of Oregon’s natural resource 
agencies. Case study research findings revealed that development of the Strategy 
provided a new forum for regular communication and coordination among the key state 
agencies involved in water management. Specifically, this was reflected in a more 
coordinated budgeting process tied to policy recommendations outlined in the Strategy. 
Although the Strategy added capacity for inter-agency coordination and collaboration, it 
did not result in a formalized institutional arrangement.  
5.7 Summary  
  This chapter provided an in-depth account of Oregon’s water history, key water 
governance frameworks and institutions, and the legal underpinnings shaping and 
constraining Oregon’s integrated water management efforts. In 2009, a statewide 
integrated water resources strategic planning process was launched to bring together 
various sectors and special interests to work towards a common purpose of meeting 
future water needs for economic and environmental purposes. This effort resulted in 
development of a widely supported strategic plan for Oregon’s water future. 
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  Through the case study, I reflected on my own experiences, researched archival 
data, observed collaborative processes, interviewed network participants to glean a 
diverse range of perspectives, and tested theoretical constructs to arrive at my research 
findings. Key informant and interview data served to illuminate important points about 
the benefits and challenges of collaborative policy networks that played a key role in 
informing the research. 
  In conclusion, viewing this case through a collaborative network theoretical lens 
facilitated a greater understanding of the integrated water policy processes in Oregon. 
What I observed and gleaned through my research is generally consistent with key 
themes that emerged in the literature; however, a few new themes arose that build upon 
existing theoretical frameworks. The Oregon case revealed a hybrid governance network 
depicting both vertical ties (within bureaucracies) and horizontal ties (through the 
collaborative network process). In the next chapter, I will address my original research 





CHAPTER 6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CASES 
 
 In the previous two chapters, I examined two case studies using the analytical 
lens of collaborative and network governance theory to unpack the complexities of 
collaborative water governance. As part of this comparative case study analysis, the aim 
was to gain a better understanding of the role of networks in developing integrated water 
policies that successfully guide implementation and ongoing governance. This research 
examined the role of state and non-state policy actors, conditions for collaboration, 
strength of actor ties, opportunities for collective learning, democratic anchorage, 
development of trust and social capital, and barriers to success in two. In this chapter, I 
revisit my original research questions by conducting a comparative analysis of findings 
for the two cases. Also included is a section comparing the treatment of tribal water rights 
in each case study. Lastly, a summary of comparative points is provided along with a 
review of each network model.  
6.1 Comparative Analsysis of Research Findings 
  To review, integrated water management is a wicked problem facing elected 
officials, policy makers, public adminstrators, and water managers today. In order to gain 
a better understanding of how collaborative networks perform in the context of integrated 
water management, this study considered the following seven research questions: 
1. How are the different governance networks structured and how are their 
boundaries determined?  
2. How do the collaborative processes work, and what role do state and non-state 
actors play in setting water policies in New Zealand and Oregon?  
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3. What functions do they carry out? How are the networks governed, and how are 
policies developed in the collaborative?   
4. How are these networks held accountable? To what extent are the networks 
democratically anchored? 
5. How fully are surface water and groundwater, water quality and quantity, and 
land use integrated in management systems under New Zealand and Oregon 
governance structures?  
6. What are the legal, political, and institutional barriers affecting water 
governance in New Zealand and Oregon? 
7. How did issues such as climate change and water scarcity influence approaches to 
water management?  
What follows is a comparative analysis of case study findings in response to each 
research question. A cross-case comparison table outlining characteristics found in 




Table 6.1 Comparative Analysis on Research Guide Question Responses 
Research Question New Zealand Case Oregon Case 





network through LAWF. 
Central and regional policy 
focus. Plenary and small 
groups.  
 
Limited duration PAGs to assist 
with Strategy design and 
update. State policy focus with 
input from federal and technical 
advisors.  
Q2: Collaborative process; role 




process. Non-state actors in 
LAWF with ‘active observer’ 
state actors. Blurred lines of 
power and authority. 
 
Collaborative, consensus-based 
process. State and non-state 
actors both actively 
participated. Clear lines of 
power and authority. 
Q3: Network functions, 




Autonomous process. Define 
and frame water problems and 
design policy solutions. 
Mutually acceptable principles, 
rules, and norms. Strong 
internal social capital. 
 
State-led process. Define and 
frame water problems and 
recommend policy solutions. 
Mutually acceptable principles, 







Government granted political 
legitimacy. Democratic 
anchorage through Ministers 
and government officials, and 
connection to LAWF 
constituencies. Weak public 
process. 
 
Government granted political 
legitimacy. Democratic 
anchorage through Governor, 
elected officials, government 
officials and PAG 
constituencies. Stronger public 
process.  
 
Q5: Integrated water 





Water quality, water quantity 
and land use managed by 
regional government. Historic 
lack of central oversight created 
patchwork of water policies. 
 
Water quality, water quantity 
and land use managed by 
separate agencies and at 
different spatial scales. 
Conjunctive management 








Weak scope of network 
authority. Bureaucratic inertia. 
Insufficient social and political 
capital between LAWF and 
state actors. 
 
Legal (prior appropriation 
doctrine); fragmented 
governance structure; deep-
seated value divides; inadequate 
resources; data gaps.  
 
Q7: Climate change 
 
 
Not a key policy driver in 
freshwater reforms but listed in 
LAWF report. 
Key policy driver in 
development of Strategy. 
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Research Question #1, Governance Network Structures and Boundaries: How are 
the different governance networks structured and how are their boundaries 
determined?   
  New Zealand’s government asked LAWF to recommend potential reform of New 
Zealand’s fresh water management – to identify shared outcomes and goals, and options 
to achieve them (Land and Water Forum, 2010). LAWF represents a multi-actor, 
horizontal governance network that provides an avenue for framing and developing 
integrated water policies. Over 60 non-governmental interest groups participate in the 
Land and Water Forum and it meets regularly (monthly in most instances) to discuss 
water policies. The smaller group, consisting of 30 major stakeholders from primary 
industry, electricity generation, tourism, environmental and recreational interest groups, 
and iwi, serves as the core group to deliberate policy details and present 
recommendations back to the large group. Scientists and other experts provide technical 
and policy advice throughout the LAWF process. Representatives from local and central 
government are non-voting members (called active observers), and participate in the 
small group discussions. LAWF operates as an autonomous organization rather than part 
of a specific government entity, and is led by an independent chair. Although staffing is 
provided through an independent secretariat, the central government provides some of 
LAWF’s funding.  
 LAWF was charged by government ministers with charting a new course for 
freshwater management. Through a collaborative process, the Forum developed specific 
terms of reference (operating principles), protocols for participation, and policy goals for 
their work. Forum participants have discussed, deliberated, and formulated policy 
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recommendations around a wide range of issues including, but not limited to, improving 
water quality, addressing water over-allocation, improving surface and groundwater 
management, addressing iwi water rights, protecting and improving drinking water 
quality, protecting recreational and ecological values, and improving regional water 
governance. Regarding spatial boundaries, the Forum develops policy recommendations 
aimed at both the central and regional levels, as New Zealand water governance system 
includes top-down policy guidance from central government with bottom-up 
implementation happening at the regional level. LAWF’s operating time frame changed 
during the course of the freshwater reform process. Document reviews showed that the 
Forum was originally scheduled to convene for one year; however, government ministers 
extended LAWF’s timeframe to continue its progress. As of 2017, LAWF had been 
meeting continuously for over nine years.  
 In the Oregon case, the collaborative network policy process similarly brought 
together a variety of actors (public sector, private sector, and NGOs) to develop Oregon’s 
first Integrated Water Resource Strategy. In contrast to New Zealand, Oregon’s 
collaborative network process was nested in state government, and thus did not operate 
autonomously. OWRD served as the lead government agency in developing the strategy, 
working in conjunction with other state and federal agencies. OWRD hired a professional 
facilitator and convened a stakeholder policy advisory group that met regularly for two 
years (its intended duration) to help frame and develop integrated water policy 
recommendations. It was reconvened in 2016 to assist with policy updates, although this 
iteration was comprised of mostly different representatives than the first PAG (only two 
members overlapped with the first PAG). Ultimate authority for adopting the Strategy 
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resided with the Oregon Water Resources Commission, whereas funding for 
implementation was approved by the Oregon legislature.   
  The Strategy provided a blueprint to better understand and meet Oregon’s in-
stream and out-of-stream needs taking into account water quantity, water quality, and 
ecosystem needs (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2012). Oregon’s Water Strategy 
was intended to help address water management challenges created by boundary 
problems by developing recommendations that transcend fragmented governance 
arrangements. Oregon’s network process attempted to work against this silo effect by 
providing a forum for state and non-state actors to coordinate and collaborate around 
integrated water policies.  
  In sum, both network cases represent a shift from top-down command and control 
water policy development to a horizontal, collaborative effort engaging a broader set of 
interests. These collaborative networks helped move beyond the status quo by bringing 
together actors representing a variety of interests and areas of expertise to deliberate 
about a broad range of policy alternatives. However, challenges emerged during the 
transition to implementation phases in both cases. More detail about how the 
collaborative policy process worked, including barriers to success, is provided later in 
this chapter.  
 
Research Question #2, Role of State and Non-state Actors in Collaborative 
Governance:  How do these collaborative processes work, and what role do state 
and non-state actors play in setting water policies in New Zealand and Oregon?  
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The New Zealand case represents a collaborative network of predominantly non-
state actors focused on framing and designing freshwater policies. Elected and appointed 
government leaders provided legitimacy to LAWF by endorsing creation of the Forum, 
providing partial funding and other resources, and encouraging stakeholders to engage in 
freshwater reforms through this process. The collaborative network created a new 
opportunity for direct dialogue among disparate interests, development of a shared 
commitment and mutual understanding around water problems, and building trust and 
social capital, primarily among non-state actors.   
  Over 60 interest groups representing non-state actors have been involved in 
LAWF, capturing a wide range of viewpoints and perspectives. Although LAWF was 
created as an autonomous trust, state actors participated regularly throughout the policy 
design process. LAWF met monthly and reported to cabinet ministers on a regular basis. 
On occasion, cabinet ministers would attend and address the plenary group. In addition, 
agency staff attended LAWF meetings regularly as “active observers.” 
  Case study interviews and researcher observations suggest that high levels of 
trust, commitment, and social capital were generated among non-state actors. This was 
due to a number of factors including robust social ties among network actors, the length 
of the collaborative process, stable staff resourcing, and strong leadership by a well-
respected and influential chair. As a result, LAWF produced four freshwater reform 
reports detailing approximately 250 consensus-based water policy recommendations from 
2009 through 2015. The findings from this research suggest that in the New Zealand case, 
the collaborative network process helped create new interdependencies among non-state 
actors with a strong commitment to LAWF as an institution. However, the collaborative 
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process did not appear to engender the same level of interdependency between LAWF 
and state actors. Key informant and participant interview data revealed tensions around 
government adoption of LAWF’s recommendations. The government did accept and 
enact many of LAWF’s key recommendations; however, they also rejected or modified 
others. 
  The LAWF network did not displace or eclipse the power of elected or appointed 
government officials, thus ultimate decision-making power still resides with 
democratically-elected government ministers (Keast et al., 2014). However, discussions 
with key informants and interview data revealed that some LAWF members were under 
the impression that once the collaborative network had reached consensus on water 
policies, then the government would adopt these recommendations. Document reviews 
and key informants confirmed that government ministers did not commit to ceding 
decision-making authority. LAWF’s Terms of Reference document underscores that the 
government would continue to make policy decision affecting water management and the 
design of policy instruments, legislation, and regulations was excluded from LAWF’s 
scope. Nonetheless, tension about lines around authority (vertical control versus 
horizontal ties) caused erosion of trust and social capital between LAWF and the 
government. Ministers were accused by some network actors of ‘cherry picking’ policies 
it favored rather than supporting LAWF’s collectively-formulated recommendations 
causing some actors to leave the network. These factors suggest that LAWF’s real 
political power was limited in that government ministers and bureaucrats maintained 
ultimate decision-making authority around adoption and implementation of integrated 
water policies.   
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  In contrast, under the Oregon case, state actors led the collaborative network 
process to frame and develop the Integrated Water Strategy. OWRD served as the lead 
agency working closely with DEQ, ODFW, and ODA. The Oregon Water Resources 
Commission played an important guidance and oversight role, along with the Governor’s 
natural resources office. Non-state actors played a framing and policy guidance role 
through sharing perspectives and knowledge, lending political credibility to the process, 
and helping foster stakeholder buy-in and support for the strategy. Interview data suggest 
that the collaborative network process’s greatest assets were to develop and enhance new 
and existing actor relationships, foster shared learning, and create a strategy for 
advancing integrated water management in Oregon. 
  From the onset, the lines of power and authority in the Oregon case were clear; 
the collaborative network served to inform and guide development of integrated water 
policies for inclusion in the Strategy. Decision-making authority and power remained 
with state actors (i.e., legislators, the governor, agencies, boards and commissions); 
however, as described in more detail in research question #6 below, Oregon’s fragmented 
legal and institutional arrangements create barriers that hinder the state’s ability to 
manage water in an integrated manner. The Oregon case study research implies that the 
collaborative network process served an important role by promoting levels of 
coordination and collaboration across state agencies. While recognizing that, tension 
between horizontal ties and vertical ties continue to constrain the state’s ability to deliver 
effective integrated water management.  
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Research Question #3, Network Governance and Functions: What functions do the 
networks carry out? How are the networks governed, and how are policies 
developed in the collaborative?   
In the New Zealand case, LAWF was designed to bring together non-state actors 
to define and frame water problems and design policy solutions. State actors, primarily 
government policy analysts, had served this function previously. Under the LAWF 
process, state actors serve solely in an advisory role to the collaborative. Research 
findings show that LAWF brought together a wide range of interests with divergent 
viewpoints to reach consensus on freshwater policy reforms, whereas previous 
government-led efforts had failed. Through the collaborative process of dialogue, mutual 
learning, and problem framing, LAWF built a significant amount of trust and social 
capital among its membership. Ultimately, the results of this collaborative process were 
transformed into a series of policy recommendations that had high levels of support 
among water users, stakeholders, and the general public. The LAWF process, however, 
faced challenges when it came to government acceptance and implementation of a 
number of recommendations. 
  As an autonomous, unelected organization, LAWF is self-governed through a set 
of mutually acceptable principles, rules, and norms. Specific terms of reference and 
protocols for participation were fashioned to guide the collaborative network process. 
Policy development, led primarily by the small group (consisting of 30 stakeholders), is 
brought to the plenary (large) group for final consideration and approval. Members are 
guided through agendas set by chair and the LAWF trustees (three members of the small 
group). Researcher observations and interview data revealed that the independent chair 
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served an important role as ‘broker’ of the collaborative. The chair’s persuasive influence 
fostered collaboration among network actors helping to facilitate consensus on a wide 
range of policy recommendations.  
 With respect to incentives for ongoing stakeholder engagement, interview 
findings suggest that the Ministers’ imprimatur for LAWF acted as an incentive for non-
state actors to participate and remain at the table. Specifically, the ministers at the time 
emphasized that LAWF was the “go to” forum for developing consensus-based 
freshwater policies. This commitment by government ministers helped lend legitimacy to 
the LAWF process and discourage stakeholders from meeting separately with 
government officials to forward their own agendas.  
  Shaped through continuous interactions, collaborative learning, and strong 
leadership, the LAWF network process helped create strong horizontal connections or 
ties among non-state actors and deepen trust, commitment, and shared narrative in the 
freshwater space. Generation of social capital allowed network actors to interact with 
each other in new ways to achieve collective ends. Hence, through these collaborative 
arrangements, LAWF was able to move beyond the bureaucratic and political inertia that 
had plagued previous efforts to formulate new water policies.  
  To compare, the collaborative process that formed around Oregon’s Integrated 
Water Resources Strategy convened state and non-state actors to define water problems, 
frame solutions, and provide policy recommendations to decision makers and 
bureaucrats. One major distinction between the two cases was the role of state actors in 
the policy network. In Oregon, the collaborative PAG process was led by the primary 
state actor, the Water Resources Department. This was in contrast to the New Zealand 
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case where LAWF worked alongside state actors; however, it operated as an autonomous 
organization with independent staff. OWRD provided dedicated staff to manage the 
Strategy development process with assistance from other state and federal agencies. In 
contrast to the New Zealand case, Oregon utilized an independent facilitator hired on 
contract, rather than appointing a chairperson to lead and facilitate the meetings. During 
the second round of the Policy advisory group meetings held in 2016, OWRD staff 
facilitated the meetings to update the Strategy. 
  Similar to New Zealand, Oregon’s collaborative network operated under a set of 
mutually acceptable principles, rules, and norms. The terms for consensus-based decision 
making, information sharing among network members, project team and facilitator roles, 
along with agency and commission roles were discussed and adopted by the PAG. The 
advisory group met regularly for two years to share information, transfer knowledge, 
promote mutual understanding, and build relationships. During the two-year process, 
non-state actors developed horizontal ties that allowed for development of some 
consensus-based policies around water issues. Ultimately, this process was transformed 
into a series of policy recommendations that formed the basis of the Integrated Water 
Resources Strategy.  
  Two important points of distinction between the cases are also worth noting. First, 
in the New Zealand case, LAWF was an ongoing process that enabled development of 
long-term relationships, trust, and social capital among network actors that might not 
have occurred outside of the network process. Although there was no formal agreement 
preventing actors from leaving the network, direct lobbying outside the LAWF process 
was discouraged by government ministers, serving to limit points of policy access. In 
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contrast, Oregon’s policy advisory group was chartered by the government and disbanded 
after the Strategy document was adopted. It did not transition into an ongoing, 
independent deliberative body as was the case in New Zealand. Another policy advisory 
group was formed in 2016 to advise state actors on Strategy policy updates; however, this 
effort was short-lived and engaged different actors from the previous incarnation. Lack of 
continuity and consistency among non-state policy actors were raised during the case 
study interview process. Second, stakeholders who participated in Oregon’s collaborative 
policy process continued interactions with legislators and agency staff throughout the 
collaborative process, thus affording non-state actors multiple points of access to the 
policy process. This utilization of multiple points of access to the policy process was 
discouraged in New Zealand case. 
  The research findings highlight that the New Zealand case exhibited the ability to 
reach consensus on a wider range of water policies than the Oregon case. This may be 
attributed to a number of factors, including the durability of the network, strong 
leadership, incentives for stakeholders to participate, or legal and institutional constraints 
that are discussed in more detail in question 5 below.Figure 6.1 presents a diagram 
depicting comparative water policy drivers in the two case studies. Both countries utilize 
national legislation and policies for freshwater management; however, there is much less 
room for sub-national interpretation and standard setting in the United States compared to 
New Zealand. The color shows the range of flexibility with red signifying strict 
implementation. In contrast to the United States, the nature of the Resources Management 
Act in New Zealand is to provide a national template but allow regional governments a 
fair amount of flexibility in setting water quality standards and allocation schemes. 
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Research Question #4, Democratic Anchorage: How are these networks held 
accountable to the public? To what extent are the networks democratically 
anchored? 
To review the concept of democratic anchorage, Sorensen and Torfing (2005) 
posit that “governance networks are democratically anchored to the extent that they are 
properly linked to different political constituencies and to a relevant set of democratic 
norms that are part of the democratic ethos of society” (p. 201). The authors (Sorensen 












































































 control by democratically elected politicians; 
 accountable to the territorially defined citizenry; 
 representative of the membership base of the participating groups and    
             organizations; and  
 following the democratic rules specified by a particular grammar of                
              conduct.   
Applying these criteria, the research illustrates that both case studies were democratically 
anchored; however, the New Zealand case demonstrated lower levels of transparency and 
public accountability. 
  New Zealand’s collaborative network process was endorsed and supported by 
democratically-elected politicians (cabinet ministers who also serve as members of 
parliament). The network was accountable to New Zealand citizens mainly through 
linkages with elected ministers; however, LAWF members are unelected representatives 
of iwi, stakeholders, and special interest groups. One could arguably point out that even 
though LAWF members are not directly answerable to the public, they are accountable to 
their own constituencies and members of their participating organizations. Finally, 
LAWF developed and followed specific rules of conduct that were endorsed by the entire 
group. These guidelines serve as the formal rules of conduct for network decision 
making. It is important to note that the network members were self-selecting, and it is 
unclear how actors gained access to these positions. Some scholars have characterized 
LAWF as a group of policy elites (Eppel, 2014), which might suggest the potential for 
power imbalances due to varying degrees of access to knowledge and resources among 
the members.  
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 Oregon’s collaborative process was similarly supported by democratically-
elected politicians (legislators and the governor). In contrast to the New Zealand case 
where LAWF participation occurred through a self-selecting process, OWRD identified 
participating groups and individuals for inclusion in the collaborative process. In both 
versions of the PAG (2012 and 2016), the Oregon Water Resource Department Director’s 
Office contacted special interest and stakeholder groups to solicit names for the PAG. 
The Director also conferred with counterparts at the three other state agencies (Oregon 
Department of Agriculture, Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, Oregon 
Department of Fish and Wildlife) and the Governor’s Office. The intent was to find 
perspectives from all types of water quantity and water quality categories -- conservation, 
tribes, public interest groups, municipalities, special districts, irrigated agriculture, 
nurseries, cattlemen, dairy industry, counties, etc. The other consideration, however, was 
geographical diversity. The Water Resources Director’s office then contacted individuals 
asking whether they would be willing to serve as individuals, not industry 
representatives. The final step was a letter of appointment from the Director to the 
prospective PAG member (personal communication with OWRD staff, March 12, 2017).  
  It is important to note that the effort to select individuals who did not represent a 
constituency was particularly strong in the 2016 PAG reconvening. Advocacy groups 
were only afforded a seat at the table through a volunteer representative rather than a staff 
person to serve on the PAG. OWRD sought participants that would not be representing a 
particular stakeholder group, but rather individual viewpoints. It appears that the 
agency’s aim was to reduce political posturing in the PAG; however, this discounts the 
fact that policy recommendations may eventually be delivered through legislative bills 
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and budget packages that must be shepherded through the political system. 
  The Oregon collaborative process was accountable to citizens through linkages 
with elected politicians, government staff, and gubernatorial-appointed Water Resources 
Commission members who ultimately adopted the Strategy. The Strategy project staff 
hosted workshops, open houses, and public surveys, and consulted with additional 
stakeholder groups not directly involved in the PAG to solicit feedback on the Strategy. 
Reports and updates were delivered to elected officials at legislative public hearings and 
information sessions, and through interaction with the Governor’s office. In addition, the 
process was accountable to the membership of the participating groups and organizations. 
Prior to reaching consensus on policy recommendations, network actors communicated 
and consulted with their members and constituencies. Finally, the Oregon collaborative 
process developed and followed specific rules of conduct endorsed by the entire group.  
  Both cases afforded a greater diversity of voices in the water policy framing 
process than through either parliamentary or legislative processes (Sorensen and Torfing, 
2007). However, a key distinction was public access to information appeared to be a 
more opaque process in New Zealand than in Oregon. As a researcher who had become 
familiar with the LAWF process, I found it challenging to access information about 
future meetings or discussion documents. Although the meetings were not closed to the 
public, they were not widely advertised. This may be due to the fact that LAWF was not 
considered a government agency, although their efforts were supported, in part, by 
government funding. In contrast, information about Oregon’s process was easy to access, 
and all meeting agendas and materials were posted on the agency’s website. 
Opportunities for public comment were included at each Policy advisory group meeting, 
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and several rounds of open houses and surveys were conducted to solicit public input 
during Oregon’s Strategy development process. 
 
 Research Question #5, Water Governance Institutions: How fully are surface water 
and groundwater, water quality and quantity, and land use integrated in 
management systems under New Zealand and Oregon governance structures?  
  Reflecting on the issue of water governance, New Zealand’s underlying water 
governance and institutional framework created a greater opportunity for integration 
between water quality, quantity, and land use. New Zealand’s Parliament and Ministries 
establish the policy framework for water management, whereas the Resource 
Management Act (1991) serves as the primary legislation for water governance (Eppel, 
2014). Responsibility for achieving policy outcomes and implementing integrated water 
management lies with New Zealand’s regional governments (Eppel, 2014). These 
regional governments, known as regional councils, are organized by catchment (or 
watershed), and are responsible for planning and managing water quality, quantity, and 
land use decisions through development of regional freshwater plans and issuance of 
resource consents. Regional freshwater plans contain policies that make direct 
connections between land use changes and impacts to water resources.  
  New Zealand’s regional governance framework sets clear authority for 
sustainable management of water quantity, quality, and land use, and lends itself to 
integrated water management. Accordingly, the regional elected body is responsible for 
developing and adopting freshwater plans that provide policy directives for managing 
water quality and quantity, mitigating soil erosion, flood control, harbor navigation, 
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pollution control, and surrounding coastal areas. Territorial authorities (local districts and 
city councils) provide the actual delivery of infrastructure around water, wastewater, and 
stormwater, along with controlling the effects of land use on local water bodies. These 
local authorities must operate within the legal context of the regional freshwater plans.  
  In sum, New Zealand offers a nested water governance framework involving 
central, regional, and local governments that aims to avoid duplication or overlapping 
jurisdictions. As discussed earlier, a key limiting factor of New Zealand’s water 
governance framework has been a lack of strong central directives resulting in a 
patchwork of regional water policies rather than a fragmented governance system. The 
LAWF collaborative process was convened to develop and promote central policies to 
overcome this shortcoming. 
  In contrast to New Zealand, Oregon’s water management system is much more 
fragmented, with compartmentalized agencies that exhibit individual policy authority. 
Oregon’s water governance regime represents a paradox of horizontal governance 
intersecting with vertical authority. To illustrate, water quality is guided by the Clean 
Water Act, a top-down federal policy, and managed by three separate state agencies, the 
Department of Environmental Quality, Department of Agriculture, and Department of 
Forestry. All three state agencies receive direction from distinct citizen and stakeholder-
led boards and commissions, and operate under a patchwork of legal and policy 
directives. Drinking water quality is overseen by the Oregon Health Authority under yet a 
different federal law, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and with a distinct state regulatory 
framework. Additionally, the management and delivery of water and wastewater services 
occurs through city and county governments, private and public utilities, and thousands 
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of special districts, many with overlapping jurisdictions. 
  Regarding water quantity, surface water and groundwater are regulated and 
managed by the same agency, the Oregon Department of Water Resources. Yet, the legal 
framework was developed sequentially without integration in mind. Oregon has been 
regulating surface water since 1909, whereas groundwater did not fall under state 
jurisdiction until 1955. When surface water availability began to wane, water users began 
turning to groundwater for their water source, motivating lawmakers to adopt 
groundwater regulations (Bastasch, 2006.) The Department is supposed to manage 
groundwater and surface waters conjunctively
22
 if it determines that the two are 
hydraulically connected (Amos, 2009). Although Oregon is ahead of many Western 
states in recognizing connections between surface and ground water, the existing 
groundwater management system tends to be reactive rather than predictive (Amos, 
2009). Lack of sufficient scientific data about groundwater availability is cause for 
concern about the state’s ability to manage surface water and groundwater in an effective 
and integrated manner. The need for more robust data to ensure proper management of 
the state’s water resources was raised repeatedly during the Oregon participant 
interviews. 
  Finally, under Oregon law, the availability of water and potential impacts to water 
quality are supposed to be considered as part of Oregon’s land use planning program. 
Under state regulations, the Water Resources Department and the Department of Land 
                                                 
22 Conjunctive management refers to where surface water and groundwater are considered a connected 
system and managed as such.  
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Conservation and Development are tasked with ensuring land use compatibility and water 
availability. However, local land use planners often lack sufficient information about 
availability of water resources to make long-term decisions. In Oregon, better 
coordination is still needed to ensure conjunctive management of groundwater and 
surface water, integrated management between water quality and quantity, and greater 
connection between land use and impacts to water resources.  
 
Research Question #6, Barriers to Success: What are the legal, political, and 
institutional barriers
23
 affecting water governance in New Zealand and Oregon? 
  Research revealed that both case studies faced barriers to success in delivering 
integrated water management. In the New Zealand case, overlapping authority and 
jurisdiction among national-level government agencies was identified by key informants 
as a barrier to consistent policy setting. To address this concern, the New Zealand 
government formed an inter-agency water directorate in 2012 in an attempt to overcome 
fragmentation and provide coordinated advice to Ministers on freshwater reforms. The 
directorate includes representatives from Ministry for the Environment, the Ministries of 
Primary Industries and Business, Innovation and Employment, and the Departments of 
Conservation and Internal Affairs, Treasury, the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, and the Office of Treaty Settlements. Discussions with key informants suggest 
that communication and coordination around freshwater policies has improved with 
                                                 
23 In this report, use of the term institutional barriers refers to governance arrangements, regulatory 
frameworks, resources, and culture that may serve as barriers to integrated approach to water management.  
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adoption of this formalized interagency coordinating group. 
  Another barrier identified in the New Zealand case study was weak scope of 
network authority. Although LAWF played a leading role in policy development, its 
authority around policy prioritization and implementation is limited. Ultimately, New 
Zealand’s elected politicians and government institutions are responsible for adopting and 
implementing LAWF’s policy recommendations and as described previously. Decisions 
around which LAWF policies to adopt and implement forward reside with central 
government ministers and ministry staff. Even though LAWF viewed itself as an 
autonomous network governance institution supported with independent staff, ultimate 
authority and power reside with state actors as they maintain legal controls and functions 
(McGuire and Agranoff, 2010).  
 The manifestation of this tension played out recently when government Ministers 
rejected LAWF’s recommendations on water quality standards and proposed an 
alternative policy path. After the government released its Clean Water package in late 
February 2017, a major stakeholder representing conservation and environmental 
interests pulled out of the collaborative process citing that “...we have considerable good 
will towards the intent of the collaborative governance process, and towards fellow 
Forum members who we have worked alongside over the last nine years. But good faith 
from the Government is an essential component that is required for this process to work, 
and without that we are left with no choice but to withdraw” (Royal Forest and Bird 
Protection Society of New Zealand letter to Minister Nick Smith, March 6, 2017). About 
a year prior, another key conservation stakeholder group had pulled out for similar 
reasons. Tensions between LAWF and the government remain high and it appears that 
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government actions have eroded trust between LAWF and the central government.    
  In reflecting on this recent turn of events, several factors may have led to this 
tension. Possible causalities include unrealistic expectations by network actors around 
their ability to affect government decisions, unclear lines of communication between 
LAWF and government officials, and a lack of social capital between LAWF and the 
government. In regards to this latter causal factor, even though government ministers 
vested LAWF with authority for freshwater reform policy guidance (a role traditionally 
held by the ministries), turf battles ensued with ministry officials. Discussions with key 
informants and direct observations indicate that there were tensions around who had the 
policy lead on some issues. Perhaps another key factor to consider is whether LAWF’s 
collaborative process can be sustained with cyclical changes in stakeholder organizational 
representatives, elected ministers, chief ministerial policy staff, and senior executives, 
including LAWF personnel. Although LAWF has made substantial progress in forming 
consensus around integrated water policies, this recent turn of events highlights the effect 
of political constraints in the New Zealand’s case.   
 With respect to the Oregon case, document reviews, personal observations, and 
key informant interviews exposed several challenges to achieving integrated water 
policies and management through the collaborative process. First and foremost, Western 
water law (the legal doctrine of prior appropriation) poses a significant legal barrier to 
developing innovative solutions to managing water quantity. In the West, water rights are 
closely associated with property rights. The interview data revealed that some interest 
groups initially were wary of the collaborative Strategy development process. These 
interests were concerned that Integrated Water Resources Strategy would facilitate 
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changes to Western water law and threaten their water rights. Thus, up front in the 
collaborative policy making process, participants discussed keeping changes to Western 
water law ‘off the table.’ Once stakeholders received assurances that the collaborative 
process would not undermine existing water rights, there was greater opportunity for 
engagement from all parties.  
  With that said, the intransigent nature of Western water law remains a major 
limitation to water policy innovation in Oregon. For example, even though Oregon has 
one of the most advanced water conservation programs in the West, conserving water for 
in-stream flows remains challenging because prior consumptive claims have precedence 
over newer in-stream claim supporting conservation and wildlife purposes. To provide 
for in-stream flows, OWRD must make a determination that a new conserved water right 
will not injure (or diminish) an existing water right (Amos, 2009). Then, even if the 
conserved water right is granted, the priority date will be junior to other water rights in 
the basin, thus posing a constraint to reserving water in-stream for non-consumptive uses.  
Second, interview findings highlighted concerns that managing water quality and 
quantity in a fragmented governance framework still hinders the ability to achieve 
integrated water management in Oregon. Although the collaborative Strategy process 
improved coordination and collaboration between the core state agencies dealing with 
water, institutional barriers to integration persist. In other words, the Strategy document 
provided policy guidance but failed to address the underlying fragmented governance 
structure. It did not set up a formal system for ongoing coordination among public 
agencies or reorganize the structure.  
  Oregon’s water governance framework is highly complex as shown previously in 
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Figure 5.2. At the state level, this includes ten state agencies with administrative and 
regulatory functions to manage water in Oregon. As early as 1955, the Legislature 
recognized the need for coordinated basin plans to address resource management 
challenges on a watershed basis. However, as mentioned in the Oregon case study, 
responsibility for natural resource interagency and intergovernmental coordination 
resides with the Governor’s Natural Resource Policy Advisor. In addition to receiving 
guidance from the Governor’s office, all of these state agencies receive direction from 
gubernatorial-appointed citizen governing boards, except for the Office of Energy, the 
Division of State Lands (governed by the State Land Board) and the Watershed 
Enhancement Board (which is comprised largely of the chairs of the other boards and 
commissions). These boards and commissions can be influenced by special interests, 
creating tension between vertical lines of authority (from the governor and legislature) 
and horizontal (clients and special interests). 
 Although it is still early in the Strategy implementation process, the case study 
research findings suggest that the fragmented nature of Oregon’s water governance 
structure poses significant constraints to implementation. Although a collaborative 
network approach created stronger bonds among both state and non-state actors, 
sustaining these ties remains a challenge. While addressing these organizational barriers 
was outside the scope of the collaborative network process, overcoming these silos is 
necessary to deliver integrated water management in Oregon.  
  Third, another key constraint to integrated water management is inadequate 
funding and resources. A consistent theme that emerged throughout the research data was 
the need for stable funding for state agency personnel, data collection and management, 
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and consistent implementation of water programs. Oregon’s budget for natural resource 
programs has not kept up with growing demands and increasing population. Escalating 
pressures on Oregon’s water resources require stable staffing and program oversight, 
more sophisticated and coordinated data, and greater investments in coordinated 
management systems. Oregon’s collaborative network process did provide greater 
cohesion among the state natural resource agencies for water-related legislative budget 
requests. Since the Strategy was adopted in 2012, many of the agency water-related 
budget requests are linked to specific Strategy recommendations. Case study research 
revealed that the collaborative network process fostered greater legitimacy for legislative 
budget requests, and stronger ties among state agencies involved in water programs.  
   Fourth, Oregon maintains a long history of conflict around water. Deep- rooted 
value divides among vested water interests proved challenging to overcome through the 
collaborative process. Even though the collaborative network helped build greater levels 
of mutual understanding and trust, resolving intractable water issues requires sustained 
levels of leadership, political will, and social capital. Similar to the New Zealand case, 
Oregon faces ongoing tension between economic and ecological uses of water that are 
difficult to resolve through the collaborative process. This theme emerged strongly 
through the interview data as respondents cited high levels of frustration around the 
inability to resolve these long-standing value conflicts. Constraining factors to resolution 
include fragmented water governance, entrenched interests, power imbalances, and lack 
of political will and leadership. 
 In closing, both cases exhibited some constraints that hinder the ability to deliver 
integrated water management effectively. Policy and governance constraints identified 
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through the case study research include deep seated histories of conflict, intractable legal 
and institutional arrangements that create barriers, political uncertainty, bureaucratic 
inertia, imbalances of power and resources, and unstable and inadequate funding. In 
addition, lack of shared expectations about how policy recommendations from the 
collaborative process will affect governmental decisions around implementation 
downstream emerged as a barrier.  
 
Research Question #7, Climate Change and Scarcity: How did issues such as climate 
change and water scarcity influence approaches to water management? 
  In both New Zealand and Oregon, change in climate is already occurring. 
Warming temperatures, changes in precipitation and runoff, and sea level rise have 
affected and will likely continue to affect water supply and quality. Changes to 
our water resources affect many sectors including agriculture, infrastructure, human 
health, energy production, and ecosystems (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, n.d.). 
During the key informant and LAWF participant interviews for the New Zealand case, I 
probed the climate change issue and found that it did not feature prominently as a policy 
driver in the freshwater reform process. Water scarcity, however, emerged an issue of 
concern due to over-allocation of water consents in some areas of the country. Although 
climate change did not emerge as a predominant theme from the interview data, it was 
identified as a concern in several Land and Water Forum reports. For example, the third 
report of the Land and Water Forum (2012) cited needing to manage the likely effects of 
climate change with this targeted recommendation: “catchment-based limits should be set 
as plan rules that define the quantity and reliability of water that is available for 
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allocation (the allocable quantum) and that take into account any flow and water level 
fluctuations caused by seasonal or other climate variations” (Land and Water Forum, 
2012, p. 42). Their fourth report referenced climate change effects and water scarcity, 
mainly in the context of addressing over-allocation and meeting future supplies. 
Alternatively, in the Oregon case, climate change and water scarcity emerged via 
document reviews and interview data as a prominent influencing factor in development of 
Oregon’s integrated water policies. In addition, research on the strategy’s enabling 
legislation, HB 3369, revealed that concern about climate change and scarcity served as a 
major driver for seeking ways to integrate water management. The bill language 
specifically identifies climate change in both the preamble and substantive sections of the 
bill (section 44(3)(D)(I)). HB 3369 calls for “continuous monitoring of climate change 
effects on Oregon’s water supply and for recommendations regarding the water user 
actions that are necessary to address climate change” (ORS 536.220). The strategy 
identifies climate change as one of four cross-cutting issues of “vital importance” to 
Oregon’s water future along with groundwater, funding, and institutional coordination 
(Oregon Water Resources Department, 2012, p. 4). Highlighting climate change as a key 
concern, the Strategy calls for several recommendations including supporting continued 
basin-scale climate change research efforts, and assisting with climate change adaptation 
and resiliency strategies (Oregon Water Resources Department, 2012, p. 76). Drought 
preparation also became a larger focus in the 2016 PAG process due to the hot, dry 
summer of 2016 that heightened awareness about water scarcity issues. This comparison 
reveals that climate change played a more prominent role as a policy driver in the Oregon 
case than in the New Zealand case. 
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  In sum, I have provided an in-depth comparative analysis of collaborative 
network governance processes in New Zealand and Oregon. One surprising aspect of this 
research study is that neither collaborative network model resulted in true power-sharing 
arrangements as found under a New Public Governance framework. While recognizing 
that these two case studies showed a shift from vertical structures of policy framing to 
horizontal structures, the transition to policy implementation proved challenging under a 
network governance approach for a variety of reasons described above.  
6.2 Additional Observations from the Case Study Analysis 
 One of the benefits that can result from case study research, or any research that 
is deeply imbedded in context and based on inductive logic, is the possibility that 
findings related to topics beyond the original research questions may arise. In this 
instance, the role of indigenous water rights and tribal treaty obligations in integrated 
water management emerged as an issue that needs further attention. In particular, tribal 
perspectives in water management have not yet been well institutionalized in either case 
and warrant more attention than provided here. Based on the research and personal 
observations, I will briefly touch on tribal water governance issues germane to network 
governance approaches to integrated water management. 
Comparison of Native Community Role in Integrated Water Management 
  With respect to involvement of native communities in integrated water 
management, there are stark differences between the underlying legal and institutional 
frameworks in the two cases. In New Zealand, the government entered into a formal 
relationship with Māori under the Treaty of Waitangi signed in 1840. The Treaty 
provides the legal foundation for the Crown-Māori relationship in New Zealand, 
 209 
 
including use of land and natural resources. Many years later, the government set up the 
Waitangi Tribunal as a permanent commission of inquiry that makes recommendations 
on claims brought by Māori relating to Crown actions which breach promises made in the 
Treaty of Waitangi (Te Ara: New Zealand Encyclopedia). In New Zealand, similar to 
tribal relations in the United States, iwi deal directly with the central government for 
resolving water issues, although each iwi negotiates independently with the government 
based on their ancestral history, lands, and grievances.  
  The Land and Water Forum took on addressing iwi rights and interests as part of 
their policy charge and released a series of supportive recommendations in their reports. 
In addition, iwi as network partners were well represented on the Forum. Throughout 
their deliberations, LAWF emphasized that iwi rights and interests in fresh water need to 
be resolved between iwi and the Crown, thus recognizing the special role that iwi play in 
New Zealand’s legal framework. LAWF’s recommendations underscore that as Treaty 
partners, the Crown and iwi should reflect on the Forum’s statement on iwi rights and 
interests in fresh water and seek a resolution that strengthens water quality limits, and 
ensures that any water rights provided to iwi comport with rights of other users (Land and 
Water Forum Third Report, 2012). This recommendation reflects the underlying tensions 
about making an across the board allocation of water rights to iwi (e.g., 10 percent 
allocation for each catchment). As of spring 2017, the New Zealand government had yet 
to develop an overarching policy for resolving iwi water rights.  
Interestingly, while the Crown and the Iwi Leaders Group are still in discussions 
about a national policy for addressing iwi rights and interests, regional councils are moving 
ahead and developing individually tailored approaches for addressing this issue in their 
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catchment areas. I observed that both central and regional governments are making greater 
efforts to include iwi in meaningful engagement and collaboration in the freshwater space. 
Some regions have implemented co-governance arrangements established as part of Treaty 
settlements, whereas other regions are experimenting with different power-sharing 
approaches on a voluntary basis. However, it is important to note that Treaty settlements at 
the central government level (or the anticipation of them) are very important drivers in these 
voluntary arrangements.  
  As explained earlier in this paper, federally recognized Indian tribes in the United 
States are sovereign nations in that they possess the ability to govern themselves within 
the United States. Tribes engage on a government-to-government basis with the federal 
government. The federal Native American trust responsibility resides with the United 
States government to protect tribal treaty rights, lands, assets, and resources. With that 
said, tribal reserved water rights are adjudicated in state courts under the McCarran 
Amendment, and thereby water issues are resolved on a case-by-case basis. This poses 
challenges to institutionalizing the role of tribal governments around integrated water 
policies as there are no overarching state-wide policies for address tribal water issues.  
  In the Oregon network process, a tribal representative served on the Policy 
Advisory Group to ensure a tribal perspective in development of the Strategy. It is 
uncertain if the PAG reached out to all of Oregon’s federally recognized tribes to solicit 
input. On the administrative side, there are ongoing relationships between Oregon’s 
natural resource agencies and tribal governments. These relationships were specifically 
recognized in the Strategy document along with the following issues of tribal interest 
regarding integrated water management: environmental justice, water needs and water 
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rights, water quality monitoring and watershed restoration and management (Oregon 
Water Resources Department, 2012). Moving forward, it will be important to ensure 
integration of tribal interests across boundaries, especially around the issue of addressing 
unresolved tribal water rights.  
  In sum, New Zealand’s unique model has an opportunity to serve as a leader in 
reconciling management of freshwater resources with indigenous rights. The government has 
demonstrated some policy leadership and support of this bi-cultural approach to integrated 
water management. A partnership-based decision-making approach could result in more 
efficient and ultimately, more effective freshwater outcomes. In both cases, enhancing tribal 
voices in these freshwater discussions brings unique and important perspectives, as 
waterways are not just resources to be managed and developed, but places full of meaning for 
past, current, and future generations.  
6.3 Building on Network Governance Theory 
The proposition at risk posited that collaborative networks involving public, 
private, and non-profit actors are better equipped than government-driven efforts to 
develop effective and durable outcomes. This involves a shift from a top-down, vertical 
command and control governance approaches to a shared governance network that 
employs horizontal ties with partner organizations and interest groups. Testing this 
proposition, what can we learn from these two case studies? Did these collaborative 
network structures make a difference? Developing a holistic theory would be imprudent 
based on two case studies; however, I offer observations for refining and improving 
existing network governance theoretical constructs.  
  The findings from this comparative case study research suggest that collaborative 
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network governance works well for framing and designing new integrated water policies 
through the process of information sharing, creating mutual understanding, building trust, 
and creating social capital. With respect to transitioning these policies into action through 
government-sponsored programs, the network governance framework proved 
challenging, albeit for different reasons in each case study. Both efforts relied on factors 
outlined in network governance theory such as transfer of knowledge and relationship 
building, building of trust and social capital, and democratic anchorage. Institutional 
arrangements and the lack of sufficient social and political capital posed challenges to 
implementing integrated water policies in these case studies and were not well 
documented in the literature. The New Zealand case was unable to institutionalize 
network authority, resulting in selective implementation by government while Oregon 
failed to address institutional fragmentation and lacked solid political leadership despite 
developing consensus around a statewide integrated water resources strategy. More 
detailed observations are presented below. 
  Research findings in the New Zealand case study showed that an ongoing 
collaborative network offers benefits to creating consensus on complex water issues. 
LAWF provided an opportunity to build long-term relationships among non-state actors 
and succeeded in moving policy conversations forward where previous government-led 
efforts had failed. By creating a shared history and collaborative experience, LAWF 
enabled non-state actors to form strong ties, build trust, and high levels of internal social 
capital. Consistent, long-term relationships and influential leadership within the 
collaborative contributed to this success. However, relationships with government 
exhibited weaker ties that translated into a lack of sufficient political capital and goodwill 
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to implement a number of consensus-based water policies. Figure 6.2 depicts these 
arrangements under the New Zealand network governance policy framework.  
Some LAWF members had high expectations that the collaborative, consensus-
based policy recommendations would translate into implementation, and it appears that 
the government support for this happening weakened over time. Other weak links 
included revolving government actors, weakening political legitimacy with government, 
and reliance on goodwill of government decision makers. This case study illustrates that 
since LAWF lacked authority for policy implementation, it needed to build stronger 
social and political capital with government institutions to ensure successful 
implementation.    
  In contrast, the Oregon case developed a collaborative network that was 
specifically set up to develop policies; it was time-limited and never intended to deliver 
or oversee implementation. When it reconvened to look at targeted implementation issues 
several years later, institutional knowledge about the prior collaboration and its outputs 
were lost because the actors changed. This resulted in weaker ties, and lower levels of 
trust and social capital among stakeholders. In addition, Oregon lacked strong leadership 
within the collaborative to broker challenging policy issues. Finally, one state agency was 
tasked with responsibility for stewarding the integrated water management process, but 
lacked broad authority for implementation or coordination with other agencies. Figure 6.3 
depicts these dynamics under the Oregon network governance policy framework.  
Despite receiving strong political support from both the legislature and governor 
in the Oregon case, translating these recommendations into action proved challenging 
given the underlying legal and institutional constraints. Dealing with the hurdle of the 
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prior appropriation doctrine, fragmented water governance structures, and overlapping 
spatial jurisdictions with weak coordination necessitates strong political leadership to 








6.4 Summary  
 By conducting in-depth analysis on these two network governance cases, I have 
provided new insights on the efficacy of collaborative networks in developing and 
delivering integrated water management. Both cases feature promising aspects, along 
with limitations, for generating new water policies and promoting integrated water 
management. This comparison revealed a similar dynamic in both cases in that the 
network processes fostered a shared understanding of complex water problems, and 
enabled a collective and collaborative process to develop new water policies. However, 
implementation constraints posed challenges for delivering integrated water management 
on the ground.   
 In conclusion, both collaborative network cases exhibited areas of tension created 
by the intersection of horizontal and vertical governance structures. While network 
governance can facilitate state and non-state actors working together to address 
intractable water problems, the lines of authority and power need to be clearly defined 
and articulated up front. In the case of New Zealand, actors within the LAWF network 
exhibited strong internal bonds, but weak ties with government constrained the effective 
delivery of water policy outcomes. In the Oregon case, the collaborative network between 
state and non-state actors exhibited stronger ties, however, the ability to make innovative 
changes was hindered by a shorter operational time frame, a fragmented water 
governance framework, intractable legal constraints, deep-seated value conflicts, and 
limited leadership. In the next chapter, I will share final conclusions and insights 
regarding the role of networks in integrated water management, and areas for future 
research exploration.   
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER POLICY 
RESEARCH 
   Integrated water management is a wicked public policy problem with no clear 
path to resolution. In this dissertation, I have studied and comparatively analyzed two 
collaborative governance processes created to tackle complex water problems in New 
Zealand and Oregon, U.S.A. Both cases convened a wide range of state and non-state 
actors in efforts to find common ground, build consensus for change, and develop 
innovative water policy solutions to guide subsequent implementation.  
  The goal of this comparative case study analysis was to gain a better 
understanding of network governance frameworks as applied to integrated water 
management, including the key defining elements, necessary conditions for collaboration, 
and primary factors for success. The research questions probed the role of state and non-
state policy actors, conditions for collaboration, strength of actor ties, opportunities for 
collective learning, democratic anchorage, development of trust and social capital, 
barriers to success, and the role of climate change. Several fascinating differences and 
similarities between these two cases emerged that add complexity to existing literature 
and theory.   
  Recognizing institutional differences in the two case studies, the comparative 
analysis revealed interesting similarities and differences between the two case studies as 
outlined in Table 6.3. In both cases, factors outlined in network governance literature, 
such as transfer of knowledge and relationship building, creating trust and social capital, 
and democratic anchorage were exhibited; however, new themes emerged that augment 
network governance scholarship. On the basis of these two case studies, key research 
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findings are summarized below.  
  First, one of the most striking similarities revealed by this case study research is 
that collaborative network governance worked well for framing and designing new 
integrated water policies, but encountered challenges with transitioning these policies 
into action, albeit for different reasons in each case study. Research findings revealed that 
policy making and reaching agreement around integrated water policies proved easier 
than transitioning these policies to implementation. The challenge exhibited in the New 
Zealand case was the inability to institutionalize network authority, resulting in selective 
implementation by government. This eroded trust and social capital built up over years of 
collective and collaborative engagement by state and non-state actors. In Oregon, the 
collaborative process developed new levels of trust and social capital; however, this did 
not necessarily transition through the implementation phase. In both cases, state actors 
retained decision-making authority for delivering integrated water policies and programs. 
Therefore, institutionalizing these collaborative network arrangements to help deliver 
effective integrated water outcomes may be beneficial.  
 Second, managing the complexities around the intersection of top-down, vertical 
command and control governance with horizontal collaborative approaches remains an 
on-going challenge of New Public Governance. Both cases exhibited challenges 
regarding the capacity of the governing bodies and institutions to develop power sharing 
arrangements with collaborative networks. Fragmented governance arrangements, 
underlying legal constraints, and the lack of sufficient social and political capital pose 
challenges to delivering integrated water policies in these two cases. This research 
highlights the need for additional capacity to develop clear lines of communication, 
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coordinated governance structures, integrated systems thinking, and political leadership 
to successfully deliver results around integrated water management.  
  Finally, the two cases represented examples of the use of formal and informal 
processes for policy development. New Zealand’s on-going collaborative network 
represented a formal arrangement that supported mutual learning and built capacity 
among non-state actors for developing innovative freshwater reform proposals. The 
process enabled important progress on previously intractable freshwater problems that 
might not have occurred otherwise. Oregon’s process was less formal and showed 
promise in creating a new space for dialogue, mutual learning, and knowledge transfer. 
However, the short duration of this process limited Oregon’s opportunity to build higher 
levels of trust and social capital between non-state and state actors. New Zealand’s 
ongoing collaborative forum could serve as a model for building long-term civic capacity 
and social capital, especially among non-state actors, in the integrated water management 
arena. 
Areas for Future Research 
Conducting research for this dissertation generated several ideas about areas for 
future examination. Both cases studied highlighted the importance of implementing 
integrated water management at the watershed scale. The rationale is that bottom-up 
approaches create local buy in, a sense of ownership, and locally-derived solutions that 
can address the complexity of each basin. Place-based, bottom-up collaborative 
approaches offer promise and perhaps can avoid limitations and constraints identified by 
this comparative analysis. These efforts also have the potential to deliver effective 
integrated water management outcomes by building a collaborative and inclusive process, 
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gathering information and data needs to identify knowledge gaps, examining current and 
future water needs that balance economic and environmental demands, and creating local 
integrated water resource plans. A more in-depth study of place-based planning could 
provide valuable information for policy makers about the effectiveness of these efforts in 
delivering integrated water management at the watershed scale.   
  Overcoming the complexities and challenges of managing a hybrid system of 
horizontal policy development with vertical implementation warrants additional 
investigation. During this research, moving from policy to implementation proved to be a 
constraint, and understanding the underlying causal factors were beyond the scope of this 
comparative analysis. The question remains, can a broad-based collaborative horizontal 
structure deliver when it comes to implementation of integrated water policies? If so, 
when, where and why might there be advantages or disadvantages to employing these 
networks? This is a fruitful area for future research that could provide additional insights.  
 Another area ripe for further examination is specific to the Oregon case. Given 
Oregon’s fragmented natural resource governance and regulatory framework, what is the 
best mechanism for delivering integrated water outcomes? Given the multitude of state 
agencies, organizations, and commissions involved in water management, and the lack of 
an institutionalized joint coordination body, who guides implementation of the Integrated 
Water Resources Strategy? Even with adoption of an overarching statewide vision and 
plan, the underlying fragmented governance and regulatory system poses challenges for 
delivering water outcomes holistically. Further research in New Public Governance 
theory could help foster more effective water governance frameworks for delivering 
integrated water outcomes in Oregon.  
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  Another area for future research is how culture influences collaborative 
governance approaches as this issue was not explicitly explored as part of this research. 
Finally, a more in-depth analysis of the role of indigenous perspectives in integrated 
water management warrants further exploration. New Zealand approaches indigenous 
water planning in a comprehensive manner that can serve as a model for offers for other 
governments working to incorporate tribal perspectives into natural resource planning. 
However, New Zealand is struggling to develop an overarching policy addressing iwi 
rights and interests in water. In Oregon, tribal treaty rights are dealt with on tribe by tribe 
basis, creating challenges for developing a comprehensive statewide policy. This research 
briefly touched upon tribal involvement in water policies, but given the complexities of 
this issue, a standalone study would be valuable.   
  Despite the limitations of Oregon and New Zealand’s collaborative network 
governance structures, this research supports the thesis that collaborative governance 
structures can be effective in developing policies to address wicked, multi-dimensional, 
multi-sectoral problems. Understanding the challenges and constraints associated with 
these collaborative efforts can assist other jurisdictions as they assess best policy 
practices for ensuring integrated water management. The benefits of collaborative 
governance for policy development are substantial, and the limitations appear to be 
obstacles to overcome and not fatal flaws. The main challenge lies in transitioning from 
policy and planning to applying changes on the ground affecting the way we manage 
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Appendix A: New Zealand Protocol 
 
New Zealand Case Study 
Collaborative Network Governance and Integrated Water Management  
Interview Questions 2016 
 
Hello, and thank you for agreeing to an interview. My name is Jackie Dingfelder 
and I am an Axford Fellow and doctorate student at Portland State University. As you 
may remember from my phone call/email, participation in this interview is voluntary. 
This means you may choose now not to participate, refuse to answer any question, or end 
the interview at any time. If you decide after the interview that you do not wish your 
interview to be included in the study, you can contact me and have your interview 
deleted. I will leave my contact information for you. Additionally, this interview will be 
recorded, per your approval. Recording the interview will help me ensure that I capture 
your answers more fully, but if you wish to not be recorded, that will in no way effect 
your participation in the interview process. Here is the consent form that goes into greater 
detail on the information that I have just provided to you. Please check the boxes 
accordingly and sign.  
 
  Thank you. Now I am going to ask a few questions that will help me better 
understand the integrated water governance work that is occurring in New Zealand. 
Please feel free to expand on any questions you find interesting. Any information you can 





Part I: Introduction 
1. Please describe why are you interested in water governance?  Help me understand 
why this is important to you?  
 
2. Could you tell me about your background in water management and governance?  
 
Part II: Integrated Water Resources Management 
1. What is your involvement with the Land and Water Forum? 
 
2. Could you describe how the LAWF process has worked? Why?  
a. What has been your role, or your organization’s role, in the LAWF process? 
b. What values or interests do you or your organization represent? 
 
3. In your view, what have been the successes and challenges with developing and 
implementing freshwater reforms through an integrated strategy? Why? 
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4. What is your view on a locally-based collaborative approaches? 
 
Part III: Network and Collaborative Processes  
1. Can you share some lessons learned by participating in this collaborative process? 
What would you do differently? 
2. What role do you see collaborative networks (involving public, private and NGOs) 
serving in implementation of integrated water management plans or programs? 
3. How are decisions made in this process? By consensus?   
4. What, if any, tangible outcomes have you observed with the LAWF collaborative 
approach? What do you attribute these outcomes to? 
5. In your view, what are the institutional barriers to implementation? 
 
Part IV: Climate Change 
1. Do you think climate change has influenced approached to water management in New 
Zealand? Can you explain why you think that and provide some examples? 
  
2. Please explain how these changes came about. 
 
Part V: Other Contacts 
 
  1. Are there specific people I should talk to at the state and local level? If so, who are     
       they? 
 
This concludes the interview. Thank you again for your time and for participating 
in this research study. As stated in my introductory letter, if you would like to receive 
research and interview results, please email me at Jackie.dingfelder@mfe.govt.nz. Please 
notify me if you choose not to have your interview included in the final report. In 
addition, I may contact you in the next few weeks to clarify answers or confirm findings. 
If you do not wish to be contacted for follow up information, please let me know now or 
via email later. 
 
Finally, are there other individuals with whom you think I should speak?  If so, 
would you be willing to provide me with their contact information? 
 
Thank you again for your time and interest, and here is my card. Please feel free 
to contact me with any questions, comments or feedback 
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Appendix B: Oregon Interview Protocol 
 
Oregon Case Study 
Collaborative Network Governance and Integrated Water Management  
Interview Questions 2016-2017 
 
Jackie Dingfelder, Ph.D.Candidate, Portland State University 
Hatfield School of Government 
 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in my research study on integrated water 
resources management. My name is Jackie Dingfelder and I am a doctoral student at 
Portland State University at the Hatfield School of Government. As you may remember 
from my phone call/email, participation in this interview is voluntary. This means you 
may choose now not to participate, refuse to answer any question, or end the interview at 
any time. If you decide after the interview that you do not wish your interview to be 
included in the study, you can contact me and have your interview deleted. I will leave 
my contact information for you. Additionally, this interview will be recorded, per your 
approval. Recording the interview will help me ensure that I capture your answers more 
fully, but if you wish to not be recorded, that will in no way effect your participation in 
the interview process.  
 
  Thank you. Now I am going to ask a few questions that will help me better 
understand the integrated water governance work that is occurring in Oregon. Please feel 
free to expand on any questions you find interesting. Any information you can provide is 




Part I: Introduction 
3. Please describe why are you interested in water governance?  Help me understand 
why this is important to you?  
 
4. Could you tell me about your background in water management and governance?  
 
Part II: Integrated Water Resources Management 
5. What is your involvement with the Integrated Water Resources Strategy policy 
advisory committee at the state level? 
a. Were you involved in the Policy Advisory Group that provided policy 
guidance and suggestions for Oregon’s first Integrated Water Resources 
Strategy?  
b. How long have you been following this process? 
 
6. Could you describe how the IWRS process has worked? Why?  
a. What has been your role, or your organization’s role, in the IWRS process? 
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b. What values or interests do you or your organization represent? 
 
7. In your view, what have been the successes and challenges with developing and 
implementing an integrated water strategy? Why? 
 
8. What is your view on a place-based approach as proposed in the Integrated Water 
Resources Strategy? 
 
Part III: Network and Collaborative Processes  
6. Can you share some lessons learned by participating in this collaborative process? 
What would you do differently? 
7. What role do you see collaborative networks (involving public, private and NGOs) 
serving in implementation of an integrated water management or governance 
structure? 
8. How are decisions made in this process? By consensus?   
9. What, if any, tangible outcomes have you observed with the IWRS collaborative 
approach? What do you attribute these outcomes to? 
10. In your view, what are the institutional barriers to implementing the IWRS? 
 
Part IV: Climate Change 
3. Do you think climate change has influenced approached to water management in 
Oregon? Can you explain why you think that and provide some examples? 
  
4. Please explain how these changes came about. 
 
Part V: Other Contacts 
 
  1. Are there specific people I should talk to at the state and local level? If so, who are     
       they? 
 
This concludes the interview. Thank you again for your time and for participating in this 
research study. As stated in my introductory letter, if you would like to receive research 
and interview results, please email me at jding2@pdx.edu. Please notify me if you choose 
not to have your interview included in the final report. In addition, I may contact you in 
the next few weeks to clarify answers or confirm findings. If you do not wish to be 
contacted for follow up information, please let me know now or via email later. 
 
Thank you again for your time and interest. Please feel free to contact me with 
any questions, comments or feedback.   
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Appendix C: Dissertation Codebook  
 
Level 1 – Descriptors 
 Name: Interviewee 
 Position: Interviewee role in network/collaborative 
 Affiliation: Organization/interest interviewee represents 
 
Level 2 – Interview Questions 
 Q1-Intro: introduction questions 
 Q2-IWRM: involvement with  integrated strategy, LAWF or PAG, IWRS 
process description, successes and challenges 
 Q3-Network and Collaborative Processes: lessons learned, role of collaborative 
processes, decision-making process, institutional barriers 
 Q4-Climate Change: climate change influences  
 Q5-Other Contacts: snowball interviews  
 
Level 3 – Themes (sub-bullets are Level 4) 
 Accountability: The obligation of an individual or organization to account for its 
activities, accept responsibility for them, and to disclose the results in a 
transparent manner. 
o Transparency: openness of the process; a prerequisite for ability to hold 
process accountable to the public 
 Agreement: Refers to creating social acceptance to support certain policies or 
activities, and/or codifying that agreement in policy recommendations 
 Capacity: Broad reference to existing resources (or lack thereof) to get work 
done. Could be internal (e.g., member investment, facilitator/coordinator, time) or 
external (e.g., funding, staffing, etc.)  
 Climate Change: Specific references to climate change 
 Collaboration: working cooperatively to solve problems 
 Communication: act of conveying intended meaning 
o External: How the collaborative communicates with the public, 
stakeholders, other collaborative groups, or other organizations (external 
communications). 
o Internal: how the collaborative communicates internally; challenges in 
internal communication. 
o Inter-agency: communication between/among agencies 
 Conflict: This could be internal conflict within the collaborative or conflict 
between the collaborative and external groups. 
 241 
 Coordination: refers to coordination among the different actors involved in water 
management 
 Cultural: Refers to different cultural approaches to solving problems 
 Decision-making: References to the decision-making process, consensus, 
agreements 
 Environmental vs. Economic Considerations: refers to a balancing of 
environmental protection or sustainability vs. economic growth 
 Equity: Refers to balancing in-stream with out-of-stream needs; balancing 
conservation with consumptive uses 
 Formal Governance: Refers to structures, process elements, including meeting 
structure, meeting roles, rules of engagement, or meeting protocols. 
o Committee: Roles or tasks taken on by committees and committee 
members. Includes leadership committees and small groups 
o Facilitation: discussing roles, responsibilities, and other aspects of the 
facilitator, and/or chair 
o Mission statement: Reading of or referencing mission statement. 
o Goals/objectives: Reading of or referencing goals or objectives 
o Procedures: Development or application of the group charter/by-laws, 
operating procedures, and/or ground rules 
 Informal Governance: Elements that contribute to informal governance 
structures, such as trust and relationships. 
o Personality: the personality types or attributes that contribute to a good 
collaborator, or that’s necessary in a collaborative.  
o Relationship-building: Discussing relationships between members or 
members and the broader community, stakeholders, agencies, or others; 
how relationships are built, whether they exist prior to or outside of the 
collaborative group, etc.  
o Representation: Discussing who is at the table; how balanced the group 
composition is  
o Trust: Referencing the level of trust within the collaborative, trust between 
the collaborative and the local community, what trust looks like, how it’s 
cultivated, or distrust (of any of the above) 
 Fragmentation/silos: refers to actors/agencies/institutions/governments working 
in silos or isolated from each other; not part of a holistic, integrated system 
 Funding: Any specific reference to how the network/collaborative is funded; 
challenges in obtaining funding or funding for implementation of plans/programs 
 Institutional Barriers: barriers to process or implementation (i.e., policies, 
institutions, prior appropriation doctrine, laws, regulations) or lack thereof 
 Information and data needs: need for additional information or data in order to 
make informed decisions 
 Influence: refers to influence on the process or within the network 
 Integration: integration of water quality and quantity; surface water and 
groundwater; water management with land use 
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 Leadership: refers to leaders in the network or collaborative; or outside the 
process 
 Learning and knowledge transfer: sharing and transfer of information 
between/among network actors 
 Legitimacy: Reference to the validity and/or acceptance of the authority of an 
actor, institution, or decision  
 “Low hanging fruit”: refers to policies that are easy to reach agreement on  
 Market-based approaches: water pricing or trading 
 Policy: Refers to policies, regulations, laws 
 Political acceptance: how supportive ministers/legislators, stakeholders, citizens 
are of recommendations/end product 
 Prioritization: evaluating recommendations/tasks and ranking them in order of 
importance or urgency 
 Resiliency: ability to adapt to change 
 Science: Reflections on the interface with science, scientists, and research 
 Social Capital: refers to “accumulated trust, reciprocity, and durability built up 
between two or more network actors that allow for the development of human 
knowledge and political capital (Putnam, 2000)  
 Spatial Scale: Issues of water governance or management scale: regional or local 
o Place-based planning:  Oregon: place-based planning refers to water 
strategies developed at the local level that roll up to the IWRS 
o In NZ, planning occurring at the regional scale 
 Success: Discussing how successful the group has or has not been (challenges to 
success), what success looks like, and what might have been done differently 
 Technical issues: related to specific technical issues around water management 
(i.e., water quality, TMDLs, allocation, groundwater, measurement, instream 
flows, stormwater, storage, non-point source) 
o Drought and water scarcity 
o Ecological flows: water left instream for fish/ecological purposes 
o Groundwater management 
o Impaired Water Quality/TMDLs: Total Daily Maximum Loads 
o Water Management Improvements: water measurement, conservation 
efficiency, storage, acquisition 
o Water measurement 
o Water storage 
o Urban stormwater 
 Top-down vs. bottom up: refers to hierarchical, vertical vs. bottom up (locally 
driven), horizontal scheme 
 Urban vs. Rural divide: refers to differences in urban vs. rural viewpoints 
around water issues 
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Appendix D: New Zealand Land and Water Forum Membership  
 
Plenary Organizations  
 
 Aqualinc Research Ltd  
 Ballance Agri-Nutrients  
 Beef + Lamb New Zealand  
 Business NZ  
 Contact Energy  
 DairyNZ  
 ECO  
 Ecologic  
 Environmental Defence Society  
 Federated Farmers  
 Federated Mountain Clubs of NZ  
 FertResearch  
 Fonterra  
 Forest and Bird  
 Foundation for Arable Research  
 Genesis Energy  
 Horticulture New Zealand  
 Ihutai Trust  
 Institute of Public Works Engineering Australasia  
 Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand  
 Irrigation New Zealand  
 King Country Energy  
 Landcare Trust  
 Lincoln University  
 Massey University  
 Meridian Energy  
 Mighty River Power  
 MWH  
 National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research  
 Newmont Waihi Gold  
 Ngati Kahungunu  
 NZ Farm Forestry Association  
 NZ Forest Owners Association  
 NZ Institute of Forestry  
 NZ Winegrowers  
 Oji Fibre Solutions  
 Opus International Consultants Ltd  
 Pioneer Generation  
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 Rural Women New Zealand  
 Spiire  
 Straterra Inc  
 Sustainable Business Council  
Te Arawa Lakes Trust  
 Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu  
 Tourism Industry Association  
 TrustPower  
 Tuwharetoa Māori Trust Board  
 Waikato River Authority  
 Waikato-Tainui  
 Water New Zealand  
 Watercare Services Limited  
 Whitewater New Zealand  
 Wood Processors and Manufacturers Association of New Zealand  
 Zespri  
 
Small Group Organizations  
 
 Beef + Lamb New Zealand  
 Contact Energy  
 DairyNZ  
 Ecologic  
 Environmental Defence Society  
 Federated Farmers  
 Fonterra  
 Forest and Bird  
 Horticulture New Zealand  
 Irrigation New Zealand  
 Meridian Energy  
 National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research  
 Ngati Kahungunu  
 NZ Forest Owners Association  
 Te Arawa Lakes Trust  
 Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu  
 Tuwharetoa Māori Trust Board  
 Waikato-Tainui  
 Water New Zealand  





Central and Local Government Active Partners  
 
 Auckland Council  
 New Zealand Conservation Authority  
 Department of Conservation  
 Department of Internal Affairs  
 Environment Canterbury  
 Environment Southland  
 Ministry for the Environment  
 Ministry for Primary Industries  
 Otago Regional Council  
 Tasman District Council  
 Treasury  
 Waikato Regional Council  
 Wellington City Council 
  
 246 
Appendix E: Oregon Integrated Water Resources Strategy  
 
Policy Advisory Group Members 
 
First Policy Advisory Group (convened from 2009-1013):  
 
Glenn Barrett, Michael Campbell, Jay Chamberlin, John DeVoe, Dennis Doherty, Bill 
Gaffi, Patrick Griffiths, Todd Heidgerken, Tod Heisler, Teresa Huntsinger, Tracey 
Liskey, Peggy Lynch, Janet Neuman, Eric Quaempts, Mike Seppa, Lorna Stickel, 
Richard Wells, and Joe Whitworth 
  
Second Policy Advisory Group (convened from 2016-2017):  
 
Robert “Will” Collin, Suzanne DeLorenzo, Arlene Dietz, Allan Elliott, Ron Foggin, 
Rebecca Geisen, TJ Hansell, Valerie Kelley, Gayle Killam, Craig Lacy, Hiram Li, Tracey 
Liskey, Peggy Lynch, Curtis Martin, Craig Pope, Brent Stevenson, Stan van de Wetering, 
Mary Wahl 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
